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 1 
Introduction 
 
As a legal counselor for asylum-seekers, the author of this paper often experienced firsthand 
the tragic situations of her clients (mainly Chechen women), who were removed from Austria 
to Slovakia according to the European Union’s “Dublin” system. Often the respective asylum-
seeker had left Slovakia for Austria after only a short while, having learned that his1 chance 
for avoiding removal to his country of origin from Slovakia was very small. Indeed, the 
researched statistics revealed extremely low asylum recognition rates: at that time, in 2005, 
the recognition rates of refugees from the Russian Federation differed greatly between Austria 
and Slovakia. Whereas in Austria, asylum was granted in 83.9 % of the cases, the recognition 
rates for asylum in Slovakia at that time lay at 0.01 % (only one family).2 These statistics 
provided the author evidential proof of either the breakdown of the Slovakian asylum system 
or intentional ignorance in the meritorious decision-making. Furthermore, in most cases no 
other permission to stay could be sought by the refused asylum-seeker.3 Through this 
evidence, it was clear to the author that there was a high risk for the individual asylum-seeker 
to be further removed from Slovakia to his country of origin without having had access to a 
serious assessment on asylum as well as on refoulement. 
However, this statistical evidence alone as an argument against the removal of the individual 
concerned has always been rejected by the respective Austrian asylum offices responsible for 
determining the risk of refoulement when an asylum application is rejected. The asylum 
offices have always used the same counter-argumentation: the European Commission has not 
initiated any legal steps against Slovakia concerning its lack of implementation of the so-
called Regulation on Minimum Norms. Furthermore, when the Council of the European 
Union (EU) passed the Dublin Regulation, Member States guaranteed that they all adhered to 
these requirements at that time; otherwise they would not have been in a position to pass the 
Regulation. Additionally, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has posed a strict 
standard for a violation by a removal to a State of Art 3 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR). As a result of these facts, a high burden of proof regarding the safety 
presumption has been developed: a legal challenge to the safety presumption can only be 
successful when the individual concerned can bring forward a “highly substantiated claim” 
and “attested exceptional circumstances” to make additional investigations necessary or 
                                                
1 Please note that the male formulations "he", "him" and "his" used throughout this thesis refer to both male and female 
subjects, unless noted otherwise. 
2 See statistics on p. 50. 
3 Idem. 
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unsettle the principal safety presumption. The reasons claimed by the applicant must provide 
evidence of a “real risk” of persecution for the individual applicant. In this sense, neither 
general situation reports, a statistically low recognition rate nor a possible arrest if a transfer 
or a procedure does not fulfill the demands of Art 13 ECHR were enough to substantiate the 
probability of a human rights violation. The necessity for these high demands has been argued 
by the danger of having the effective implementation of the Dublin Regulation undermined by 
a lower threshold. As the author was not able to fulfill this standard of proof of the individual 
risk in any of the cases she defended, the risk of refoulement was denied, and the asylum-
seekers concerned were removed to Slovakia. 
 
Due to these experiences, the author intends in this thesis to analyze the compatibility of the 
EU’s legislation on “safe country” concepts with the principle of non-refoulement. This thesis 
will not focus on meritorious procedures, but rather on the aforementioned “Dublin” and all 
other “safe country” procedures, which do not allow for a meritorious analysis of the flight 
reasons. While the “safe country of origin” (SCO) and “safe third country” (STC) concepts in 
theory potentially offer opportunities for the genuine and fair allocation of protection 
responsibility, these concepts have in practice raised serious concerns regarding respect for 
refugees’ rights and have hence been referred to as “the most popular of […] restrictions 
imposed on asylum-seekers, and one of the most threatening to refugee rights”.4 As of yet, no 
consensus has been reached among governments, domestic courts, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and academics about basic questions such as the 
meaning of the term "safety", which has hence been a matter of legal and political 
controversy. However, the debate is not limited to definitions, but also extends to under which 
circumstances the notion of a "safe country" is legally valid.5  
This thesis’ point of departure is a definite positive removal decision that is issued in the 
course of a safe country procedure. Such a single procedure for both the asylum and the 
refoulement decision is the rule in all EU Member States (MS) except Ireland.6 Therefore, 
while the procedural distinction between the decision-making process on asylum and removal 
                                                
4 Borchelt, Gretchen, ‘The Safe Third Country Practice in the European Union: a Misguided Approach to Asylum Law and a 
Violation of International Human Rights Standards’ (2002) 33 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 473. 
5 Byrne, Rosemary and Shacknove, Andrew, ‘The Safe Country Notion in European Asylum Law’ (1996) 9 Harvard Human 
Rights Journal 188. 
6 UNHCR, Observations on the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on 
Strengthened Practical Cooperation – New Structures, New Approaches: Improving the Quality of Decision Making in the 
Common European Asylum System [COM(2006) 67 final, 17 February 2006] available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/445f0abe2.html [accessed on 12 September 2011], p. 2. 
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may legally be an issue, it is not of relevance in practice in the States in focus of this thesis.7 
In fact, the two aspects are thus two sides of the same coin: discharging the non-refoulement 
obligation requires an evaluation of the risk of harm- being also condition for a serious 
assessment of the asylum claim.  
 
Chapter I presents the two anti-poles: the EU’s legislation on “safe country” concepts (with 
example of its legislative implementation in Austria) and the principle of non-refoulement. 
Chapter II gives insight into the fact that, in its practical application, the “safe country” 
concepts have put the asylum-seekers concerned into precarious situations. Chapter III 
presents the “direct balancing approach” and the “complicity principle” as the analytical tool 
of the thesis. With their analytical support, procedural obligations for the protection of 
asylum-seekers from refoulement in the removal procedure are developed in Chapter IV. As 
the ECHR possesses the most powerful monitoring mechanism in asserting and granting 
human rights, this thesis bases its discussion on the protection from refoulement afforded by 
this human rights treaty and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. The UN Convention against 
Torture (CAT) and the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (GRC) will be 
referred to for argumentative support. Chapter V concludes by identifying incompatibilities of 
the EU’s “safe country” concepts with the principle of non-refoulement, measured by the 
developed procedural obligations.  
This study of refugees’ rights and their protection by the ECHR undertaken in the thesis is a 
novelty in its detail. Systematic legal analyses of the human rights of refugees are generally 
scarce and, hence, so too are holistic approaches to the question of States’ obligations to 
refugees. Such an analysis with a rights-based approach is necessary for States to again 
become aware of their legal obligations in the often emotionally charged discourse on 
refugees.8 
 
                                                
7 In this sense, the European Commission on Human Rights (ECommHR) found in Cemal Kemal Altun v. the Federal 
Republic of Germany for the Austrian asylum proceedings as being a single procedure that “the Austrian Ministry for the 
Interior […] found that he would risk persecution in Somalia. In the asylum proceedings, the Austrian authorities had to 
consider basically the same elements under Austrian law as the Commission must consider under Article 3”: Application no. 
10308/83, report of 5 July 1995, paras 65; emphasis added; and that “the protection by human rights treaties’ refoulement 
provisions complement and overlap with the refugee protection regime” explains for the Committee against Torture the 
references to the GRC by the ECtHR and the Human Rights Commission: Nowak, Manfred & McArthur, Elizabeth, ’The 
United Nations Convention against Torture – A Commentary’ (Oxford, 2008), 147. 
8 Gil-Bazo, Maria-Teresa, ‘The Practice of Mediterranean States in the Context of the European Union’s Justice and Home 
Affairs External Dimension: The Safe Third Country Concept Revisited’ (2006) 18 International Journal of Refugee Law 
597. 
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I. Law: EU legislation v. non-refoulement 
 
This chapter presents the two anti-poles of protection: the EU’s legislation on “safe country” 
concepts (A) and the principle of non-refoulement (B). 
 
A. The EU’s legislation  
 
In this section, after presenting an overview of the development of the EU’s asylum policy as 
is relevant for understanding the legislative and political background (1), the "safe country" 
concepts will be presented in detail (2) and Austrian legislative implementation will be 
referred to as an example (3).  
 
1. Overview of the development of the EU’s asylum policy 
 
In the early 1990s, the then European Community (later the European Union) laid out the 
basic structure of an integrated asylum policy with the “Convention Determining the State 
Responsible for Examining Applications for Asylum Lodged in One of the MS of the 
European Community” (Dublin Convention or DC) and a series of agreements known as the 
London Resolutions. The London Resolutions contain three related documents: The 
“Resolution on a Harmonised Approach to Questions Concerning Host Third Countries” 
(Resolution on Host Third Countries), the “Resolution on Manifestly Unfounded Applications 
for Asylum” (Resolution on Manifestly Unfounded Applications) and the “Conclusions on 
Countries in Which There is Generally No Serious Risk of Persecution” (London 
Conclusions).9 These documents first embraced the terminology of a “safe country of origin” 
and “safe third country” and aimed to hinder both "forum shopping" as well as "asylum-
seeker in orbit" situations, where asylum-seekers are transferred between States with no State 
willing to take responsibility for examining the substance of their claim.  
 
The Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 was the next big step in establishing a common European 
response and policy toward asylum-seekers and migrants.10 The treaty provided a detailed 
                                                
9 European Council, ‘Conclusions on Countries in Which There is Generally No Serious Risk of Persecution’ ("London 
Resolution"), 30 November 1992, Doc. 10579/92. 
10 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and 
Related Acts, 1997 Official Journal, C 340, 10 November 1997. 
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legal basis for the harmonization of common asylum and migration policies under what was 
then known as the "Third Pillar" of the EU, which regulated the area of justice and home 
affairs. The Treaty of Amsterdam amended Art 63 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community (TEC) and mandated that a number of measures be taken towards the integration 
of asylum policy among MS within five years of the treaty’s entering into force, ending on 1 
May 2004. In 1999, the European Council introduced its first multi-annual programme on the 
Common Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, the Tampere Programme, which focused on 
establishing "consistent control of external borders" and common asylum regulations.11 
 
In order to create a Common European Asylum System, as foreseen under the Tampere 
Programme, the EU adopted a number of measures to harmonise practices and policies among 
MS. The most relevant measures for the purposes of this thesis are the "Council Directive 
laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers" (Minimum Standards 
Directive)12 and the "Council Regulation establishing the criteria and mechanisms for 
determining the MS responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the MS 
by a third-country national" (Dublin Regulation or DR)13.  
 
While the London Resolutions had an unclear legal status and lacked enforcement 
mechanisms or a legal structure for implementation,14 the “Council Directive on minimum 
standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as 
refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the 
protection granted” (Qualification Directive or QD) and the “Council Directive on minimum 
standards on procedures in MS for granting and withdrawing refugee status” (Procedures 
Directive or PD) are binding for EU MS. 
  
 
                                                
11 European Council, ‘Presidency Conclusions’ (15-16 October 1999), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm. 
12 Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers, 
Official Journal L 31, 6 February 2003, pp.18-25. 
13 Council Regulation 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member 
State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national, 
Official Journal L 50, 25 February 2003, pp.1-10. 
14 Guild, Elspeth, ‘The Impetus to Harmonise: Asylum Policy in the European Union’, in Nicholson, Frances, and Twomey, 
Patrick (eds.), ‘Refugee Rights and Realities: Evolving International Concepts and Regimes’ (Cambridge/Cambridge 
University Press, 1999) 313, 323. 
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2. The “safe country” concepts  
 
A variety of “safe country” schemes have been instituted within the international protection 
regime for asylum-seekers and refugees, starting as separate national policies and ending in 
EU legislation. The “safe country” schemes encompass two different but related mechanisms: 
the “safe country of origin” and the “safe third country”.15 Within these mechanisms, asylum-
seekers are denied access to substantive refugee determination procedures in a particular State 
on the grounds that, in the first case, they are not in danger in their country of origin or, in the 
second case, they already enjoyed, could or should have requested and, if qualified, would 
actually have been granted refugee protection in another country.16 Hence, the concept of 
“safe” countries is a device meant to enable States to exclude large numbers of asylum-
seekers and refugee claimants without going into the specifics of their individual cases. While 
the “safe country of origin” concept addresses an asylum-seeker’s qualification as a refugee or 
as a person to be protected from refoulement (see further down under (B)), the “safe third 
country” concept concerns the safety of a State other than the country of origin of the asylum-
seeker.17  
According to the logic of EU legislation, the “safe country of origin” concept (a) is followed 
by the “safe third country” concept (b). The use of the notion of a "safe country" and its 
possible procedural consequences (determination and examination of safety vis-à-vis safety 
presumption, shift of burden of standard of proof and acceleration of procedure) are presented 
in the next section. 
 
a. “Safe country of origin” concepts 
 
The SCO concept is even more recent and more controversial than the concept of “safe third 
countries”. In 1990, Switzerland was the first country to adopt a SCO rule in its asylum law.18 
Today, EU legislation covers both presumably safe countries as non-EU MS (aa) or as EU 
                                                
15 The following analysis is concerned with the safe third country concept as a procedural tool for states to refuse 
responsibility for refugee status determination by transferring it to another state. This concept has to be distinguished from 
safe third country as a standard to determine whether sufficient protection exists in a particular country in order for states to 
remove individuals there for the purposes of examining their claims. In our use of the concept, states refuse to take 
responsibility for examining a protection claim, while in the other use states accept their responsibility to undertake refugee 
status determination but do not see any obligation to do so within their territory, but in transit processing centres and 
protection zones. Gil-Bazo 596.  
16 Kjaergaard, Eva, ‘The Concept of “Safe Third Country” in Contemporary European Refugee Law’ (1994) 6 International 
Journal of Refugee Law 4 651. 
17 Battjes, Hemme, ‘European Asylum Law and International Law’ (Leiden, 2006) 344 cf. Preamble recital (17) of Council 
Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and 
withdrawing refugee status, Official Journal L 326, 13 December 2005, pp.13-34. 
18 Costello, Cathryn, ‘The European Asylum Procedures Directive in Legal Context’ (UNHCR/Geneva, 2006) 4. 
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MS (bb). 
 
aa. Non-EU Member States: Procedures Directive and Qualification Directive 
 
While the SCO notion was first adopted at the EU level in the London Conclusions,19 the 
Procedures Directive is the current legal basis for this concept. When originally adopted, the 
SCO concept foresaw two modes for the designation of third countries as safe countries of 
origin. The first, set out in Art 29 PD, was a common list of safe countries of origin agreed 
upon by the EU’s Council of Ministers, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the 
European Commission and after consultation with the European Parliament.20 However, 
following a decision of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 2008, Art 29 (1) and (2) PD 
were annulled, as the procedure for the adoption of a common list of safe countries of origin 
was deemed to infringe on Community law.21 According to the ECJ, any future adoption of a 
common list of safe countries of origin must be carried out in compliance with the co-decision 
procedures stipulated by the TEC and reiterated in the Treaty on European Union (TEU), 
which establish a stronger decision-making role for the European Parliament. At the time of 
writing, no such common list has been adopted and, therefore, this thesis does not address Art 
29 PD. 
At the time of writing, the only mode for designating third countries as SCOs under the 
Procedures Directive is the second mode, set out in Art 30 PD. This permissive article sets out 
the circumstances under which MS may, at the national level, designate third countries as 
SCOs. Art 30 PD reads as follows: 
                                                
19 The EU Immigration Ministers defined a safe country of origin in Para 1 of the Conclusions as a country 
“which can clearly be shown, in an objective and verifiable way, normally not to generate refugees or where it can be clearly 
shown, in an objective and verifiable way, that circumstances which might in the past have justified recourse to the 1951 
Convention have ceased to exist.”  
According to Para 4 of the Conclusions Member States should consider the following factors in evaluating the risk of 
persecution in any country: 
”(a) Previous numbers of refugees and recognition rates; 
 (b) Observance of human rights; 
 (c) Democratic institutions; and 
 (d) Stability.” 
The Conclusions provided in Para 3 indicate that a safe country of origin determination by a Member State should not be an 
automatic bar to all asylum applications from that State, but may be used instead as justification for directing applicants into 
expedited procedures with sharply curtailed legal safeguards. For the procedure, the Resolution on manifestly unfounded 
applications allows applications to be so deemed if the asylum-seekers came from a country ‘in which in general terms no 
serious risk of persecution’ existed. 
20 While it was originally foreseen that the common list would be adopted with the Directive, as an Annex thereto, it proved 
impossible to reach the requisite unanimous agreement on the list. Hence, the PD now foresees later adoption of a common 
list, which has already failed twice. One problem in agreeing the list is that, as it “is not possible to make group or 
geographically-specific designations, in contrast to the practice of some Member States”, “Member States prefer to maintain 
their own more detailed context-sensitive lists, which are explicitly permitted under the Procedures Directive”: Costello 13. 
21 European Court of Justice, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 6 May 2008, European Parliament v. Council of the 
European Union, Official Journal C 158, 21 June 2008, pp.3-4. It must be added that, as regards the future adoption of the 
lists of safe countries and their amendment, the Council must proceed in compliance with the procedures established by the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
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“1. Without prejudice to Art 29, Member States may retain or introduce legislation that allows, in 
accordance with Annex II, for the national designation of third countries other than those 
appearing on the minimum common list, as safe countries of origin for the purposes of examining 
applications for asylum. This may include designation of part of a country as safe where the 
conditions in Annex II are fulfilled in relation to that part. 
2. By derogation from paragraph 1, Member States may retain legislation in force on 1 December 
2005 that allows for the national designation of third countries, other than those appearing on the 
minimum common list, as safe countries of origin for the purposes of examining applications for 
asylum where they are satisfied that persons in the third countries concerned are generally neither 
subject to: 
(a) persecution as defined in Art 9 of Directive 2 004/83/EC; nor 
(b) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.  
3. Member States may also retain legislation in force on 1 December 2005 that allows for the 
national designation of part of a country as safe, or a country or part of a country as safe for a 
specified group of persons in that country, where the conditions in paragraph 2 are fulfilled in 
relation to that part or group. 
4. In assessing whether a country is a safe country of origin in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 
3, Member States shall have regard to the legal situation, the application of the law and the 
general political circumstances in the third country concerned. 
5. The assessment of whether a country is a safe country of origin in accordance with this Art 
shall be based on a range of sources of information, including in particular information from other 
Member States, the UNHCR, the Council of Europe and other relevant international 
organisations. 
6. Member States shall notify to the Commission the countries that are designated as safe 
countries of origin in accordance with this Art.” 
 
Designation under Art 30 (1) PD is subject to Annex II PD, which stipulates the current 
definition of a “safe country of origin”: 
“A country is considered as a safe country of origin where, on the basis of the legal situation, the 
application of the law within a democratic system and the general political circumstances, it can 
be shown that there is generally and consistently no persecution as defined in Art 9 of Directive 
2004/83/EC [QD], no torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and no threat by 
reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict. 
In making this assessment, account shall be taken, inter alia, of the extent to which protection is 
provided against persecution or mistreatment by: 
(a) the relevant laws and regulations of the country and the manner in which they are applied; 
(b) observance of the rights and freedoms laid down in the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and/or the International Covenant for 
Civil and Political Rights and/or the Convention against Torture, in particular the rights from 
which derogation cannot be made under Art 15(2) of the said European Convention; 
(c) respect of the non-refoulement principle according to the Geneva Convention; 
(d) provision for a system of effective remedies against violations of these rights and freedoms.“ 
 
 
Furthermore, according to Art 30 (2) PD, MS may retain, by derogation from para 1 and the 
criteria in Annex II, legislation in force on 1 December 2005 that allows for the national 
designation of countries as safe countries of origin, as long as they are satisfied that persons 
in the third countries concerned are generally subject neither to persecution as defined in Art 
9 Qualification Directive, nor to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 
even if only part of the country was declared safe. If Member States derogate from Art 30 (1) 
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PD in assessing whether a country is a safe country of origin, they “shall have regard to the 
legal situation, the application of the law and the general political circumstances in the third 
country concerned”.22 
 
Under Art 23 (4) (c) (i) PD, being a citizen of a safe country of origin within the meaning of 
Arts 29, 30 and 31 PD may be grounds for the prioritization and/or acceleration of the 
examination of the application. 
 
The Procedures Directive fails to set out clear requirements regarding the determination and 
examination of the safety of the particular country for the individual applicant. Art 31 PD 
only stipulates that: 
 
“1. A third country designated as a safe country of origin in accordance with either Art 29 or 30 
may, after an individual examination of the application, be considered as a safe country of origin 
for a particular applicant for asylum only if:  
(a) he/she has the nationality of that country; or  
(b) he/she is a stateless person and was formerly habitually resident in that country; 
and he/she has not submitted any serious grounds for considering the country not to be a safe 
country of origin in his/her particular circumstances and in terms of his/her qualification as a 
refugee in accordance with Directive 2004/83/EC. 
2. Member States shall, in accordance with paragraph 1, consider the application for asylum as 
unfounded where the third country is designated as safe pursuant to Art 29. 
3. Member States shall lay down in national legislation further rules and modalities for the 
application of the safe country of origin concept.”23 
 
Hence, Art 31 PD merely states that the SCO concept cannot be applied to a particular 
applicant unless there has been an individual examination of the application.  
 
On the presumption of safety and the consequential shift of burden as well as standard of 
proof, Art 31(1) PD articulates that the applicant has to submit “serious grounds” to prove 
that his country of origin is not safe “in his/her particular circumstances”. Furthermore, 
Recital 21 PD recognizes that the “designation of a third country as a safe country of origin 
[...] cannot establish an absolute guarantee of safety for nationals of that country”, and states 
that the assessment underlying the designation of a third country as a safe country of origin, 
by its nature, can only take into account “the general civil, legal and political circumstances in 
that country and whether actors of persecution, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment are subject to sanction in practice when found liable in the country concerned”. 
                                                
22 Art 30 (4) PD. 
23 Art 31 PD, emphasis added. 
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Recital 19 refers to the “rebuttable presumption of the safety” of the safe country of origin. 
Finally, Recital 17 states that “a key consideration for the well-foundedness of an asylum 
application is the safety of the applicant in his/her country of origin. Where a third country 
can be regarded as a safe country of origin, MS should be able to designate it as safe and 
presume its safety for a particular applicant, unless he/she presents serious counter-
indications.”  
 
The Procedures Directive is silent on whether or how applicants can be given an effective 
opportunity to rebut a presumption of safety, although Art 31 (3) does require States to 
establish further rules and modalities in national legislation for the application of the safe 
country of origin concept. The Qualification Directive provides a certain degree of 
clarification. Art 4 QD (assessment of facts and circumstances), is applicable even to cases in 
which the EU MS are entitled to apply special procedures under the Procedures Directive and 
sets out relevant rules on the assessment of evidence as well as risk and shall be cited as 
fundamentally relevant:  
 
“1. Member States may consider it the duty of the applicant to submit as soon as possible all 
elements needed to substantiate the application for international protection. In cooperation with 
the applicant it is the duty of the Member State to assess the relevant elements of the application. 
2. The elements referred to in of paragraph 1 consist of the applicant's statements and all 
documentation at the applicants disposal regarding the applicant's age, background, including that 
of relevant relatives, identity, nationality(ies), country(ies) and place(s) of previous residence, 
previous asylum applications, travel routes, identity and travel documents and the reasons for 
applying for international protection. 
3. The assessment of an application for international protection is to be carried out on an 
individual basis and includes taking into account: 
(a) all relevant facts as they relate to the country of origin at the time of taking a decision on the 
application; including laws and regulations of the country of origin and the manner in which they 
are applied; 
(b) the relevant statements and documentation presented by the applicant including information 
on whether the applicant has been or may be subject to persecution or serious harm; 
(c) the individual position and personal circumstances of the applicant, including factors such as 
background, gender and age, so as to assess whether, on the basis of the applicant's personal 
circumstances, the acts to which the applicant has been or could be exposed would amount to 
persecution or serious harm; 
(d) whether the applicant's activities since leaving the country of origin were engaged in for the 
sole or main purpose of creating the necessary conditions for applying for international 
protection, so as to assess whether these activities will expose the applicant to persecution or 
serious harm if returned to that country; 
(e) whether the applicant could reasonably be expected to avail himself of the protection of 
another country where he could assert citizenship.”24 
Hence, Art 4(1) QD contains an optional provision permitting EU MS to consider it the duty 
of the applicant to submit all elements needed to substantiate the application for international 
                                                
24 Art 4 QD, emphasis added. 
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protection. However, this does not affect the basic duty of the EU MS to assess the relevant 
elements of the application. This key co-operative requirement applies in addition to the 
Procedures Directive’s requirements that decisions be taken in an individual, objective, 
impartial25 manner. Thus, the applicant must be afforded the opportunity to participate in the 
process.26  
 
When an applicant is from a nationally designated safe country of origin that was also deemed 
safe after an individual examination of his application, the applicant’s claim is found 
unfounded27 or manifestly unfounded.28  
 
 
bb. EU Member States: Protocol on Asylum for Nationals of Member States of the EU   
 
The only provision of EU legislation applying to asylum-seekers who are nationals of EU MS 
is the Article of the “Protocol on Asylum for Nationals of Member States of the European 
Union” annexed to the TEC (Spanish Protocol). This Article reads as follows:  
 
 “Given the level of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms by the Member States of the 
European Union, Member States shall be regarded as constituting safe countries of origin in 
respect of each other for all legal and practical purposes in relation to asylum matters. 
Accordingly, any application for asylum made by a national of a Member State may be taken into 
consideration or declared admissible for processing by another Member State only in the 
following cases: 
(a) if the Member State of which the applicant is a national proceeds, availing itself of the 
provisions of Art 15 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, to take measures derogating in its territory from its obligations under that 
Convention; 
 (b) if the procedure referred to in Art I-59(1) or (2) of the Constitution has been initiated and 
until the Council, or, where appropriate, the European Council, adopts a European decision in 
respect thereof with regard to the Member State of which the applicant is a national; 
(c) if the Council has adopted a European decision in accordance with Art I-59(1) of the 
Constitution in respect of the Member State of which the applicant is a national or if the European 
Council has adopted a European decision in accordance with Art I-59(2) of the Constitution in 
respect of the Member State of which the applicant is a national; 
(d) if a Member State should so decide unilaterally in respect of the application of a national of 
another Member State; in that case the Council shall be immediately informed; the application 
shall be dealt with on the basis of the presumption that it is manifestly unfounded without 
affecting in any way, whatever the case may be, the decision-making power of the Member 
State.”29 
                                                
25 Art 8 (2) (a) PD. 
26 Noll, Gregor, ‘Negotiating Asylum: The EU Acquis, Extraterritorial Protection and the Common Market of Deflection’ 
(The Hague/Nijhoff, 2000) 299-301. 
27 Art 28 (1) PD. 
28 Art 28 (2) PD in conjunction with Art 23 (4) (c) (i) PD. 
29 Emphasis added. 
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Thus, EU MSs are safe third countries by definition. This means that the examination of 
safety is not to be undertaken. The safety presumption is absolute; no possibility for the 
rebuttal of safety is given to the applicant. Only the European Council can adopt a rebutting 
decision, after which the deciding EU MS can declare the asylum-application admissible.   
 
For the acceleration of procedure, the application shall be dealt with on the basis of the 
presumption that it is manifestly unfounded.  
 
b. “Safe third country” concepts  
 
The STC notion was first introduced into Danish legislation (and as such is often known as 
the “Danish clause”) and quickly gained ground due to the fear of other EU MS that they 
would be perceived by comparison as being soft on asylum-seekers, which could result in an 
increase in applications in their countries. By the end of the 1990s, virtually every Western 
European State had implemented a STC policy.30 
 
At the EU level, the safe third country principle emerged in the Dublin Convention31 and was 
elaborated under the term "host third country" in the London Conclusions and the Resolution 
on Host Third Countries. The latter established that, before assessing the strength of an 
asylum application, the respective EU MS must first verify the existence of a safe country of 
asylum outside of the EU to which the applicant may be returned. Only if no such safe 
country of asylum exists does the Dublin Convention apply.32 In that sense, "all substantive 
                                                
30 Lavenex, Sandra, ‘Safe Third Countries: Extending the EU Asylum and Immigration Policies to Central and Eastern 
Europe’ (Budapest/Central European University Press, 1999) 29-42. 
31 The Dublin Convention allowed in its Art 3 (5) any Member State, pursuant to its national laws, to "send an applicant for 
asylum to a third State, in compliance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention, as amended by the New York 
Protocol." 
32 In the Resolution on Host Third Countries, no provision for common designation of countries deemed "safe” was included 
– this is presumably due to the difficulty among states to find consensus on the definition. Para. 2 hence only stipulated: 
“The Immigration Ministers identified the following factors to be considered when assessing safe countries of asylum ("host 
third countries"): 
(a) In those third countries, the life or freedom of the asylum applicant must not be threatened, within the meaning of Art 33 
of the Geneva Convention; 
(b) The asylum applicant must not be exposed to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment in the third country; 
(c) It must either be the case that the asylum applicant has already been granted protection in the third country or has had an 
opportunity, at the border or within the territory of the third country, to make contact with that country's authorities in order 
to seek their protection, before approaching the Member State in which he is applying for asylum, or that there is clear 
evidence of his admissibility to a third country; and  
(d) The asylum applicant must be afforded effective protection in the host third country against refoulement, within the 
meaning of the Geneva Convention.” 
Hence, the Resolution adopted a rather vague definition of safe third country. 
According to Para 1 of the Resolution, the following procedural principles applied in safe country of asylum cases: 
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examinations of asylum claims and their justifications should be, in principle, preceded by the 
process of identifying a potential host third country."33 Hence, priority is given to sending 
asylum-seekers to a "safe” non-EU MS (aa) before applying the rules on EU MS (bb).34  
 
aa. Non-EU Member States: Procedures Directive 
 
Through EU legislation, the STC scheme has developed to encompass three forms of STC 
practice: first country of asylum, “pre-determined” safe third countries and STC simpliciter.  
 
The definition of the concept of first country of asylum, i.e. the safe third country concept for 
any applicant who has already found a form of durable protection in another country, is 
stipulated in Art 26 PD: 
 
“A country can be considered to be a first country of asylum for a particular applicant for asylum 
if: 
(a) he/she has been recognised in that country as a refugee and he/she can still avail 
himself/herself of that protection; or 
(b) he/she otherwise enjoys sufficient protection in that country, including benefiting from the 
principle of non-refoulement; 
provided that he/she will be re-admitted to that country. 
In applying the concept of first country of asylum to the particular circumstances of an applicant 
for asylum Member States may take into account Art 27(1).”35 
 
“Pre-determined” safe third countries are envisioned in Art 36 PD, which provides the 
possibility to establish a list of European safe third countries. However, also Art 36 (3) PD 
requiring the adoption of a common list of European safe countries by the Council was 
annulled by the ECJ, as the procedure was deemed to infringe on EC law.36 As such, no 
common list of European safe third countries has been adopted and Art 36 PD cannot be 
applied at the time of writing. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
“(a) The formal identification of a host third country in principle precedes the substantive examination of the application for 
asylum and its justification; 
(b) The principle of the host third country is to be applied to all applicants for asylum, irrespective of whether or not they 
may be regarded as refugees; 
(c) Thus, if there is a host third country, the application for refugee status may not be examined and the asylum applicant 
may be sent to that country; and 
(d) If the asylum applicant cannot in practice be sent to a host third country, the provisions of the Dublin Convention will 
apply.” 
33 European Council, ‘Conclusions on Countries in Which There is Generally No Serious Risk of Persecution’ ("London 
Resolution"), 30 November 1992, Doc. 10579/92. 
34 Guild 325. 
35 Emphasis added. 
36 European Court of Justice, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 6 May 2008, European Parliament v. Council of the 
European Union, Official Journal C 158, 21 June 2008, 3-4.  
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The application of the STC simpliciter concept is stipulated in Art 27 PD as follows: 
 
“1. Member States may apply the safe third country concept only where the competent authorities 
are satisfied that a person seeking asylum will be treated in accordance with the following 
principles in the third country concerned: 
(a) life and liberty are not threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion; 
(b) the principle of non-refoulement in accordance with the Geneva Convention is respected; 
(c) the prohibition of removal, in violation of the right to freedom from torture and cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment as laid down in international law, is respected; and 
(d) the possibility exists to request refugee status and, if found to be a refugee, to receive 
protection in accordance with  the Geneva Convention.” 
 
Regarding the determination of safety, Art 27 (2) (c) PD foresees that national legislation 
shall permit the applicant to challenge the presumption of safety on the grounds that he would 
be subject to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.  
 
The examination of safety, in the Procedures Directive is notably vague. The wording of Art 
28 (1) and (2) PD indicates that MS are required to establish the fact that the STC concept 
applies, before an application can be declared manifestly unfounded on these grounds.37 
Furthermore, Art 27 (2) to (4) PD states that:  
 
“2. The application of the safe third country concept shall be subject to rules laid down in national 
legislation, including: 
(a) rules requiring a connection between the person seeking asylum and the third country 
concerned on the basis of which it would be reasonable for that person to go to that country; 
(b) rules on the methodology by which the competent authorities satisfy themselves that the safe 
third country concept may be applied to a particular country or to a particular applicant. Such 
methodology shall include case-by-case consideration of the safety of the country for a particular 
applicant and/or national designation of countries considered to be generally safe; 
(c) rules in accordance with international law, allowing an individual examination of whether the 
third country concerned is safe for a particular applicant which, as a minimum, shall permit the 
applicant to challenge the application of the safe third country concept on the grounds that 
he/she would be subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
3. When implementing a decision solely based on this Art, Member States shall: 
(a) inform the applicant accordingly; and 
(b) provide him/her with a document informing the authorities of the third country, in the 
language of that country, that the application has not been examined in substance.  
4. Where the third country does not permit the applicant for asylum to enter its territory, Member 
States shall ensure that access to a procedure is given in accordance with the basic principles and 
guarantees described in Chapter II.”38 
 
                                                
37 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Improving Asylum Procedures – Comparative Analysis and Recommendations for 
Law and Practice: Detailed Research on Key Asylum Procedures Directive Provisions’, March 2010, available at:  
http://www.unhcr.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/home/opendocPDFViewer.html?docid=4c7b71039&query=The%20safe%20country%
20of%20origin%20concept [accessed 2 May 2011] 322. 
38 Emphasis added; it is implicit in Art 27 (4) PD that, if an applicant is not admitted to the third country, in accordance with 
Art 27 (4) PD, the applicant must be given access to an asylum procedure in the MS in question. 
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It should be underlined that Art 27 PD is a permissive provision, allowing but not obliging 
MS to apply the safe third country concept. Moreover, the concept cannot be applied unless 
the MS has laid down rules in national legislation regarding the methodology by which the 
competent authorities satisfy themselves that the safe third country concept may be applied to 
a particular country or to a particular applicant.  
 
On the basis of the STC presumption, the deciding EU MS may consider the application as 
manifestly unfounded in accordance with Art 28 (2) PD39 or inadmissible in accordance 
with Art 25 (2) (c) PD.40  
 
Regarding consequential acceleration of procedure, Art 12 (2) (c) PD, together with Art 23 
(4) (c) (ii) PD, permits the deciding EU MS to omit the personal interview. In addition, Art 36 
(1), (4) and (5) PD allows EU MS to deny access to the procedure to all asylum-seekers who 
arrive ‘illegally’ from the- annulled- “pre-determined” safe third countries and the nationally 
designated safe third countries:41 
 
“1. Member States may provide that no, or no full, examination of the asylum application and of 
the safety of the applicant in his/her particular circumstances as described in Chapter II, shall take 
place in cases where a competent authority has established, on the basis of the facts, that the 
applicant for asylum is seeking to enter or has entered illegally into its territory from a safe third 
country according to paragraph 2. [...] 
4. The Member States concerned shall lay down in national law the modalities for 
implementing the provisions of paragraph 1 and the consequences of decisions pursuant to those 
provisions in accordance with the principle of non-refoulement under the Geneva Convention, 
including providing for exceptions from the application of this Art for humanitarian or political 
reasons or for reasons of public international law. 
5. When implementing a decision solely based on this Art, the Member States concerned shall: 
(a) inform the applicant accordingly; and 
(b) provide him/her with a document informing the authorities of the third country, in the 
language of that country, that the application has not been examined in substance.”42 
 
 
bb. EU Member States: Dublin Regulation   
 
Besides EU MS, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland are also included in the Dublin regime. 
The Dublin Regulation, which replaced the Dublin Convention, differs from the Convention 
                                                
39 The application must be unfounded in the sense that the applicant does not qualify for refugee status pursuant to the 
Qualification Directive. 
40 Recital 23 PD states that “Member States should also not be obliged to assess the substance of an asylum application where 
the applicant, due to a connection to a third country as defined by national law, can reasonably be expected to seek protection 
in that third country”. 
41 Art 36 (6) PD. 
42 Emphasis added. 
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in “verbiage and intent”:43 whereas the Dublin Convention was drafted in order to prevent 
confusion for the applicant and among the EU MS of the then European Community, the 
Dublin Regulation intends to promote a common asylum policy for the entire EU. The 
European Commission, in its “Regulation 1560/2003/EC of 2 September 2003 laying down 
detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003”, concretized the 
rules for the application of the Dublin Regulation.  
 
The Dublin Regulation’s central objective is the determination of the EU MS responsible for 
the asylum application. The criteria for determining responsibility are founded on the 
“authorization principle”,44 i.e. those constituting the expression of an explicit authorization 
take precedence over others. This results in the following order of precedence:45 the family 
reunion provision;46 the MS which granted valid residence document or visa;47 the State into 
which the asylum-seeker came illegally, or if he stays illegally in a different State for six 
months or more, the responsibility shifts to that State;48 and by default, where no other 
criterion applies, the MS where the request for asylum was first lodged will be responsible.49 
Hence, “[t]he more a Member State has consented (explicitly or tacitly) to the penetration of 
its territory by an asylum-seeker, the more it is responsible”.50 
 
Aside from these binding criteria, the so called “humanitarian clause”51 allows MS to accept 
responsibility voluntarily, taking into account exceptional humanitarian considerations not 
foreseen by the binding rules mentioned so far. Conversely, according to the “sovereignty 
clause” of Art 3 (2) DR, each MS in which the applicant resides can take responsibility 
instead of initiating a Dublin procedure with the otherwise responsible MS:  
 
“By way of derogation from paragraph 1, each Member State may examine an application for 
asylum lodged with it by a third-country national, even if such examination is not its 
responsibility under the criteria laid down in this Regulation. In such an event, that Member State 
shall become the Member State responsible within the meaning of this Regulation and shall 
assume the obligations associated with that responsibility. Where appropriate, it shall inform the 
Member State previously responsible, the Member State conducting a procedure for determining 
                                                
43 Junker, Barry, ‘Burden-Sharing or Burden-Shifting? Asylum and Expansion in the European Union’ (2006) 20 
Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 300. 
44 Art 3.2 DC. 
45 Hurwitz, Agnes, ‘The 1990 Dublin Convention: a Comprehensive Assessment’ (1999) 11 International Journal of Refugee 
Law 652. 
46 Arts. 7 and 8 DR. 
47 Art. 9 DR. 
48 The “Sangatte clause” of Art 10 DR. 
49 Art 13 DR. 
50 De Lobkowicz, Wenceslas, ‘The Dublin Convention: A Useful Complement to International Humanitarian Law’ (1990) 19 
European Vision 7-9. 
51 Art 15 DR. 
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the Member State responsible or the Member State which has been requested to take charge of or 
take back the applicant.” 
 
When a transfer takes place, the requesting MS issues a reasoned decision to the third-country 
national.52 This decision must be subject to a procedure of appeal and/or judicial review.  
 
When responsibility has been established, which according to the Regulation should happen 
within five months of the application at the latest, the responsible MS (possibly after the 
asylum-seeker has been transferred to its territory)53 must examine the substance of the claim. 
The MS retains its responsibility until the claim has been accepted, or the refused asylum-
seeker has been removed from the MS’s territory or voluntarily leaves it for more than three 
months.54  
 
Regarding the determination of safety, it is stated in Recital (2) DR that, in respect of 
“maintaining the principle of non-refoulement”, “and without affecting the responsibility 
criteria laid down in [the Dublin Regulation], Member States, all respecting the principle of 
non-refoulement, are considered as safe countries for third country nationals”. Thus, EU MSs 
are safe third countries by definition. However, the Dublin Regulation allows for rebuttal of 
the safety presumption. While rebuttal is not explicitly addressed in the Regulation, removal 
to the responsible EU MS is not obligatory due to Art 3 (2) DR. Any decision not to examine 
a claim on the grounds that another EU MS is responsible is hence also a decision not to take 
over this responsibility, which must be open to appeal before a court or tribunal.55 The stating 
of conditions or requirements for taking over responsibility because the otherwise responsible 
MS is not safe for the purposes of the STC exception is left to domestic law.56  
 
In a Dublin procedure, the asylum-seeker is denied access to substantive refugee 
determination procedures and is returned to the first EU MS through which he transited.  
 
Overall, the EU’s legislation gives the initial impression that its ultimate goal is to seal the 
borders of its Member States by ensuring that, first, individuals do not leave their countries of 
origin (visa, carrier sanctions); that if individuals still manage to leave their country, they, 
second, remain in their region of origin; and that if they manage to reach the EU they, third, 
                                                
52 Art 19, Paras 1-2 DR. 
53 Art 19 DR. 
54 Art 16 DR. 
55 Arts 19 and 20 DR. 
56 Battjes, European Asylum Law, 420. 
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are either, by application of the “safe country” concept removed again to the SCO, or the non-
EU STC or, as a last resort, according to the Dublin Regulation to the EU MS responsible for 
the border the individual was able to cross or illegally stay in for at least five months.57 
 
As example shall now be looked at the legislative implementation of the EU’s legislation in 
Austria. 
 
3. Example: Legislative implementation in Austria 
 
Austria ratified the ECHR in 1956. Within the domestic legal system, a constitutional bill of 
196458 clarified the Convention's formal status as constitutional law.59 This status has a 
twofold implication. First, while initially having taken the view that the ECHR was not more 
than a mere programmatic statement,60 the Austrian Constitutional Court soon came to accept 
that the Convention grants individual, enforceable rights.61 The Convention may thus be 
relied upon by individuals before the courts, most notably before the Constitutional Court in 
complaints against administrative rulings for "violation of a constitutionally guaranteed 
right".62  
Despite its quite strict criteria of “exceptional circumstances“,63 some applicants successfully 
complained to the Austrian Constitutional Court against the decision taken in a single safe 
country procedure to reject the asylum claim and allow removal. In these cases, an 
interpretation of Art 3 ECHR in conformity with the Constitution would have obliged the 
respective decision-maker to abstain from removal.64   
                                                
57 Gil-Bazo 573. 
58 Federal Gazette no. 59/1964. 
59 Austrian Constitutional Court, case no. 5100/1965. 
60 Austrian Constitutional Court, case no. 3767/1960, 4122/1961.  
61 Austrian Constitutional Court, case no. 4792/1964. 
62 Complaint to the Constitutional Court under Article 144 of the Constitution. 
63 Austrian Constitutional Court, case no. 2400/07, 6 March 2008. 
64 The Dublin Regulation allows the Member States by its Art 3 (2) to take up responsibility for the applicant’s claim if a 
transfer to the Member State responsible for dealing with the asylum claim would constitute a violation of the principle of 
non-refoulement. Domestic legislation “requiring examination if another Member State is unsafe for a particular applicant 
would not run counter to Preamble recital (2) […] that states that Member States are safe, as that recital does not state that the 
presumption of safety cannot be rebutted”: Austrian Constitutional Court, case no.s G 117/00, G 146/00, G 147/00, 8 March 
2001. In the following, see e.g. Austrian Constitutional Court, case no. 1802/06, 26 February 2007 (omission of any 
investigation of the circumtances in the presumably safe country); case no. 592/09-26, 21 September 2009 (psychologically 
and physically severly handycapped applicant, no medical treatment available in the presumably safe country Poland). 
Finally, in October 2010, the Constitutional Court judged the return of vulnerable asylum seekers to Greece unconstitutional 
and accepted the petition of an Afghan mother with three small children that she remain in Austria. The court said that 
Austrian authorities must first obtain assurances from Greece that individuals requiring special protection - such as mothers 
with small children, sick people or unaccompanied minors - will receive adequate care, otherwise the readmission process 
must be discontinued. According to the ruling, due to the poor conditions for the care of asylum seekers, their return to 
Greece could lead to a violation of Art 3 ECHR (case no. 1441/10, 13 October 2010). 
On the safe third country being a non-EU MS, namely the Russian Federation, a decision of the Asylum Court was revoked 
by the Constitutional Court as it justified the third-state-security only with the membership of the Russian Federation to the 
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Second, the Convention's rank as constitutional law makes it a yardstick for legislation and 
subjects ordinary laws to scrutiny by the Constitutional Court. Besides general reviews of the 
Asylum Law, ending sometimes in annullment of provisions violating the ECHR or the rule 
of law,65 the Austrian Constitutional Court considered the following provisions on safe 
country procedures in its crucial ruling of 15 October 2004:66 the Asylum Law’s provisions 
that intended to totally exclude the suspensory effect of appeals against negative decisions on 
asylum  and removal in a Dublin procedure were declared as being illegal under the rule of 
law and Art.s 2, 3, and 13 ECHR because they hamper effective judicial review of negative 
decisions on asylum, do not allow for exceptions in individual cases and burden all applicants 
with the negative consequences of a potentially illegal decision. However, as to the lists of 
"safe third countries" and "safe countries of origin", the Constitutional Court, as on the first 
list, simply referred to the actual situation in the countries on the list, at the present moment, 
and found that both Switzerland and Liechtenstein met the prerequisites. It found that should 
this, in an exceptional case, prove to be otherwise, with regard to a specific asylum seeker, the 
Asylum Law obliges the competent authority to take notice and act accordingly. On the list of 
"safe countries of origin", the Constitutional Court recalled that any decision to expel an 
asylum seeker must be made on the basis of a reasonable and objective examination of the 
particular case, and that the existence of the list did not change this into a procedure of 
collective expulsion. The Asylum Law merely established that a "safe country of origin" was 
one of the grounds on which an application for asylum may be dismissed as manifestly ill-
founded. The competent authorities still had to examine individually the merits of each 
application. Moreover, the Court found that the countries mentioned in this list (EU member 
states, Australia, Iceland, Canada, Liechtenstein, New Zealand, Norway, and Switzerland) 
were, in fact, "safe countries of origin" and that, if there were indications that this might be 
otherwise with regard to a specific asylum seeker, the competent authority would be obliged 
to investigate and act accordingly. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
GCR and the ECHR and the existence of a procedure to grant the legal refugee status. The arguments of the Asylum Court 
that no systematic notorious violations of fundamental human rights would occur in the Russian Federation and that this state 
would be governed by the rule-of-law- principle were considered only assertions not based on respective investigations and 
not proved by concrete facts. Further, the Asylum Court neither considered the assertion of the applicant trying to disprove 
the third-state-security, which is sustained by precise and substantial documentation, nor examined whether the principles of 
the ECHR were implemented effectually; country documentation and knowledge on the situation in the Russian Federation 
remained unconsidered (case no. U5/08, 8 October 2008). 
65 E.g. Austrian Constitutional Court, case no. G31/98,G79/98,G82/98,G108/98, 24 June 1998. See, as well, case no. G 
237/03, 15 October 2004: the provision that confines judicial review of negative asylum decisions to facts and evidence 
already submitted before the competent authority ("unless the appellant was not able to do so before because of trauma") 
prevents effective judicial review of negative decisions regarding asylum. 
66 Case no. G 237/03. 
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As it stands, the current procedural and legislative situation in Austria is the following: All 
decisions on asylum applications are made by the Federal Asylum Office (FAO) whose 
decisions can be appealed to the Asylum Court. If the Asylum Court instance issues a 
negative decision, an appeal can be made to the Supreme Administrative Court.  
 
In a single procedure and in one decision, the FAO decides on whether to grant asylum or 
subsidiary protection and, if these two decisions are negative, on the question of 
refoulement.67  
 
The EU’s “safe country” concepts were implemented in Austria in the 2005 Federal Law 
concerning the Granting of Asylum (Asylum Act).68  
 
Beyond the EU’s borders, Australia, Island, Canada, Liechtenstein, New Zealand, Norway 
and Switzerland are considered to be safe countries of origin (SCOs) by Art 39 Para 4 of the 
Asylum Act; Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia 
are deemed SCOs by order of the Federal Government.69 To be deemed safe by order, the 
Federal Government shall primarily take account “the existence or absence of State 
persecution, protection from private persecution and legal protection against human rights 
violations”.70 
 
All EU MSs are considered SCOs pursuant to Art 39 Para 1 of the Asylum Law. Para 2 and 3 
of Art 39 of the Asylum Law provides a procedure on EU-level that has never been used: 
“(2) If, upon a reasoned proposal by one third of the member States, by the European Parliament 
or by the Commission, it is determined by the Council, acting by a majority of four fifths of its 
members, that there is a clear risk of a serious breach by a member State of principles stated in 
article 6, paragraph (1), of the TEU, the suspensory effect of complaints against rulings on 
applications by asylum-seekers from that country of origin shall not be disallowed. 
(3) If, after a procedure has been initiated pursuant to article 7, paragraph (1), of the TEU, a 
determination as referred to in article 7, paragraph (2), of the TEU is not made or all the measures 
imposed in connection therewith are revoked, the suspensory effect of complaints against 
applications by asylum-seekers from that country of origin may again be disallowed.” 
 
Within the asylum procedure, the consequence of coming from a country that is considered a 
                                                
67 With exception of the airport procedure: In procedures at an airport, no decision on expulsion shall be rendered. Rejection 
at the border may be enforced only after the decision of total dismissal or rejection becomes final: Art 33 Para 5 Asylum 
Law. 
68 Issued on 16 August 2005 Federal Law Gazette of the Republic (FLG) of Austria, FLG I No. 100/2005, amended by FLG I 
No.s 75/2007, 2/2008, 4/2008, 29/2009, 122/2009, 135/2009 and 38/2011. 
69 Order of the Federal Government, according to which States are to be deemed safe countries of origin, issued on 16 June 
2009 Federal Law Gazette of the Republic of Austria (FLG) II No. 177/2009. 
70 Art 39 Para 5 Asylum Law. 
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SCO is that, upon arrival at an Austrian airport, the dismissal of an application is admissible if 
there is no substantiated evidence to indicate that the asylum-seeker would be granted asylum 
status or subsidiary protection status.71 The airport procedure is accelerated: one interview is 
deemed sufficient,72 the time-limit for filing complaints against a ruling by the FAO in 
procedures at an airport is seven days,73  and the Asylum Court should render its decision in 
procedures at an airport within two weeks of the submission of the complaint.74 
 
In general, as an exception to the general rules, the suspensory effect of a complaint against a 
dismissal ruling on an application for international protection and the expulsion order issued 
in conjunction therewith may be disallowed by the Federal Asylum Agency.75 Furthermore, 
the transmission of personal data to the country of origin for purposes of security policing and 
criminal justice administration is admissible.76 
 
Austrian legislation also covers the issue of safe third countries (STCs). Art 3 Para 1 of the 
Asylum Act provides that the application is to be rejected on account of safety in a third 
country, which is defined in Art 4 Para 2 of the Asylum Law as a country in which “a 
procedure for the granting of refugee status in accordance with the Geneva Convention on 
Refugees is available” and where “he is not exposed to danger as specified in article 8, 
paragraph (1), or is guaranteed via other countries (asylum procedure), and the alien is 
entitled to reside in that country during such procedure and has protection there against 
deportation to the country of origin, including via other countries, provided that the alien is 
exposed in the country of origin to danger as specified in article 8, paragraph (1)”.  
As safety presumption, Art 3 Para 3 of the Asylum Law provides that such requirements shall 
refutably be met in a country if that country has ratified the GRC and has established by law 
an asylum procedure incorporating the principles of GRC, of the ECHR and of its Protocols 
No.s 6, 11 and 13. 
 
EU MSs are presumed to be safe according to Art 5 Para 3 of the Asylum Law “unless 
specific reasons relating to the person of the asylum-seeker and indicating a real risk of 
absence of protection against persecution are satisfactorily established or are evident to the 
Federal Asylum Agency or to the Asylum Court”. 
                                                
71 Art 33 Para 1 Asylum Law. 
72 Art 33 Para 2 Asylum Law. 
73 Art 33 Para 3 Asylum Law. 
74 Art 33 Para 4 Asylum Law. 
75 Art 38 Para 1 Asylum Law. 
76 Art 57 Para 1 (1) Asylum Law. 
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In order to maintain current evidence of “safe countries“, the FAO maintains country records 
in which facts relevant to procedures pursuant to the present federal law and relating to the 
situation in the countries concerned are entered, together with their sources, in particular, for 
deciding whether a certain country is safe within the meaning of Art 39 of the Asylum Law. 
The facts gathered shall be “collated, scientifically reviewed on the basis of objective criteria 
(general analysis) and recorded in a generic manner. Records shall be rectified with respect to 
facts which do not or no longer correspond with reality. Any analysis based on such facts 
shall be corrected”.77  
 
If two negative decisions are made on asylum and subsidiary protection, Art 10 of the Asylum 
Law provides that, in conjunction, an expulsion order shall be issued. Art 10 Para 3 of the 
Asylum Law explicitly states that, “if execution of an expulsion order would constitute a 
violation of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights for reasons relating to the 
person of the asylum- seeker and such reasons are not long-lasting, a pronouncement shall be 
made that the execution thereof shall be postponed for the necessary period.” 
 
After having presented the EU’s legislation and its implementation by Austrian legislation, 
two policy realms that are open for political discussion, the principle of non-refoulement shall 
be presented, a fundamental principle of international law that is not up for debate. 
 
 
 
B. The principle of non-refoulement  
 
The principle of non-refoulement is often referred to as the cornerstone of international 
protection. While the opinion is not unanimously shared,78 numerous international scholars 
argue that the principle of non-refoulement has acquired the status of ius cogens, also known 
as a peremptory norm.79 To have attained the normative value of ius cogens, the norm 
prohibiting refoulement must be accepted “by the international community of States as a 
whole” as a norm from which “no derogation is permitted”. Hence, State practice should not 
                                                
77 Art 60 of the Asylum Law. 
78 For example, Goodwin-Gill, Guy & McAdam, Jane, ‘The Refugee in International Law’, 2nd edition, (New York/Oxford 
University Press, 1996), 168 n. 234.  
79 Allain, Jean, ‘The Jus Cogens Nature of Non-Refoulement’ (2001) 13 International Journal of Refugee Law 4 534-541. 
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entail forcibly repatriating refugees, and this practice must be based on the opinion iuris that 
States themselves are bound by a customary legal obligation that is binding on them as a 
matter of ius cogens. 
 
Regarding State practice, the principle of non-refoulement is custom:80 During the Cold War 
era, questions remained as to its customary nature, which was quickly attained following the 
end of the Soviet era.81 The State practice that has emerged from States’ national legislation 
and administrative practices identifies the customary rule that return to a third State is 
prohibited if the refugee is not effectively protected in that country against refoulement.82 
Furthermore, State practice emerging in Latin America on the basis of the 1984 Cartagena 
Declaration on Refugees can be seen as evidence. The Declaration recognizes “the importance 
and meaning [of non-refoulement] as a rule of ius cogens”. Joan Fitzpatrick finds the 
acceptance of this position having become manifest in the fact that intergovernmental bodies 
as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the OAS General Assembly have 
acknowledged the Conclusions of the Cartagena Colloquium with approval.83 
 
Any doubt as to the State practice due to the increased violations of the norm of non-
refoulement should “be set aside as irrelevant to its legal standing”:84 Allain refers to the 
argumentation of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Nicaragua case: 
 
“In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct 
of States should, in general, be consistent with such rules, and that instances of State conduct 
inconsistent with a given rule should generally have been treated as breaches of that rule, not as 
indications of the recognition of a new rule. If a State acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a 
recognized rule, but defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications contained 
within the rule itself, then whether or not the State's conduct is in fact justifiable on that basis, the 
significance of that attitude is to confirm rather than to weaken the rule.”85 
 
Hence, increasing violations of the norm of non-refoulement do not make its status as ius 
cogens insecure, until a new norm of ius cogens emerges. 
 
Regarding the necessary opinion iuris, the Conclusions of the UNHCR Executive Committee 
(ExCom) clearly reflect the consensus of States: In Conclusions No. 25, State Parties 
                                                
80 Gilbert, Geoff, ‘Is Europe Living Up to its Obligations to Refugees?’ (2004) 15 European Journal of International Law 5, 
966; G.S Goodwill-Gill, G.S., ‘The Refugee in International Law’, 2nd ed., 1996, 345-354; Nowak 147. 
81 Allain 538, fn. 19, referring to Goodwill-Gill, The Refugee, 166-7.  
82 See Borchelt 476-9. 
83 Fitzpatrick, Joan, ‘Temporary Protection of Refugees: Elements of a Formalized Regime’, 94 AJIL 284, 2000, 284.  
84 Allain 540. 
85 Para 186, emphasis added. 
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determined that the principle of non-refoulement “was progressively acquiring the character 
of a peremptory rule of international law”. In 1989, the ExCom concluded that “all States” 
were bound to refrain from refoulement on the bases that such acts were  “contrary to 
fundamental prohibitions against these practices”86 and in 1997, that the principle of non-
refoulement had acquired the level of a norm of ius cogens: “the principle of non-refoulement 
is not subject to derogation”.87 Further, 181 States are party to the GRC and/or UN human 
rights treaties that explicitly or implicitly prohibit refoulement88 and thereby commit 
themselves to respecting the principle of non-refoulement. State Parties bound by such treaties 
with relevant provisions against refoulement repeatedly reassert their support for the principle, 
as well as their regret at reported instances of non-observance. In general, States are reluctant 
to admit violating their non-refoulement obligation; as the cited paragraph of the ICJ’s 
Nicaragua case pointed out, this implies their continuing consent to be legally bound by its 
proscription. As Kay Hailbronner acknowledged, "States have never claimed a general right 
to return refugees to a country where they may face severe persecution on account of race, 
religion, or political opinion."89 Also the States not party to any of these treaties or 
conventions have "repeatedly both reaffirmed and demonstrated their support for basic 
protection principles, especially the principle of non-refoulement, recognizing at least 
implicitly its normative character".90  
 
Thus, it can be concluded that the principle of non-refoulement has acquired the status of ius 
cogens. Given the geographical scope of this thesis and the fact that all EU MS are Parties to 
the GRC, it may seem unnecessary to refer to this legal fact. Goodwin-Gill stated that little 
                                                
86 Conclusions No. 55. 
87 Conclusions No. 79. 
88 Art 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art 5 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Art 3 ECHR. 
Further, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, as the GRC in its 
Art 33, has an explicit, specific non-refoulement provision in Art 3. The Committee against Torture has interpreted the CAT's 
non-refoulement provision to include a prohibition on indirect refoulement. This Art is drafted in a more inclusive manner 
than Art 33 GFC, as the prohibition of removal to torture has been termed absolute. Finally, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights does not contain explicit prohibitions of refoulement. However, as for other human rights treaties, 
the norm prohibiting torture and other forms of ill-treatment has been construed by their treaty-monitoring bodies to protect 
from removal to a state where a claimant would be exposed to respective violations, constituting, in turn a state obligation to 
grant extraterritorial protection. Hence, implicit prohibition is, as stated by the Human Rights Committee for the first time in 
its General Comment 20, Para 9, and was affirmed in a number of views, worded in the treaty, namely in Art 7. This 
provision bars state parties from exposing individuals to those dangers “upon return to another country by way of their 
extradition, expulsion or refoulement”: Battjes, European Asylum Law, referring in fn 39 exemplary to Kindler v. Canada, 
CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991, UN Human Rights Committee, 11 November 1993, Charles Chitat Ng v. Canada, 
CCPR/C/49/D/469/1991, UN Human Rights Committee, 7 January 1994, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4028b5002b.html [accessed 7 June 2011]. According to Art 4(2) ICCPR, no derogation 
may be made from Art 7 ICCPR. For Noll, the pivotal factor is Art 2 (1) ICCPR that provides the contextual element tilting 
interpretation in favour of a universalistic reading: Noll, Negotiating,416.  
89 Borchelt 484. 
90 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Note on International Protection (submitted by the High Commissioner)’, 7 
September 1994, A/AC.96/830, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3f0a935f2.html [accessed 30 April 2011], 
reprinted in (1994) 6 International Journal of Refugee Law, 679, 698. 
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was likely to be achieved by insisting on the ius cogens status of the principle of non-
refoulement.91 However, Arts 53 and 64 of the Vienna Convention on Treaties (VCT) provide 
that treaties may be invalidated upon their ratification or may later be terminated if their 
content “conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law”, which is “accepted 
and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted”. Peremptory norms thus limit the action and interaction of States on 
the international stage. When arguing against transgressions of the norm of non-refoulement, 
it can hence be gained that any action that falls within the domain of ius cogens, be it a 
unilateral, bilateral or multilateral act, is by definition prohibited as being illegal.  
 
James Crawford, UN Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission’s working 
group on “State Responsibility”, introduced the notion that compliance with a norm of ius 
cogens constitutes a circumstance that precludes the wrongfulness of an otherwise illegal act, 
in part with the intention to give the concept its proper standing on the international plane.92  
 
Draft Art 41 (1) and (2) on State Responsibility reads: 
„1. States and international organizations shall cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means 
any serious breach within the meaning of Art 40. 
2. No State or international organization shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious 
breach within the meaning of Art 40, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.“ 
 
The Article also reflects the fact that a collection of States forming an intergovernmental 
organization, such as the EU, is not exempt from the peremptory nature of non-refoulement. 
Hence, by referring to the ius cogens nature of the principle of non-refoulement, the EU can 
be held accountable for actions that result in violations of the principle of non-refoulement.93 
 
It can be therefore defended that the principle of non-refoulement has the status of ius cogens 
and thereby obliges States to refrain from returning a refugee to the frontiers of territories 
where his life or freedom would be threatened. 
 
However, the legal basis of the prohibition of non-refoulement must also be examined: While 
the Geneva Refugee Convention contains an explicit provision in its Art 33 (1), human rights 
imply the principle of non-refoulement as an expression of their preventive approach, in 
                                                
91 Goodwill-Gill and McAdam 168, n. 234. 
92 International Law Commission Report, 1999, A/54/10, Para 306. 
93 Allain 537-8. 
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particular to the protection from torture. Art 3 ECHR (2) and Art 3 CAT (3) will be discussed 
in this context.  
1. Art 33 GRC 
 
The GRC and the 1967 New York Protocol are binding for all EU MS and comprise part of 
the acquis communtautaire;94 Art 63 (1) TEC explicitly prescribes that measures on asylum 
adopted by the Council must be in accordance with these instruments.95 
 
While the Preamble of the GRC speaks of securing “the widest possible exercise” of human 
rights by refugees, the Contracting States are only liable for a violation of Art 33 GRC.96 This 
provision sets out the prohibition of refoulement, obligating States to refrain from returning a 
refugee "in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom 
would be threatened".97 According to Lauterpacht, common sense dictates a “measure of 
equation” between the threat which precludes refoulement and that which is at the core of the 
definition of the term “refugee” pursuant to Art 1A (2) GRC, namely, that the person 
concerned has a well-founded fear of being persecuted. Any other approach would lead to 
“discordance in the operation of the Convention”.98 As a matter of the internal coherence of 
the Convention, the words “where his life or freedom would be threatened” in Art 33 (1) GRC 
must therefore be read to encompass territories in respect of which a refugee or asylum-seeker 
has a “well-founded fear of being persecuted”.99 
 
The guidelines of the UNHCR ExCom affirm the importance of non-refoulement: in 
Conclusions No. 6, the ExCom recalled that "the fundamental humanitarian principle of non-
refoulement has found expression in various international instruments adopted at the universal 
and regional levels and is generally accepted by States."100 The ExCom also expressed its 
                                                
94 Draft List, Para I.A.b. 
95 Treaty establishing the European Community as amended by subsequent treaties. Rome, 25 March 1957, “The Council 
[…] shall […] adopt measures on asylum, in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 
January 1967 relating to the status of refugees and other relevant treaties”. 
96 Battjes, European Asylum Law, 404. 
97 See UN High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-Refoulement (Opinion)’ 
[Global Consultations on International Protection/Second Track], 20 June 2001, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b3702b15.html [accessed 1 May 2011] and Noll for further references: Noll, 
Negotiating, p. 363, footnote 1059; E. Feller, V. Türk and F. Nicholson (eds.), Refugee Protection in International Law 
(2003), at 87. 
98 Lauterpacht, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, The Scope and Content of the principle of non-
refoulement, Opinion, 20 June 2001, Para. 123, available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/home/opendocPDFViewer.html?docid=3b33574d1&query=refoulement [accessed 30 April 2011]. 
99 Ibidem. 
100 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Non-Refoulement’, 12 October 1977, No. 6 (XXVIII) - 1977, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae68c43ac.html [accessed 30 April 2011]. 
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concern that this principle of "fundamental importance," while "in practice widely observed, 
[…] has in certain cases been disregarded". Similarly, Conclusions No. 15 and No. 22 set out 
the general principle that "action whereby a refugee is obliged to return or is sent to a country 
where he has reason to fear persecution constitutes a grave violation of the recognized 
principle of non-refoulement"101 and that "in all cases the fundamental principle of non-
refoulement […] must be scrupulously observed".102  
 
The plain language of Art 33 GRC also bans indirect refoulement or chain-refoulement.103 
Support for the intended proscription of indirect refoulement comes from the drafters' Ad Hoc 
Committee Report, which shows that Art 33 GRC refers "not only to the country of origin but 
also to other countries where the life or freedom of the refugee would be threatened".104 
Moreover, during the 1951 Conference of Plenipotentiaries, there was general agreement on 
the principle that no refugee should be sent to a country where he would be in danger of 
persecution whether it was the country from which the refugee came or any other country.105 
Further, the UNHCR ExCom Conclusions No. 58 reiterate that governments may return 
refugees and asylum-seekers to a third country only if they “are protected there against 
refoulement”.  
 
However, the protection provided by Art 33 (1) GRC is excluded if its Para (2) applies. This 
states: 
 
“The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are 
reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, 
having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to 
the community of that country.” 
 
 
                                                
101 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Refugees Without an Asylum Country’, 16 October 1979, No. 15 (XXX) - 1979, 
available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae68c960.html [accessed 30 April 2011]. 
102 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Protection of Asylum-Seekers in Situations of Large-Scale Influx’, 21 October 
1981, No. 22 (XXXII), available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae68c6e10.html [accessed 30 April 2011]. 
103 Emphasis added; also Art 3 (1) of the 1967 Declaration on Territorial Asylum (UN General Assembly, ‘Declaration on 
Territorial Asylum’, 14 December 1967, A/RES/2312(XXII), available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f05a2c.html [accessed 30 April 2011]) states that “no refugee shall be compulsory 
returned to any State where he may be subjected to persecution or from which he might be compelled to return to the country 
of persecution”.  
104 Lauterpacht, Para 126. 
105 Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, Summary Record of the Sixteenth 
Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.16,  (July 11, 1951), 9.   
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2. Art 3 ECHR 
 
The ECHR is a piori more generous in its scope of protection than the GRC. First, the ECHR 
does not have the limitation of the GRC regarding the reason for persecution being “of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion”.106 It hence 
does not include an alienage requirement similar to Art 1A (2) of the refugee definition, but is 
solely concerned with the actual risk violation of rights, regardless of the underlying 
motivation. Second, the protection afforded by the ECHR is not excluded by clauses, such as 
Art 1F GRC, which stipulates the persons to whom the GRC shall not apply. While these facts 
suggest that the ECHR is more generous than the GRC, a closer examination of the ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence reveals that this textual difference has not led in every aspect to more generous 
protection from refoulement by the ECHR.107 
 
While numerous rights have been discussed by the ECtHR in removal cases,108 Art 3 ECHR is 
of utmost relevance. This provision stipulates that "no one shall be subjected to torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment". The prohibition under Art 3 ECHR is of an 
absolute nature which cannot be suspended under any circumstances. From this absolute 
prohibition of torture, the ECtHR has inferred the principle of non-refoulement.109 Also in 
case of chain-refoulement, the State removing a person must be held indirectly responsible for 
the imminent treatment in that other State, regardless of whether that treatment is to be 
expected from public authorities or from non-State actors, how great the efforts of the 
government have been to prevent such treatment and of whether the latter State is or is not a 
                                                
106 Contrary to the GRC that is limited in its protection to persons under persecution in its sense, the reasons for a real risk of 
exposure to ill-treatment are immaterial for the application of Art 3 ECHR: See H.L.R. v. France, 11/1996/630/813, Council 
of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 22 April 1997, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3f3779b24.html [accessed 22 June 2011]; Nnyanzi v. United Kingdom, application no. 
21878/06, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 8 April 2008, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4805cd722.html [accessed 17 July 2011]; D. v. the United 
Kingdom, 146/1996/767/964, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 2 May 1997, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/46deb3452.html [accessed 22 June 2011], N. v. the United Kingdom, application no. 
26565/05, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 27 May 2008. 
107 Boutillon, Sonia, ‘The Interpretation of Article I of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees by the 
European Union: Toward Harmonization’ (2003) 18 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 1 150-1. 
108 The processing of asylum applications has also raised issues of return to face risks under other Articles: Art 4 (trafficking 
in persons and freedom from forced labour), Protocol No. 6 (abolition of the death penalty), Protocol No. 13 (in all 
circumstances) and Art 1 of Protocol No. 12 (general prohibition of discrimination). Art 1 Protocol 7 (Procedural safeguards 
relating to expulsion of aliens) has been virtually not considered by the ECtHR. While it was adopted as reaction against the 
exclusion of fair hearing right in cases of expulsion and extradition “in order to afford minimum guarantees” (Explanatory 
Report on Protocol No. 7 to the ECHR for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, p 7, § 7) it demands 
that the alien be lawfully resident to invoke the procedural safeguards it offers and does not apply to aliens whose leave to 
remain was on terms which were subsequently broken. Thus, it provides weak protection for asylum-seekers who might not 
qualify. 
109 Kälin, Walter, ‘Das Prinzip des Non-refoulement’ (Bern/Frankfurt 1982),185. 
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party to the ECHR.110 The reasoning behind this is based on the idea that a State is violating 
Art 3 ECHR if its act of extradition or expulsion constitutes a crucial link in the chain of 
events leading to torture or inhuman treatment or punishment in the State to which the person 
is returned.  
3. Art 3 CAT 
 
The CAT, adopted in 1984 by the UN General Assembly, is the first international human 
rights treaty which not only prohibits torture in absolute terms but also contains a definition of 
torture and an explicit provision concerning the absolute prohibition of refoulement in its Art 
3,111 whose Para 1 reads as follows: "No State Party shall expel, return ('refouler') or extradite 
a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in 
danger of being subjected to torture." Compared to Art 3 ECHR, the scope of Art 3 CAT is 
limited to torture and does not extend to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Furthermore, 
threats of torture at the hands of non-State actors without the consent or acquiescence of the 
government fall outside the scope of Art 3 CAT;112 only in the exceptional circumstances of 
“failed States” could acts by groups exercising quasi-governmental authority fall within the 
definition of Art 1 CAT and thus call for the application of Art 3 CAT.113  
As for Art 3 ECHR, the absolute and non-derogable nature of the prohibition of torture by Art 
3 CAT extends to the prohibition of refoulement.114 The Committee against Torture (CAT 
Committee) has specified that the phrase “another State” refers to the State to which the 
individual is being expelled, returned or extradited as well as to any State to which the 
applicant may subsequently be expelled, returned or extradited.115 Hence, chain-refoulement 
is also prohibited by Art 3 CAT. 
 
Regarding the removal of asylum-seekers, it should be mentioned that in the vast majority of 
individual complaints it was the reference provision that was decided by the CAT Committee.  
Most violations found by the Committee were not actually directed against States practicing 
                                                
110 Van Dijk, Pieter, van Hoof, Fried, van Rijn, Arjen and Zwaak, Leo (eds.), ‘Theory and Practice of the European 
Convention on Human Rights’ (Antwerpen-Oxford/Intersentia, 2006), 429-30. 
111 See the convincing arguments in M.Raess, ‘Der Schutz vor Folter im Völkerrecht’ (Zürich 1989), 136 et seq. 
112 Nowak 165, referring to Nos. 83/1997, 130 and 131/1999, 177/2001. 
113 See Nowak 166. 
114 Nowak 148, referring to Tapia Paez v. Sweden, No. 39/1996; the nature of the activities a person engages in is not a 
relevant consideration in the taking of a decision in accordance with Article 3. Thus, in the case of Tapia Paez v. Sweden 
(where the facts were not in dispute that the author, a member of Sendero Luminoso had handed out leaflets and hand- made 
bombs during a demonstration in Peru in 1989), a refusal to grant the author asylum based on the exception clause of Art 1F 
GRC was found not to meet the requirements of Art 3 CAT: Nowak 166. 
115 Nowak 178, referring to the Mutumbo v. Switzerland (No.13/1993), Korban v. Sweden (No.88/1997), Z.T v. Australia 
(No.153/2000). 
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torture themselves, but against countries of destination where the authorities had rejected 
asylum requests and then decided to return the asylum seeker to his country of origin.116 
However, after the first cases in which asylum-seekers successfully invoked a violation of Art 
3 CAT before the CAT Committee,117 the Committee, eager to avoid the impression of acting 
as a kind of highest asylum review board or fourth instance, reacted by declaring a 
considerable number of similar complaints by asylum-seekers from at that time Zaire, 
Nigeria, Ghana, Algeria, Georgia and Iran as inadmissible.118  
 
Governments sometimes argue that non-refoulement complaints, such as to the CAT 
Committee, have been misused by asylum-seekers for the purpose of circumventing the 
asylum procedure.119 While there is indeed a certain risk that asylum-seekers whose asylum 
request is refused by domestic authorities may turn to international human rights treaty 
monitoring bodies for protection by invoking the non-refoulement principle, such a situation 
merely shows that, “in times of increasingly restrictive asylum and immigration laws in 
Europe and other industrialized States, the authorities are put under a heavy political pressure 
which leads to a substantial number of violations of the non-refoulement principle”.120 In 
order to provide proof of this phenomenon, the following chapter will now present the 
disputable practice resulting from the EU’s “safe country” procedures. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
116 Nowak 127. 
117 Nowak 208, referring as examples to Nos. 13/1993, 15/1994, 21/1995, 34/1995, 43/1996, 41/1996, 39/1996, 101/1997. 
118Nowak 208, referring as examples to Nos. 17/1994, 18/1994, 22/1995, 23/1995, 24/1995, 26/1995, 30/1995, 31/1995, 
32/1995, 35/1995. 
119 Nowak 208, referring as examples to Nos. 13/1993, §9.2, 15/1994, §12.3, 34/1995,§9.6, 138/1999,§7.3. 
120 Nowak 128. 
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II. Reality: The EU’s “safe country” concepts 
 
Having presented the two anti-poles for our discussion – the EU’s legislation on “safe 
country” concepts and the protection afforded by Art 33 GRC – the reality of the situation in 
practice will now be examined. Reality cannot be depicted by exclusively focusing on EU 
institutions and their creation of regional and international norms through the acquis 
communautaire. Rather, a look at the sub-regional interplays between asylum offices across 
Europe provides a greater understanding of the reality. 
 
In order to understand the reality of the “safe country” concepts in practice, the regular 
asylum procedure will be depicted as worrying point of departure (A) before a general critical 
view on presumed safe countries will be presented (B).  
 
 
A. Worrying point of departure 
 
After the atmosphere of a typical asylum interview (1) was examined, the preliminary 
assumption underlying the “safe country” concept must be contravened: information available 
to domestic decision-makers is often not sufficient to decide on the safety of a country (2).
  
1. The atmosphere of asylum interviews 
 
During the author’s work as a legal advisor to asylum-seekers,121 she gained firsthand insight 
into the atmosphere in asylum interviews between asylum-seekers, immigration personnel and 
interpreters. The atmosphere in other EU MSs described by Rycroft (the United Kingdom) 
and others shows that similar sociological and psychosocial dynamics prevail in asylum 
interviews in other EU countries:  
 
                                                
121 Examples are cited from some cases that the author attended as legal representative or adviser. For reasons of privacy, 
family names have been abbreviated and only examples are cited that do not give insight in the applicant’s reasons for 
leaving the country. 
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The asylum-seeker is often asked to sit in a position that excludes him from the desk 
interaction between the officer, the interpreter and other personnel.122 The procedure starts 
with a question to the applicant of whether he understands the interpreter - the first tense 
situation often arising if he says no. Besides language problems, the applicant might 
experience difficulties due to the interpreter’s sex, age and/or ethnic group, any of which may 
be locus of deep social or personal prejudice. There is no pre-emptive discussion of these 
potential problems, and it is extremely difficult for the applicant to raise such issues in this 
hierarchical atmosphere. 
 
The interview starts with the interpreter reading out a shortened explanation of procedure and 
demanding that the asylum-seeker speak the truth, thus giving the asylum-seeker the 
impression that he is already primarily perceived as a potential liar. Some asylum office’s 
officers ask the applicant if he is earning his own money or is financially dependent on the 
State, if he has integrated into society by joining a sports club or another civil society 
organization and if he has learnt the language of the receiving country. These questions are 
often highly cynical, as, e.g. in Austria, asylum-seekers are generally not allowed to work, are 
often accommodated in very remote regions with little or no possibility and support to 
integrate into Austrian society and do not receive any support to learn the language of the 
receiving country. However, officers often become less friendly if the applicant has nothing to 
produce. 
 
The applicant is then asked to confirm his personal details - address in the home country, 
family in Europe and in the country of origin, details regarding the route of travel etc. At this 
point, sociological misunderstandings can germinate which may continue for the whole 
interview; in particular, knowledge about exact dates or other quantitative data is specific to 
the Western scientific rational discourse to which the asylum-seeker is forced to adhere.123 
Based on the author’s observations, applicants who state themselves to be illiterate and were 
still asked persistently about their addresses in Austria and the country of origin.124 The 
applicant is also asked to provide all documents available. On the one hand, numerous 
documents can make the officer angry as they mean an effort and incur translation costs; on 
                                                
122 If the applicant is actively participating, such as in writing down names in response to questions, he can be excluded again 
if the officer rudely snatches the paper from him: Federal Asylum Office (Bundesasylamt, in the following FAO), Ali A., 5 
March 2008. 
123 During one interview, when the applicant was not able to provide data as precisely as demanded by the officer, the latter 
exclaimed aggressively: “Does he want to take the piss out of us? Is he under drugs? Is he still present?”: FAO, Achmedov A., 
4 March 2008.  
124 FAO, O., 21 February 2008.  
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the other hand, when no documents are provided, the applicant is often already perceived as 
lacking credibility. As observed by the author, when asylum-seekers promised to provide 
documentation at a later stage, one officer often responded “well, to order is the better 
word”,125 implying that these documents were generally to be regarded with suspicion. 
  
After covering the issues of personal information and documentation, the interview turns to 
the applicant’s reasons for leaving the country of origin. The asylum officer has the monopoly 
over the flow of conversation.126 The applicant is often forced to answer in brief segments, 
which are sometimes broken up by very long pauses for interpretation and writing, only to be 
expected to continue perfectly and without hesitation when asked to do so. When the 
applicant speaks for too long or in too much detail on issues that are not perceived to be 
relevant, the officers often become easily irritated and sigh, exclaim,127 raise their voices or 
show other signs of nervousness. By doing this they show superiority, as this behavior would 
not be tolerated from anyone else in the room. Superiority is also quite often shown by 
addressing the applicant in a degrading manner.128 
 
By discouraging the applicant from explaining his experience in his own way and reacting 
negatively to the account by not asking for clarification or eliciting important information, the 
deciding official “employs covert adversarial tactics to set [the asylum-seekers] up to fail”.129 
Immigration personnel (asylum officers as well as interpreters) actively influence the result of 
asylum information by eliciting details considered to be relevant, omitting details found to be 
irrelevant, editing and making mistakes. In addition, the interpreter is not always willing to 
disclose himself as being remunerated by the asylum office, whose officer he would be forced 
to correct if he misunderstood the asylum-seeker. 
 
Most emotional interactions are omitted from the asylum record as well as the description of 
the mental state of the applicant, the pressure applied, or the provocation or offence issued by 
the officer.130 As Rycroft describes: “interpreters are shown to change the rendition of image 
                                                
125 FAO, B., 14 January 2008.  
126 The applicant was first stopped to explain the situation in Iraq, only to be yelled at the next minute for not having detailed 
a certain development, FAO, Ali A., 5 March 2008. 
127 FAO, Elpascha B., 1 April 2008; FAO, Dzabrailova M., 21 October 2008; FAO, B., 14 January 2008. 
128 “Sultan”, FAO, Ali A., 5 March 2008; “007”, FAO, Achmedov A., 3 March 2008.  
129 Rycroft, Roxana, ‘Communicative Barriers in the Asylum Account’, in Shah, Prakash (ed.), ‘The Challenge of Asylum to 
Legal Systems’ (London/Cavendish, 2005) 232. 
130 E.g.: Applicant: “The relatives in Chechnya also have problems”, officer in a disparaging way: “They are not all already 
here in Austria?”, Dzabrailova M., 21 October 2008; applicant: “since then my brother started to misuse alcohol”, officer 
cynically: “very dramatic, yes!”, FAO, Elpascha B., 1 April 2008; officer asks for documents, is very impatient and 
aggressive as the presented documents are not relevant, FAO, B., 14 January 2008. 
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and character of speakers by altering the pragmatics of speech, while their actual role may 
vary between usurping the power of the attorney to coercing the witness. Additional 
interpreter-related factors affecting the proceedings reside in extralinguistic features like 
voice, which adds or eliminates nuances from testimony, and personality […]”.131 
 
The following observations made in British and Canadian asylum procedures also coincide 
with those made by the author: “any inconsistencies, omissions or untimely revealing of new 
material will affect the credibility of the claim, as the applicant is unfairly expected to tell 
their story exactly in the same way every time, instead of allowances being made for human 
factors like memory, emotional state, trust in those present and circumstances of story being 
told.”132 Hence, “[t]he substantive interview, purportedly the fair opportunity given to 
asylum-seekers to make their case, is there for the eyes of the law and the public because in 
reality the ‘fair’ opportunity is the scene of deployment of covert adversarial tactics, best 
described from a verbal interaction point of view as negative engagement with the account 
designed to set asylum-seekers up for failure”.133 
 
Besides unbiased asylum officers, whom the author disappointingly rarely met as legal 
adviser for asylum-seekers, asylum officers with the described prejudiced approach to the 
asylum-seeker have the legal possibilities of the “safe country” concepts that they – due to 
national interests – will have been instructed to apply. 
 
 
2. Information for decision-makers  
 
Deciding whether a refugee claim is well-founded has been described as “the single most 
complex adjudication function in contemporary Western societies.” The complexity arises out 
of “the need for the decision-maker to have a sufficient knowledge of the cultural, social and 
political environment of the country of origin, a capacity to bear the psychological weight of 
hearings…and of consequent decisions which may prove fatal, and an ability to deal with 
legal issues such as the subtle international definition of the refugee”.134 
                                                
131 Rycroft 225. 
132 Rycroft 230-1. 
133 Rycroft 242-3. 
134 Costello, Cathryn, ‘The Asylum Procedures Directive and the Proliferation of Safe Country Practices: Deterrence, 
Deflection and the Dismantling of International Protection?’ (2005) 7 European Journal of Migration and Law, 36, referring 
in fn 7 to Rousseau, Cécile, Crèpeau, François, Foxen, Patricia and Houle, France, ‘The Complexity of Determining 
Refugeehood: A Multidisciplinary Analysis of the Decision-making Process of the Canadian Immigration and Refugee 
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Proponents of the “safe country” concept assume that current, accurate and sufficient 
information is available to enable asylum officials to declare a given country as safe. For 
accelerated procedures to achieve the desired level of administrative efficiency, a general, 
countrywide assessment of safety must be made.135 The central question is “whether it is in 
fact possible to determine safe countries on a general basis, and what procedural safeguards 
are necessary to guarantee the correctness of such decisions".136 A study by Byrne and 
Shacknove came to the conclusion that the substantial majority of government officials, 
UNHCR personnel, NGO representatives, lawyers and academics in Western Europe and 
North America who were interviewed shared doubts about whether conditions in allegedly 
safe countries can be reliably established:137 “many of those interviewed frequently reported 
the inadequacy of currently available information and expressed doubts concerning the 
impartiality of both foreign ministry and independent sources”.138 Those interviewed also 
voiced concern as to whether the available evidence, after being filtered through foreign 
ministries and various levels of interior ministries, was sufficiently current by the time it 
reached the interviewing officers.139 
 
Regarding SCOs in particular, the Byrne and Shacknove study attested the same by showing 
that “country of origin information is often insufficient to support general conclusions about 
safety”.140 According to Statewatch, in the negotiations on the later annulled common list of 
SCOs in the Procedures Directive, in-depth analyses on country conditions and consensus 
among States on human rights standards within the specified jurisprudence were absent to an 
alarming degree: None of the EU MSs’ assessments were in agreement regarding conditions 
of safety for any of the seven African states on the list (Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, 
                                                                                                                                                   
Board’, Journal of Refugee Studies 1 (2002), pp. 1-2 citing Showler, Peter, Chair of the Canadian Immigration and Refugee 
Board (2002). 
135 Byrne and Shacknove 194. 
136 Hailbronner, Kay ‘The Concept of “Safe Country” and Expeditious Asylum Procedures: A Western European 
Perspective’ (1993) 5 International Journal of Refugee Law 31-65. 
137 Byrne and Shacknove 196. 
138 Ibidem, fn 40: “For example, an official at the Austrian Ministry of Interior stated that the main criteria for identifying 
safe countries were political. The Ministry bases its determinations upon information compiled from newspapers, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs profiles and some U.S. human rights reports. Information compiled by organizations such as Amnesty 
International was considered ‘too obscure’ to rely upon. Interview with Austrian Ministry of Interior Official No. 2 (July 
1992). Several British Home Office officials identified the following factors that affect the quality and availability of Foreign 
Ministry information: the level of interest of individual Foreign Ministry desk officers in such issues; the willingness of 
Embassy personnel to gather information, especially from remote or violent areas; and the working relationship between 
Home and Foreign Office officials. One U.K. Home Office official referred to Amnesty International as a "suspect outfit with 
an axe to grind". Joint Interview with U.K. Home Office Officials (December 1993). 
139 Byrne and Shacknove 194, fn 41: “Outdated country of origin information and the lack of time to review it by police 
interviewers are considered problems for the authorities in Norway. Interview with Norwegian Immigration Official (July 
1992). In 1992, an Austrian lawyer pointed out that country profiles used by asylum officers had not yet been altered to 
reflect the end of the Cold War. She stated that officials had considerable expertise with respect to Eastern Europe, yet knew 
little about the countries of origin of most contemporary asylum-seekers. Interview with Austrian Lawyer (June 1992)”. 
140 Byrne and Shacknove 194. 
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Mali, Mauritius and Senegal). Furthermore, the European Commission opposed the 
designation of every African State on the list as a SCO.141 The prevailing feeling was captured 
by a senior Norwegian police official who said: “concerning country of origin information, I 
have a bad conscience".142 
 
Hence, based on the author’s and others’ cited experience, it is asylum officers with an often 
prejudiced approach to the asylum-seeker who determine his need for refugee protection 
based on policy considerations or biased sources. The following section will examine where 
this point of departure in a “safe country” procedure leads the applicant. 
 
 
B. “Safe country” concepts  
 
As States’ application of the “safe country” concept has continued to expand, UNHCR, 
academics and NGOs have expressed criticism that generalized safety presumptions do not 
reflect reality, but rather lead to a situation where asylum-seekers are removed to a State in 
which they may be confronted with a situation that it would be wrong to confront them with. 
Until it has been clarified what is to be understood under “safe”, the author will use the term 
“precarious” for the contrary. For these situations, examples were researched and will be 
presented for SCOs (1) as well as for STCs (2). The examples aim to give the reader an 
impression of the complexity of the problems. While the recent examples speak for the 
urgency of the problem, the partly outdated examples – due to difficulties in finding recent 
studies – are helpful, as they allow for a clearer ex post diagnosis. 
 
1. “Safe country of origin” concepts 
 
Due to the different implications, the problems faced by the asylum-seeker from non-EU MS 
(a) and from EU MS (b) will be presented separately. 
 
                                                
141 Statewatch, ‘EU divided over list of SCOs– Statewatch calls for the list to be scrapped’, September 2004, available at: 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/sep/safe-countries.pdf. 
142 Byrne and Shacknove, 194, fn 42: “Interview with Norwegian Police Official (June 1992)”. 
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a. Non-EU Member States 
 
UNHCR’s research revealed that “there are significant differences and divergences in the type 
of information used to designate a country as safe across the Member States of focus. 
Furthermore, there are variations with regard to which authority is responsible for making 
designations, as well as whether this is done through the creation of SCO lists, or exclusively 
on a case by case basis. Furthermore, there is evidence of inconsistent state practice in relation 
to arrangements for periodically reviewing the safety of designated safe countries of origin. 
Finally, there are significantly different procedural consequences that follow from designation 
as a safe country of origin”.143 UNHCR concluded that, although most States have adequately 
transposed Art 30 (5) PD and refer to broadly similar sources of information as part of the 
designation process, “the generic formulation of this article permits wide divergences in the 
precise sources used by states. This fact, combined with major differences in the designation 
criteria applied, inevitably results in inconsistency in the designation of ‘safe countries of 
origin’. This is evident from a comparison between those States that currently have in place a 
national list, most significantly France, Germany and the United Kingdom.  
It is only France, Germany and the United Kingdom that actually have operational national 
lists of designated SCOs of the six among the 12 EU Member States in focus in UNHCR’s 
research carried in 2010 on the “safe country of origin” concept144 that have national 
legislation in place permitting the national designation of third countries as SCOs.145 At the 
time of UNHCR’s study, France had designated 18 countries as safe, and Germany had 
designated the Member States of the EU, plus another two countries - Ghana and Senegal - as 
safe. The United Kingdom had designated 24 countries as safe. At the time of UNHCR’s 
research, only eight countries appeared on the lists of both France and the United Kingdom. 
Only one country (Ghana) appeared on the list of all three States - although in the United 
Kingdom, Ghana was only considered a SCO for male applicants.146 
 
Four Member States do not have legislation in place that provides for the ‘national 
designation’ of SCOs, but nevertheless do have legislation in place that provides for the 
                                                
143 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Improving Asylum Procedures – Comparative Analysis and Recommendations for 
Law and Practice: Detailed Research on Key Asylum Procedures Directive Provisions’, March 2010, 351; for detailed 
information on every country, see 351-360. 
144 The study examined Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Slovenia, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
145 Bulgaria, France, Germany, Greece, Slovenia and the United Kingdom, UNHCR, 2010, 335. 
146 UNHCR, 2010, 336. 
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application of the SCO concept in the examination of applications.147 Of the Member States 
surveyed, only Belgium and Italy do not have legislation that permits the designation of third 
countries as SCOs or the application of the concept in the examination of applications. 
 
Of the ten States that provide for the national designation of third countries as SCOs or have 
legislation in place which provides for the application of the SCO concept in the examination 
of individual applications, six have retained legislation in effect prior to 1 December 2005. 
This allows these States to continue designating countries as safe in conflict with the 
requirements under Annex II.148 Only two surveyed States – Greece and the United Kingdom 
– permit designation of part of a country as safe or as safe for a specified group of persons. 
 
In practice, the SCO concept is applied in Finland, France, Spain and the United Kingdom as 
a procedural tool to assign applications to the accelerated procedure, and in Germany to 
prioritize applications. 
 
The following subsections will examine the fact that precarious conditions can indeed exist in 
assumed SCOs (aa) and the inability of the applicant to rebut the safety presumption (bb). 
 
aa. Precarious conditions  
 
Regarding the States in focus in UNHCR’s research carried in 2010 that actually have 
operational national lists of designated SCOs, UNHCR speaks of “an absence of clear 
provisions for reviewing the safety of countries, including what criteria would trigger a 
decision to either add or remove a country from the list”.149 UNHCR reiterated that “it must 
always be recognized that decisions about ‘safety’ are extremely difficult, given volatile 
human rights situations and the inherently biasing effect of political or foreign policy 
considerations”.150 
UNHCR’s research study revealed significant divergence in the criteria applied by Member 
States in designating third countries as SCOs. Bulgaria failed to include in the definition of a 
SCO the requirement that there be “no torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or 
                                                
147 The Czech Republic, Finland, the Netherlands and Spain; Ibidem. 
148 The Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom; UNHCR, 2010, 337. 
149 Ibidem. 
150 UNHCR, ‘Background Note on the Safe Country Concept and Refugee Status’, 26 July 1991, EC/SCP/68, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae68ccec.html [accessed 13 June 2011], at 3, Para 10. 
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punishment”.151 In Spain, the criteria for a SCO are the same as the criteria for a STC, 
reflecting neither the mentioned requirement nor the requirement of lack of threat by reason 
of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict. 
 
Of those States permitted to derogate under Art 30 (2) or (3) PD,152 the extent of the 
incorporation of or reference to Annex II criteria contained in national legislation varies 
considerably. The Czech Republic has not transposed Annex II’s criteria of “respect for the 
principle of non refoulement or the existence of a system of effective remedies against 
violations of rights and freedoms” or a requirement that there is “generally and consistently” 
no persecution in the country concerned. While Finnish legislative provisions go beyond the 
criteria under Annex II, in practice parts of countries have been considered as generally safe. 
The German concept does not equate to Arts 6 and 9 QD, in that it does not cover all serious 
violations of fundamental human rights that constitute an act of persecution under the 
Qualification Directive. Furthermore, the requirements do not reflect certain aspects of Annex 
II PD, lacking an explicit requirement for a “democratic system” and an explicit reference to 
indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict or to any of the 
criteria set out in sub-clauses (a) to (d). While the criteria in Dutch legislation are limited to 
whether a country has ratified (rather than observes) the GRC, the ECHR or CAT, the 
authorities are obliged to assess whether the country concerned complies with the stated 
international treaties in practice. However, the legal criteria do not adequately reflect Art 30 
(2) and (4) PD. The United Kingdom has derogated from Art 30 (1) PD and has retained 
criteria under national legislation in place prior to 1 December 2005 which falls short of the 
requirements of Annex II, namely because it does not require a consistent absence of 
persecution or that the application of the law in a democratic system be used as a basis for 
considering safety; and because there is no reference to threat by reason of indiscriminate 
violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict, nor a requirement that the 
absence of persecution can be shown. 
 
French legislation merely states that a country is considered to be a SCO if “it makes sure that 
the principles of freedom, democracy and the rule of law, as well as human rights and 
fundamental freedoms are fulfilled”.153 
 
                                                
151 For further omissions noticed by UNHCR regarding Bulgaria, Spain, but also Greece and Slovenia see UNHCR, 2010, 
340. 
152 The Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
153 UNHCR, 2010, 341, footnotes omitted. 
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In UNHCR’s study, the difference between legislation on the SCO concept and its application 
in practice is well documented in the analyzed countries. For example, in Germany, contrary 
to the legal provisions, persecution from non-State agents is not taken into account as a 
possibility for rebutting the presumption of safety, as was witnessed in UNHCR’s audit of 
case files.154 Furthermore, requirements specified in Annex II PD were not stipulated in the 
law but in the overall assessment required by the case-law of the Federal Constitutional Court. 
Despite this requirement, German discussions in 1993 about the designation of Ghana as a 
SCO show that some criteria are still disputable, e.g. the relevance of the abolition of the 
death penalty, of a catalogue of human rights in national law or of the necessary degree of 
stability in a post-dictatorial state.155 In France, according to the Ministry of Immigration, the 
elements contained in Annex II PD are taken into account in the designation of safe countries 
of origin. Furthermore, the effective application of laws and remedies are taken into account 
in its assessment.156 
 
 
bb. Impossibility to challenge the safety presumption 
 
The first common problem identified in several States is that no provision is made for 
applicants to receive information on the fact that their country of origin is considered safe, 
until the point at which they are notified of the decision to refuse their application.157 Thus, in 
effect, the first and only opportunity to challenge the safety presumption is during the appeal. 
Bulgarian legislation explicitly provides the applicant the opportunity to rebut the safety 
presumption, but interviewed asylum officers indicated they would not notify the applicant 
that they considered his country to be safe. This would de facto deny the applicant the 
opportunity to effectively rebut the safety presumption during the first instance procedure. In 
Spain, the asylum procedure establishes that the applicant will be notified about a decision to 
channel the application into the accelerated procedure. However, no information is provided 
on the specific grounds upon which this decision is taken. The applicant, the assisting NGO or 
lawyer has to contact the asylum office directly in order to obtain the information from the 
case file and eventually present grounds to rebut the presumption, which would be taken into 
account in the individual assessment of the claim. In the Netherlands, under the Dutch 
                                                
154 According to information provided by the determining authority (BAMF), the decision-makers have been instructed to be 
particularly alert to situations of non-state persecution for gender-specific reasons in Ghana – a designated safe country of 
origin: UNHCR, 2010, 339. 
155 UNHCR, 2010, 339. 
156 Ibidem. 
157 Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia, UNHCR, 2010, 354. 
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“intention procedure”, the applicant is notified of the intention to designate his country of 
origin as safe in advance of taking a decision. While this allows the applicant the opportunity 
to submit grounds as to why a designated country would not be safe in his particular 
circumstances, in the accelerated procedure the applicant only has three procedural hours in 
which to submit these grounds. In the United Kingdom, according to UNHCR, there is no 
indication that the applicant is told in advance of a positive decision on the safety 
presumption.  
 
Second, in relation to the substantive interview, in the United Kingdom the applicant is not 
given any further opportunity beyond that of other applicants to submit further evidence after 
the interview – within 48 hours in the processes in which applicants are detained and within 
five working days in the non-detained procedure.158 In Slovenia, the personal interview may 
be omitted and, in practice, is omitted in the SCO procedure as an accelerated procedure. This 
denial of a personal interview deprives the applicant of an effective opportunity to rebut the 
safety presumption. 
 
Third, UNHCR’s research has revealed divergence among Member States with regard to the 
opportunity given to applicants to rebut a safety presumption in practice. The burden of 
proof was increased on the applicant, as envisaged by Art 31 (1) PD, in the Czech Republic, 
Greece, Slovenia and the United Kingdom. In the Czech Republic, it is unclear whether the 
legally established right to rebut the presumption of safety is effective in practice. Information 
about SCO designations and procedures is not included in the general written information 
provided to applicants at the start of the procedure. In Greece, there is no provision for 
advance notice of any decisions, and reasons for refusal are only supplied once the negative 
decision has been issued. Moreover, the standard phraseology included in all refusal decisions 
does not make reference to SCO considerations. Therefore, in practice, there is no opportunity 
for the applicant to rebut the presumption of safety, or seek the assistance of a lawyer in 
relation to this. 
 
Under United Kingdom legislation, if the applicant comes from a designated SCO, there is a 
quasi-presumption that the case is clearly unfounded, leaving it entirely to the applicant to 
submitting serious grounds to counter this presumption. In Germany, the presumption of 
safety from persecution can be rebutted on the basis of the presentation of facts or evidence 
                                                
158 UNHCR, 2010, 355. 
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by the applicant. This does not amount to imposing the full burden of proof on the applicant; 
it is sufficient that the facts or evidence submitted by the applicant “give reason to believe” 
that the applicant is in danger of persecution, despite the general situation in the country. In 
France, the presumption that the nationally designated countries of origin are safe applies to 
the asylum office, which is empowered to refuse a temporary residence permit to an applicant 
from a listed SCO. As a consequence, the application for international protection is directed 
into the accelerated procedure. While there is no explicit provision of legislation placing the 
burden of proof entirely on the applicant, in practice, the burden of proof on the applicant 
appears nevertheless to be greater, and it may play a role in the credibility assessment.159 In 
the Netherlands, national legislation requires that the applicant make a “plausible case” that 
the country of origin does not fulfil its international human rights treaty obligations with 
regard to him; as such, the burden of proof on the applicant is greater, but this does not relieve 
the determining authority of its duty to gather evidence. Similarly, in Finland, it is the 
responsibility of the applicant to rebut the presumption of safety and, therefore, in theory the 
burden of proof shifts to the applicant; however, in practice, the safety assessment is made in 
cooperation with the applicant and responsibility is thus shared. 
 
 
b. EU Member States 
 
The following subsections will again examine the fact that precarious conditions can indeed 
exist in assumed SCOs (aa) and the inability of the applicant to rebut the safety presumption 
(bb). 
 
aa. Precarious conditions  
 
Even today, it is evident that Roma are subjected to persecution in some EU MS on racial 
grounds or as members of a particular social group and are unable to avail themselves of the 
proper protection of the State, i.e. in Hungary with its attacks on and murder of Roma.160 
There is current concern regarding claims for asylum lodged in EU MSs by Roma and other 
                                                
159 UNHCR, 2010, 354. 
160 See, e.g., Spiegel, ‘Racist Crime Wave, Hungary’s Roma Bear Brunt of Downturn’, 2 December 2009: “With Hungary in 
the depths of economic despair, its Roma minority has become an easy target for many people’s resentments. The murder of 
a Roma man and his five-year-old son an Monday is the latest incident in a spiral of fear and hate”. 
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related groups who have been forced to flee another EU MS due to the persecution faced 
there.161 
 
To more clearly demonstrate the issue of possible persecution in an EU MS in an ex post 
diagnosis, this section will present a case that the author defended as legal representative. This 
case involved a Romanian citizen, Mr. Romeo B., from whom the Austrian asylum office 
wanted to withdraw his recognized asylum protection after Romania’s accession to the EU on 
1 January 2007, which meant that Romania was subject to the “safe country” exception. Mr. 
B., who had been active in Romania as a leader of syndicational strikes and was also well-
known in the international media, had received asylum on 8 November 2005 due to a 
politically motivated conviction of five years imprisonment. 
 
In Romania, the independence of the judiciary is severely limited by political corruption. As 
was found in a 2006 study by Stanford University, corrupt politicians are hierarchically still 
more powerful than judges and hence above the law. According to the study, “in the absence 
of effective deterrents and mechanisms of punishment, Romanian political elites have weak 
internal incentives to reduce corruption”.162 In a 2007 report, Transparency International 
likewise criticized the corruption in the Romanian justice system as being systematic.163 And 
                                                
161 Mole, Nuala, ‘Asylum and the European Convention on Human Rights’, in Plender, Richard (ed.), ‘Problems Raised by 
Certain Aspects of the Present Situation of Refugees from the Standpoint of the European Convention on Human Rights’ 
(Strasbourg/Council of Europe, 2000) 74. 
162 Burduja, S.I., ‘Assessing corruption in Romania. An integrationist story’, Stanford’s Student Journal of Russian, East 
European and Eurasian Studies, 2006, Spring 58-9. 
163 Transparency International, ‘Global Corruption Report 2007: Corruption in Judicial Systems’, (2007) Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 268: “After analysis, TI Romania concluded that implementation of reforms was deficient due 
to poor administrative skills and lack of will by heads of courts and prosecutors’ offices. The summary report for the centre’s 
first phase of operation revealed that courts, registries, archives and clerks’ offices suffer from poor integrity and bad 
administration in the quality and promptness of service. This led to the conclusion that the reforms have had little impact thus 
far on citizens’ relationship with the justice system. Pressure on judgement: […] According to a TI Romania survey in 
September 2005, 78 per cent of magistrates view the justice system as independent, though not ‘absolutely independent’. 
Judges indicated that they felt pressure on their decisions from media, members of parliament, government officials and 
economic interests while prosecutors said they experienced pressure from within the hierarchy, notably from chief 
prosecutors. Though judiciary management will pass to the supreme council, this development will be accompanied by 
continuing structural weaknesses, such as inadequate court staffing and magistrates’ low professional standards. […] 
Accountability in the judiciary: Corruption and lack of transparency in relations between court users and court personnel are 
also systemic. […] Despite several attempts to standardise the system of jurisprudential interpretation, Romanian justice is 
inconsistent, with many unpredictable decisions and differing legal interpretations in different courts – and sometimes in the 
same court. A law is under consideration that will outline mechanisms to foster unitary jurisprudence, and ensure a proper 
balance between judges’ decision-making independence and the increased predictability of their decisions. Conflicts of 
interest: Since 2003 a stricter set of conflict of interest provisions has prohibited magistrates from numerous compromising 
situations, including the hearing of cases that involve relatives up to the fourth degree. Where conflicts of interest remain, 
visitors to the centre cited instances of acts of a criminal nature, such as trafficking of influence, through which family or 
non-family relationships were used to twist rulings or motivate magistrates to make particular judgements. Of the 600 cases 
adopted by the counselling centre, 190 were serious enough to pursue through legal channels. The two most frequent charges 
were ‘failure to consider evidence’ and ‘violation of court procedures’, and many clients attributed these actions to conflicts 
of interest. […] Disciplinary procedure for judges: The system for ensuring the integrity of magistrates is another issue in the 
fight against corruption. [W]hen Romania was expected to complete the requirements of the Justice and Internal Affairs 
chapter of the EU accession protocol, the pace of reform accelerated, but EU monitoring reports, increasingly frequent and 
more detailed, reflected the difficulties facing the justice sector. For most of the measures adopted, the Justice Ministry 
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finally, the European Commission concluded its report on the improvements in Romania in 
January 2008: 
 
“When Romania entered the EU on 1 January 2007, a Cooperation and Verification Mechanism 
[…] was set up to help Romania to remedy shortcomings in the area of judicial reform and the fight 
against corruption and to monitor progress in these areas. […] In its first year of EU membership 
Romania has continued to make efforts to remedy weaknesses that would otherwise prevent an 
effective application of EU laws, policies and programmes. However, in key areas such as the fight 
against high-level corruption, convincing results have not yet been demonstrated. The technical 
update which is provided in this report does not constitute an in depth assessment of progress under 
the benchmarks but the situation on the ground gives rise to concerns which need to be addressed 
before the Commission carries out a full assessment in June. Delays have occurred in implementing 
a coherent recruitment strategy for the judiciary […], in the establishment of a National Integrity 
Agency […] and in developing an overall strategy and implementing flagship projects to fight local 
corruption […]. Romania should particularly step up its efforts in the fight against high-level 
corruption […] and should strengthen its efforts to maintain the legal and institutional stability of 
the Romanian anti-corruption framework.”164 
 
In Mr. B’s particular case, three of his supporters and colleagues were convicted in the same 
court case and subsequently detained at the moment that the extradition claim was issued. 
Romania’s extradition claim to enforce the sentence of a politically motivated criminal 
proceeding also on Mr. B proves the continuity of Mr. B’s persecution, and thus the currency 
of his refugee claim. 
 
 
bb. Impossibility to challenge the safety presumption 
 
In the case of Mr. B., the asylum office undertook research on the general situation in 
Romania that was not based on publications from international organisations or NGOs, but 
rather solely on “media information”, which is still highly politically influenced in 
Romania.165 For Mr. B., it was impossible to rebut the safety presumption, as the deciding 
                                                                                                                                                   
benefited from EU technical advice on the legislation most likely to reduce corruption. What remains to be done is for these 
measures to be applied more effectively”.  
164 European Commission COM (2008) 62 final ‘Interim Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council on Progress in Romania under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism’ Brussels, 4 February 2008, available at  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52008DC0062:EN:HTML.  
165 Freedom House in its report on Romania in 2007: “In 2006, there was much discussion over the alleged role of the 
Romanian secret service in the country’s independent media. […] After the CNSAS gained numerous Securitate files, these 
revelations fed a widespread conspiracy theory that most of the press takes part in the propaganda and disinformation 
structure run by the secret services in cooperation with Mafia networks built on the Russian model. […] The issue of 
collaboration in Romanian media remains quite ambiguous. […] Furthermore, Romanian media are heavily editorialized and 
frequently run stories without sources, publish innuendo, or stage wild campaigns on issues that would traditionally not make 
news in other professional media. […] Additionally, concentration in media ownership continued to increase in Romania in 
2006. […] Basescu called a number of talk shows to argue with his critics in 2006, an unprecedented practice. Disinformation 
wars rage continually in the media, but the patient viewer or reader can find credible information alongside misinformation. 
[…] Two cases of open censorship occurred in 2006. […] The modification of the Law on Public Television, introduced 
nearly a year ago, continues to move slowly through the Parliament. The law does not greatly improve the statute of the 
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officer was of the opinion that the accession of Romania to the EU on 1 January 2007 “is 
intrinsically tied to the positive judgment of the general human rights situation”.166 
 
The decision Horvath v Secretary of State for the Home Department167 shall be presented as 
an example of the reluctance to protect EU citizens by granting them asylum status. In this 
case, the appellant claimed to have left Slovakia with his family because he was a member of 
the Roma community and feared persecution by skinhead groups that targeted Roma who 
were not protected by the Slovak police. For the sake of the efficiency of the Spanish 
Protocol, the House of Lords changed its jurisprudence to a degree that it has become 
unwilling to accept that treatment in other European states might generate a valid refugee 
claim.  
 
 
2. “Safe third country” concepts 
 
Again, in this section, the problems arising from the STC concept will be presented separately 
regarding non-EU MS (a) and EU MS (b).  
 
a. Non-EU Member States 
 
UNHCR’s research from 2010 revealed that in 16 EU MS, the STC concept is reflected in the 
law, but not (systematically) applied in practice.168 Poland does not include the concept in its 
laws. In addition, Belgium, France and Italy do not reflect the STC concept in national 
legislation, nor do they apply it in practice.169 In fact, only five EU MS apply the concept in 
law and in practice: Spain, Austria, Hungary, Portugal and the United Kingdom. Furthermore, 
UNHCR’s research found that in Spain, the concept is reportedly never used as the sole 
ground for inadmissibility or rejection; however, Spain apparently extends the use of the 
concept, in practice and on a case-by-case basis, to some Latin American and African 
                                                                                                                                                   
politically battered public station. If it passes, the responsibilities of the chairman of the board and director general will be 
separate, but the law will likely have no impact on the main problems facing public TV, the most daunting being that the 
Parliament continues to approve the yearly report of the president director general and also appoints the board.“, available at 
 http://www.freedomhouse.hu//images/fdh_galleries/NIT2007final/nit-romania-web.pdf. 
166 English translation of “untrennbar mit einer positiven Beurteilung der allgemeinen Menschenrechtslage verbunden”. 
167 [2000] 1 AC 489 (HL). 
168 Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, the Netherlands, Cyprus, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden and Slovenia; UNHCR, 2010, 7. 
169 UNHCR, 2010, 299. For more details, see 299-300. 
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States.170 No evidence was found of the United Kingdom applying the STC concept to 
countries other than the USA, Switzerland or Canada. In addition, there are no publicly 
available statistics confirming the numbers of removals or to which countries the United 
Kingdom removes applicants under this concept.171  
 
This result leads UNHCR in its study to conclude that, while Member States appear to support 
the notion, the STC concept is largely symbolic and has little practical use regarding non-EU 
MS.172 
 
Nevertheless, the fact will now be presented that precarious conditions can indeed exist in 
assumed STCs (aa) and the applicant can be inhibited in rebutting the safety presumption 
(bb). 
 
aa. Precarious conditions  
 
The STC concept has been applied since the early 1990s to Eastern European countries, 
regardless of the fact that their legislation adopted at that time did not comply with the 
international standards relating to the protection of refugees.173  
 
bb. Impossibility to challenge the safety presumption 
 
Asylum applications falling under the STC concept may be declared manifestly unfounded in 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, and the United Kingdom and inadmissible in Finland, 
Greece, Slovenia, Spain and the United Kingdom.174 Among the EU MSs surveyed by 
UNHCR that have transposed the STC concept into national legislation, omission of the 
interview is only possible in Greece, Slovenia and the United Kingdom.175 
 
Governments of EU MSs applying the STC concept have emphasized that the practices within 
the State in question are more important in determining whether a country is "safe" than 
formal accession to the GRC or other human rights instruments. However, such statements are 
                                                
170 Ibidem. 
171 Ibidem. 
172 On practical use in detail, see UNHCR, 2010, 303-307. 
173 Amnesty International published the study on 60 cases of individual asylum-seekers refused on safe third country ground 
by the United Kingdom Home Office: Bouteillet-Paquet, Daphné. ‘Passing the Buck: A Critical Analysis of the Readmission 
Policy Implemented by the European Union and Its Member States’ (2003) 5 European Journal of Migration and Law 367.  
174 UNHCR, 2010, 319. 
175 UNHCR, 2010, 314-5. 
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not reflected in State practice: few EU MSs have “exhibited enthusiasm for investigating the 
protection conditions in countries of first asylum prior to the return of individual asylum-
seekers”,176 but rather “commonly rely on formal ratification of the Geneva Convention as the 
sole criterion justifying return”.177 There are even certain governments that have returned 
asylum-seekers to States that have neither ratified the Geneva Convention nor complied with 
its provisions in practice.178 This analysis coincides with the result of UNHCR’s survey on the 
Member States in its focus. It appears that only the law and procedure in the Netherlands 
provides the applicant with an effective opportunity to challenge the presumption of safety:179 
in the intention procedure, applied also in all other asylum procedures, the determining 
authority first gives the applicant its “intended decision”. This gives the applicant and his 
lawyer the opportunity to formulate a view on the intended decision and submit any counter-
indications. The applicant is, therefore, informed in advance of the fact that the determining 
authority considers a country to be a safe third country and the applicant has the chance to 
rebut the presumption of safety. The view of the applicant and his lawyer is taken into account 
                                                
176 Byrne and Shacknove 201, referring in fn 58 to Thavathevathasan v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [1994] 
Imm AR 269, 258-59 (finding that the Secretary of State has no obligation to make a direct enquiry of France, a third country 
in which a Sri Lankan asylum-seeker had spent five days, to establish that the claim would be substantively considered 
there). In Norway, a Ministry of Justice official stated that checks are rarely made to see if asylum-seekers may be refouled 
from a first asylum country. Interview with Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Police Official (May 1992). An Austrian 
Ministry of Interior official observed that with regard to safe third country removals it is not required that the transit State 
have signed or conform its practice to the 1951 Geneva Convention. Interview with Austrian Ministry of Interior Official No. 
2 (July 1992). Under the Austrian safe country of asylum policy, asylum-seekers have been removed to Algeria, Iran, Russia 
and Turkey, based on brief transit stays and irrespective of local treatment of asylum-seekers. See Brandl, Ulrike, ‘Asylrecht 
und Asylpolitik in Osterreich’, (1993) 8 ASYL 3, 6. 
177 Ibidem, fn 59: “For example, Art 30 (3) of the Finnish Asylum Act specifies, inter alia, the following special grounds for 
denying asylum claims: the alien concerned previously stayed in a country which has acceded to the Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees or stayed in another safe country and applied for asylum or had the opportunity to do so; or according 
to the Convention between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden Concerning the Waiver of Passport Control at 
the Intra-Nordic Frontiers (SopS 10/58), another signatory to the Convention is obliged to readmit the alien in question 
Ulkomaalaislaki [Aliens Act], Feb. 22, 1991, Statutes of Finland 639/93”. 
178 Ibidem, fn 60: “The Austrian government has removed asylum-seekers to Saudi Arabia, which is not a party to the 1951 
Geneva Convention or the 1967 New York Protocol and has not enacted refugee legislation or adopted policies concerning 
the grant of asylum”: See Achermann, Alberto, and Gattiker, Mario, ‘Safe Third Countries: European Developments’ (1995) 
7 International Journal of Refugee Law 19 31. A similar attempt by the U.K. Home Office to return an asylum-seeker to 
Saudi Arabia was prevented on appeal. See Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Razaq Mohd Saeid Abdu Abdel 
[1992] Imm AR 152 (Immigration Appeals Tribunal rules that Home Secretary's finding that Saudi Arabia was a safe country 
of asylum was not justified on the evidence). An Austrian Ministry of Justice Official stated that Austria had identified as 
safe countries of first asylum the Czech Republic, that had not yet ratified the Convention and other countries, such as 
Hungary, that had done so only with geographic reservations. Interview with Austrian Ministry of Justice Official (April 
1992). The United Kingdom also attempted to remove an asylum-seeker to Hong Kong, stating that the territory was a 
signatory to the 1951 Convention, and that, based on assessment of its immigration policies and practices, it could be 
considered a safe country of asylum: Notification Letter to Asylum Seeker of Safe Third Country Removal, Immigration and 
Nationality Department, Home Office, August 20, 1994 (on file with the Harvard Human Rights Journal). Hong Kong is not 
a signatory to the 1951 Convention, has not enacted refugee legislation or adopted policies concerning the grant of asylum for 
non-Vietnamese claimants, and is not considered to be a safe country by UNHCR. The U.K. Home Office has had its 
decision to remove asylum-seekers to Kenya upheld by the Courts: Arthur Kingori v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [1994] Imm AR 539. Kenya has signed, but not ratified the 1951 Convention and has, to date, not enacted 
refugee legislation.” 
179 UNHCR, 2010, 312; for the other countries, see 312-5. 
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before the determining authority issues the decision.180 In contrast, in the Czech Republic and 
the United Kingdom, the presumption of safety can only be rebutted “in theory”.181 
 
b. EU Member States 
 
Only some years after the Dublin Regulation entered into effect,182 national jurisprudence 
across the EU on protection grounds started to be embroiled in asylum controversies. 
Therefore, it will be presented in detail, that through “Dublin”, precarious conditions can 
indeed exist in the assumed STCs (aa) and the situation of the rebuttal of the safety 
presumption (bb). 
 
aa. Precarious conditions in the “safe” third country 
 
In the course of the enlargement of the EU, commentators have expressed doubts about 
whether all EU MSs can be considered STCs. These doubts arose from the fact that asylum-
seekers had either no access to a substantive refugee determination procedure at all or only 
access to a procedure ending in refoulement, chain-refoulement or entailing inhuman 
conditions in accommodation, detention or regarding medical treatment.183 Hence, the 
“safety” of a third country encompasses two different issues: the conditions and the asylum 
procedure awaiting the applicant in the respective country. In other words, precarious living 
or detention conditions awaiting the asylum-seeker in the third country (1) as well as 
deficiencies of the STC’s refugee determination procedure (2) can lead to refoulement. 
 
1. Precarious living or detention conditions  
While Poland,184 Slovenia and especially Slovakia185 are questionable in terms of living or 
detention conditions, the most striking example among EU MSs is Greece. In that country, 
                                                
180 UNHCR, 2010, 313. 
181 UNHCR, 2010, 316. 
182 The Dublin Regulation covers the 25 Member States of the European Union plus Norway and Iceland as of 1 September 
2003 and Switzerland as of 12 December 2008. 
183 Very good inquiry by the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), ’Report of the Application of the Dublin II 
Regulation in Europe’, (March 2006) AD3/3/2006/EXT/MH. 
184 Inhuman conditions and treatment in the asylum reception facilities and camps: March 2006: Racist assaults, stabs with a 
knife: Asyl in Not, „Traumatisierter in Schubhaft“, email of 27 March 2006; June 2006: When arriving in a camp, Mr. A was 
forced to undress, kneel down and undress. He was put in a cell with a blanket and was told that “An animal is given hay and 
a kennel, you have a blanket”. For 48 hours, he had to beg for toilet and walk and received only old bread and coloured 
water: Email of Amnesty International Regional EU Affairs and IGO Team, 22 November 2006, sending the article Marcin 
Wojciechowski, “Isa, who wanted to be a human”, 11 November 2006; September 2006: Dramatically bad treatment: 
uneatable food, no medical treatment, attacks by skin heads, unbearable discriminations, presence of Russian security 
personnel of FSB: Flüchtlingsrat des Landes Brandenburg, ‘Odyssee tschetschenischer Flüchtlinge hat kein Ende Familien 
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living and detention conditions for asylum-seekers have been alarming for a long time. 
Regarding the living conditions, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) 
stated in its report on its visit in December 2006: “[W]ith respect to the centres visited, which 
were all opened during the last four years, the CPT was concerned to observe that its previous 
recommendations in this field have not been taken into account, and the conditions under 
which foreigners were detained could in certain cases be qualified as inhuman and 
degrading”.186 The ECJ found on 19 April 2007 that Greece had failed to implement the 
Minimum Standards Directive; the Directive was subsequently transposed into Greek law in 
November 2007. On 15 April 2008, UNHCR advised EU MSs in a position paper to refrain 
from returning asylum-seekers to Greece under the Dublin Regulation until further notice. 
The position paper also noted that the implementation of the Minimum Standards Directive 
continued to present serious flaws. The paper stated: “UNHCR remains concerned about the 
extremely limited reception facilities for asylum-seekers as this situation is seriously 
compromising the full implementation of the Presidential Decree on the Reception Conditions 
and urges the Government of Greece to promptly issue the awaited ministerial decision that 
should establish the criteria for the provision of a daily financial allowance”. In addition, the 
Norwegian Organization for Asylum Seekers, the Norwegian Helsinki Committee, and Greek 
Helsinki Monitor issued a joint report in April 2008 on accommodations and social conditions 
awaiting Dublin Regulation returnees to Greece, finding the number of actual places available 
to destitute asylum-seekers to be “negligible” and the conditions of the few accommodation 
centres “deplorable”. They observed that “the large majority of asylum seekers remain 
completely without social assistance with regard to accommodation and/or other forms of 
                                                                                                                                                   
durch Sachsens Behörden getrennt, ihnen allen droht die Rückführung nach Polen’, email of 5 September 2006; Esser, 
Barbara and Gladysch, Barbara: ‘Die Situation tschetschenischer Asylbewerber und Flüchtlinge in Polen und Auswirkungen 
der EU-Verordnung Dublin II’, February 2005, 3. 
No medical treatment: June 2006: Mr. A was transferred from Belgium with the information of medical doctor that he suffers 
from jaundice type C. The Polish border guard took away from him the remaining medicine; the Polish medical doctor saw 
no need for treatment. After intervention by his sister he is operated, but not put on a diet, later jaundice is diagnosed. Mr. A 
is released in July, but dies in October after doctors could not/did not want to help him. 
185 As to the living conditions and treatment in the asylum reception facilities and camps, experiences have been so bad that 
Chechen refugees cannot bare them anymore and prefer to return “voluntarily” to the RF or even Chechnya: In February 
2006, beatings by Slovakian police were reported which amounted, according to the Austrian psychotherapist-NGO 
Hemayat, to “extreme degrading and almost torturous treatment” and re-traumatization; Asyl in Not, ‘Folter in der Slowakei’, 
email of 24 February 2006; in March 2006, an NGO reported that 80 % of the asylum-seekers fell sick due to conditions in 
over-crowded camp, mistreatment, and beatings, frightening by dogs. “When a suicide attempt was reported, the officers 
said: ‘we come when he is dead, call us then.’ Panic increased, the person was brought to hospital but received no medical 
treatment and was told that he ‘will beg for deportation’”:  Asyl in Not, ‘Folter in der Slowakei (Teil 2)’, email of 10 March 
2006; also from asylum-seekers being detained, inhuman treatment was reported: in detention in February 2006, a group of 
asylum-seekers was forced to lie down; policemen urinated on their heads: Asyl in Not, ‘Folter in der Slowakei’, email of 24 
February 2006. Regarding medical treatment, there exist no or extremely limited psychiatric health-care facilities for 
torture/trauma survivors. The consequences are severely detrimental effects on the concerned individuals who have already 
suffered highly traumatic experiences. 
186 Council of Europe, ‘Report to the Government of Greece on the visit to Greece carried out by the European Committee for 
the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 27 August to 9 September 2005’, 
CPT/Inf (2006) 41. 
 50 
social assistance. Greece is in practice a country where asylum seekers and refugees are 
almost entirely left to their own devices”.187 In November 2008, Human Right Watch 
reported: “Asylum seekers of all nationalities who manage to obtain and maintain their red 
cards have little hope of receiving support from the government during the often protracted 
time their claims are pending. The homeless and destitute among them often lack housing 
accommodation and other basic forms of social assistance, in part, because Greece only has 
reception centre spaces for 770 of the most needy and vulnerable asylum seekers. Although 
three of the 10 reception centres are reserved for unaccompanied children, Human Rights 
Watch met unaccompanied children, among others, who were living in the streets, parks, and 
in abandoned buildings because of a lack of accommodations and other social services”.  
With regard to detention conditions, Amnesty International had already reported in October 
2005 that asylum-seekers were being detained in metal containers.188 UNHCR stated in March 
2006 for its campaign on “the difficulties of being an asylum-seeker in Greece” that most of 
the people caught entering the country illegally were arrested and placed in administrative 
detention usually for the maximum legal term of three months.189 In its report on its visit of 
December 2006, the CPT summarized: “As was the case in 2001, a considerable number of 
persons interviewed by the delegation in the course of the visit alleged they had been ill-
treated by police officers. The alleged ill-treatment consisted mostly of kicks, punches and 
blows with batons or various other objects, often inflicted during questioning. Certain 
allegations also referred to the use of excessive force at the time of arrest. In some cases the ill 
treatment alleged could be considered as amounting to torture”.190 On 11 June 2009, the 
ECtHR found in S.D. v. Greece that the Greek detention conditions violated Art 3 ECHR on 
the basis that the conditions of detention to which the applicant was held, bearing in mind he 
was an asylum-seeker, combined with the excessive length and conditions, amounted to 
degrading treatment.191 Finally, the reports cited in the ECtHR’s judgment M.S.S. v. Belgium 
and Greece192 attest to “a systematic practice of detaining asylum seekers in Greece from a 
                                                
187 “A gamble with the right to asylum in Europe-Greek asylum policy and the Dublin 2 Regulation”. 
188 Amnesty International, ‘Greece: Out of the Spotlight: The rights of foreigners and minorities are still a grey area’, 5 
October 2005, EUR 25/016/2005, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/43b149b34.html [accessed 15 June 
2011]. 
189 UNHCR, ‘New campaign highlights the difficulties of being an asylum seeker in Greece’, 16 March 2006, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/news/opendoc.htm?tbl=NEWS&id=4419605f4 [accessed 15 June 2011]. 
190 Council of Europe, Report, 41. 
191 The asylum-seeker was confined to a prefabricated cabin for two months without allowing him outdoors or to make a 
telephone call, and with no clean sheets and insufficient hygiene products, amounts to degrading treatment within the 
meaning of Art 3 ECHR: S.D. v. Greece, Application No. 53541/07, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 
11 June 2009, Paras 49 to 54. 
192 Council of Europe, ‘Report of the LIBE Committee delegation on its visit to Greece (Samos and Athens)’, European 
Parliament, 17 July 2007; Pro Asyl, ‘The truth may be bitter but must be told - The Situation of Refugees in the Aegean and 
the Practices of the Greek Coast Guard’, October 2007; UNHCR, ‘Asylum in the European Union. A Study of the 
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few days up to a few months following their arrival”.193 This practice affects both asylum-
seekers arriving in Greece for the first time and those transferred by an EU MS under the 
Dublin Regulation. All the centres visited by the above-mentioned bodies and organizations 
that produced the reports describe “a similar situation to varying degrees of gravity: 
overcrowding, dirt, lack of space, lack of ventilation, little or no possibility of taking a walk, 
no place to relax, insufficient mattresses, dirty mattresses, no free access to toilets, inadequate 
sanitary facilities, no privacy, limited access to care. Many of the people interviewed also 
complained of insults, particularly racist insults, proffered by staff and the use of physical 
violence by guards“.194 After his mission to Greece in October 2010, the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Torture concluded after inspecting the detention conditions that “[t]here is a 
humanitarian crisis facing new arrivals into Greece, detained in overcrowded and poor 
conditions amounting to inhuman and degrading treatment; particularly vulnerable are 
pregnant women, single women with small children, and unaccompanied minors. Most have 
no access to legal assistance or interpretation and medical attention is extremely limited or 
unavailable”.195 
 
2. Deficiencies in the asylum procedure  
 
Some asylum-seekers have had no access to a substantive refugee determination procedure, 
due to their difficulties after their return to the third country in having their case either re-
opened or examined in a fair asylum procedure. 
                                                                                                                                                   
implementation of the Qualification Directive’, November 2007; European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, 
following its visit to Greece from 20 to 27 February 2007, 8 February 2008; Amnesty International, ‘Greece: No place for an 
asylum-seeker’, 27 February 2008; European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), ‘Spotlight on Greece – EU asylum 
lottery under fire’, 3 April 2008; Norwegian Organisation for Asylum Seekers (NOAS), ‘A gamble with the right to asylum 
in Europe – Greek asylum policy and the Dublin II regulation’, 9 April 2008; UNHCR, ‘Position on the Return of Asylum-
Seekers to Greece under the "Dublin Regulation”’, 15 April 2008, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/482199802.html; 
Human Rights Watch, ‘Stuck in a revolving door – Iraqis and other asylum seekers and migrants at Greece/Turkey entrance 
to the European Union, November 2008; Clandestino, “Undocumented migration: counting the uncountable: data and trends 
across Europe”, December 2008; Human Rights Watch, “Left to survive”, December 2008; - Cimade, “Droit d'asile: les gens 
de Dublin II, parcours juridique de demandeurs d'asile soumis à une réadmission selon le règlement Dublin II”, December 
2008; Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr T. Hammarberg, report prepared following his visit to Greece 
from 8 to 10 December 2008, 4 February 2009; - Greek Council of Refugees, “The Dublin Dilemma – “Burden shifting and 
putting asylum seekers at risk”, 23 February 2009; - European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, report prepared 
following its visit to Greece from 23 to 28 September 2008, 30 June 2009; Austrian Red Cross and Caritas, “The Situation of 
Persons Returned by Austria to Greece under the Dublin Regulation. Report on a Joint Fact-Finding Mission to Greece (May 
23rd - 28th 2009)”, August 2009; Norwegian Helsinki Committee (“NHC”), NOAS and Aitima, “Out the back door: the 
Dublin II Regulation and illegal deportations from Greece”, October 2009; Human Rights Watch, “Greece: Unsafe and 
Unwelcoming Shores”, October 2009; - UNHCR, Observations on Greece as a country of asylum, December 2009; Amnesty 
International, “The Dublin II Trap: transfers of Dublin Asylum Seekers to Greece”, March 2010; National Commission for 
Human Rights (Greece), “Detention conditions in police stations and detention areas of aliens”, April 2010; Amnesty 
International, “Irregular migrants and asylum-seekers routinely detained in substandard conditions”, July 2010. 
193 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, application no. 30696/09, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 21 
January 2011, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d39bc7f2.html [accessed 16 June 2011], para 161. 
194 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, para 162. 
195 Report submitted by the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment to 
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According to a survey from March 2006, certain asylum cases were not reopened by the 
asylum office of the STC after a decision had been made in the absence of the asylum-seeker, 
in Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Spain.196 In another, older 
example, 52% of the asylum-seekers returned to France and 15% of those returned to the 
Netherlands between 26 July 1993 and early March 1995 were bounced back to the United 
Kingdom.197 States that do not allow the re-opening of the case leave the applicant with no 
option but to try to file a subsequent, second asylum application. This becomes problematic 
when a subsequent asylum application is only permitted subject to strict criteria, such as the 
establishment of new facts or circumstances, as it is the situation in Belgium, Hungary, the 
Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden and the United Kingdom.198 In reality, most applicants do not 
have new circumstances since leaving the responsible STC, and thus their cases are never 
heard. 
 
Research has shown that “often, the receiving ‘safe’ country had already made arrangements 
for the asylum-seeker’s return to the country of origin or to another unsafe country en 
route.”199 For example, Amnesty International reported two separate cases of Colombian 
asylum-seekers who were returned from the United Kingdom to Spain on STC grounds 
without the United Kingdom’s authorities having sought assurances from Spain that the 
Colombians would receive a determination of the substance of their application; the Spanish 
authorities summarily expelled the asylum-seekers without hearing their case.200 In practice, 
this has led to some cases not being substantively examined within the EU before expulsion201 
and hence to instances of chain-refoulement. 
 
Chain-refoulement also takes place through refugee determination procedures by a “safe” 
third country which itself has fallen short of minimum standards in crucial respects by 
                                                
196 ECRE 151. 
197 Dunstan, Richard, ‘Playing Human Pinball: the Amnesty International United Kingdom Section Report on UK Home 
Office “Safe Third Country” Practice’ (1995) 7 International Journal of Refugee Law 4 623. 
198 In this context it is worth noting that, while Art 32 (3) PD permits Member States to impose special procedures for 
subsequent applications including requirement on new facts/circumstances, Art 34 (2) states that such conditions for 
subsequent applications should not render access to a new procedure impossible nor result in the severe curtailment of such 
access.  
199 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, ‘Restrictions on asylum in the member states of the Council of Europe and 
the European Union’, Doc. 8598, Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography, 21 December 1999, para. 22; for 
examples, see Salignat, Claire, ‘The Stakes for Human Rights in the Dublin II Regulation: Underlying Principles and 
Practical Implementations’ (Raoul Wallenberg Institute/Lund, 2005), 71. 
200 Amnesty International, ‘Passing the Buck: Deficient Home Office Practice in “Safe Third Country” Asylum Cases’ 
(1993), 610. 
201 Salignat, Claire, ‘The Stakes for Human Rights in the Dublin II Regulation: Underlying Principles and Practical 
Implementations’ (Raoul Wallenberg Institute/Lund, 2005), 151. 
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restricting access to asylum procedures, fair hearings and appeal possibilities.202 For example, 
in an ex post analysis, the former Communist bloc countries that acceded to the EU in 2004 
(Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary and Slovenia) 
were questionable STCs for asylum-seekers to be returned to according to the Dublin 
Regulation. Before their accession to the EU, these countries were new democracies without 
experience in refugee determination procedures. Although it had signed the GRC in 1997, 
Lithuania expelled asylum-seekers and immigrants who had entered the country illegally, 
often to countries where their lives were at risk.203 In addition, serious doubts were expressed 
with regard to Poland and the Czech Republic due to their structural overload by taking back 
asylum-seekers according to readmission agreements or because of dubious legislation.204 In 
view of this situation, the then-UN High Commissioner for Refugees Ruud Lubbers publicly 
warned the EU Justice and Home Affairs Council on the eve of expansion in May of 2004 that 
the Dublin Regulation could overwhelm the asylum systems of the new border States like 
Slovakia and Poland. "A decade ago they had no asylum systems at all," Lubbers said, "What 
is going to happen if thousands of extra asylum-seekers are sent back to them from the inner 
EU countries?".205 
For the year 2005, the first year of their membership to the EU, UNHCR published the 
following data for these selected countries: 206 
 
EU MS recognition rates  
  refugee status right to stay* 
Slovakia 3 3 
Greece 0.8 1.9 
Czech Rep. 8.7 8.7 
Hungary 11.3 22.9 
Austria 42.6 49.7 
Germany 62.2 73.5 
 
                                                
202 Council of Europe Meeting on Migration Issues, International Organization for Migration News, Memorandum of the 
Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 
September/October 1996, 11; For examples concerning Lithuania, Greece and Italy, see Salignat, 71.  
203 Abell, N.A., ‘The compatibility of readmission agreements with the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees’ 
(1999) 11 International Journal of Refugee Law 1, 67, fn 29 referring to Migration News Sheet that “has reported the 
comments of a Danish Immigration Service Legal Department Official who was told by Lithuanian officials that they take 
advantage of every opportunity to expel asylum seekers who enter the country illegally, they believe that by entering the 
country illegally, such asylum seekers violate Lithuanian laws and are therefore unlikely to qualify for refugee status.” 
Migration News Sheet, October 1996, 9, available under http://www.migrationnewssheet.eu.   
204 Achermann and Gattiker 36. 
205 Healy, Alison, ‘Warning by UN Commissioner on Asylum Regulations’, Irish Times, 23 January 2004. 
206 UNHCR, ‘Asylum levels and trends in industrialized countries, 2005 overview of asylum applications lodged in Europe 
and non-European industrialized countries in 2005, 17 March 2006, http://www.unhcr.org/44153f592.pdf; UNHCR, ‘2005 
Global refugee trends. Statistical overview of populations of refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons, stateless 
persons, and other persons of concern to UNHCR’, 9 June 2006, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/STATISTICS/4486ceb12.pdf [accessed 16 June 2011].  
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For the three main countries of origin, the recognition rates were the following:  
 
SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO      
      
EU MS number of applications recognition rates  
    refugee status right to stay* 
Slovenia 520 2.8 5.6 
Germany 4,818 3.2 31 
Hungary 243 6.5 23.4 
Austria 4,409 29.5 35.3 
 
IRAQ       
      
EU MS number of applications recognition rates  
    refugee status right to stay* 
Greece 971 0.1 0.2 
Germany 1,895 29.8 51.1 
Austria 221 55.3 79.1 
 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION      
      
EU MS number of applications recognition rates  
    refugee status right to stay* 
Greece 343 0 22.2 
Slovakia 1,031 0 0 
Poland 5,015 15 67.8 
Czech Rep. 260 31.1 31.1 
Austria 4,362 83.9 91.3 
Germany 1,663 93.3 95.4 
 
* right to stay = refugee status + any title allowing the applicant to stay (temporarily) in the country (e.g.: Poland: “tolerated 
stay”)207 
 
It is particularly alarming that recognition rates for asylum-seekers from a certain country or 
region range dramatically among EU MSs. In the case of asylum-seekers from the Russian 
                                                
207 Glöde, Harald, ‘Polens Regierung setzt Flüchtlinge auf die Straße’, Der Schlepper 38, Spring 2007, citing the Office of 
Repatriation and Aliens, Warsaw.  
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Federation (mainly Chechens), high recognition rates in central EU MSs (e.g. Austria, 
Germany) contrast with alarmingly low recognition rates in Greece, which joined the EU in 
1981, and new EU MSs, such as Slovakia. These numbers are even more dramatic since these 
border countries of the EU are very often responsible for asylum procedures according to the 
Dublin Regulation. It must be added that the increased numbers of returns can exert 
dangerous pressure on the already fragile asylum determination systems of the EU’s border 
States. This pressure works as a disincentive for these States that are not capable of providing 
their own citizens with adequate social and medical treatment, to provide individuals seeking 
protection full access to fair asylum procedures. The natural consequence is that the affected 
States respond with unduly harsh measures of their own to “motivate” involuntarily returned 
refugees to move on. Another strategy seems to be followed, as could be read from the 
statistics, in Poland, where a high number of applicants are presumably not recognised as 
refugees, but receive the status 'tolerated stay', because this status provides its beneficiaries 
with almost no rights. Even though it does provide for a work permit, finding a job is 
extremely difficult in a country where 18% of the population is unemployed. In reality, many 
“tolerated” foreigners find themselves homeless and jobless. Some even choose to re-enter the 
asylum procedure, just to be able to stay in the centres, while others head west.208  
 
To go more into detail: According to the official statistics of the Ministry of Interior of 
Slovakia, not a single asylum-seeker from the Russian Federation was granted asylum in 2005 
and 2006.209 Chain-refoulement,210 arbitrary reasons for non-recognition of refugees after 
their return from the requesting EU MS and alleged data exchange with the country of origin 
have been reported in case of asylum applications of Chechen refugees. In December 2005, 
circular letters from the Slovakian Foreign Ministry were reportedly added to every Chechen 
asylum-seeker’s file: “Due to security reasons, asylum is not to be granted to Chechens”.211 
Hence, Chechens were seen as security risk. The reasoning given by the Slovakian authorities 
for non-recognition of Chechen refugees allows no possibility for Chechens to argue their 
                                                
208 http://www.unhcr.org/news/NEWS/43947275a.html. 
209 http://www.minv.sk/mumvsr/STAT/statistika.htm. (accessed on 15 March 2011).  
210 Norwegian Refugee Council, Report on the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons, Asylum Seekers and Refugees 
from Chechnya, April 2005, p. 57; in 2006, 11 Chechens were transferred back to Slovakia and chain-refouled via Ukraine to 
the Russian Federation, where 8 persons are currently in prison (children in children-prisoner-camp), Chechen family who 
was refouled to Ukraine without any asylum procedure: interview with Mr. Banjaev; February 2007: Deportation of 
Chechens during pending asylum procedure to the Russian Federation where they were imprisoned and questioned by 
Russian translator who was voiced being proud of his good relations to the Russian military: Asyl in Not, “Schubhaft, Dublin 
und kein Ende”, email of 16 February 2007.  
211 Asyl in Not, ‘UBAS: Slowakei nicht sicher!’, 12 December 2005, available at: http://www.asyl-in-
not.org/php/ubas_slowakei_nicht_sicher,12307,5041.html [accessed on 16 June 2011] citing expert Martin Skamla, Helsinki 
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individual cases: Slovakian authorities state that asylum-seekers who leave Slovakia for 
another EU MS have already proven that they are not looking for protection in Slovakia. 
 
However, a 2006 report by the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights reveals 
that this can lead to severe consequences for the asylum-seeker: 
 
“While the confidentiality of personal data on asylum-seekers was legally protected, there were 
serious suspicions that in some cases in which the applicants had been detained before they filed their 
asylum claim and remained in detention pending decision, the aliens police leaked such information to 
authorities of the applicants’ countries of origin – and Slovak media, which used it for negative 
reporting – with the aim of receiving extradition requests from the countries of origin. 
A Chechen asylum-seeker was deported to the Russian Federation in September while his asylum 
application was still being processed. He was arrested by Russian authorities at Sheremetyevo airport 
in Moscow upon his arrival, sent to prison in Groznyy, prosecuted, and tortured so badly that he had to 
be hospitalized. Two Chechen asylum-seekers were facing deportation upon the request Russian 
authorities at the time of this writing, while awaiting a final solution of their asylum claims.”212 
 
In the case of Greece, low recognition rates in the asylum system are also an issue of concern. 
UNHCR highlighted in March 2006 the multiple problems that refugees and asylum-seekers 
face in the country that “has one of the lowest rates for granting refugee status in the 
European Union”.213 In 2004, for example, Greece granted overall recognition (including 
humanitarian status) to 0.9% of applicants; the average equivalent figure in other EU MS that 
year was 26.4%. In 2005, except for two cases, virtually all asylum-seekers were rejected at 
first instance, including medically certified torture survivors. The recognition rates remained 
disturbingly low in 2007 with 2.05%.214 In 2008, Greece was, according to UNHCR statistics, 
in seventh place on the list of EU MSs in terms of the number of asylum applicants received, 
with a total of 19,880 applications lodged that year.215 Eighty-eight per cent of the illegal 
foreign nationals who entered the EU in 2009 entered through Greece. In 2008, UNHCR 
reported a success rate at first instance (in relation to all the decisions taken) of 0.04% for 
refugee status under the GRC (eleven people), and 0.06% for humanitarian or subsidiary 
                                                
212 International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF), "Human Rights in the OSCE Region: Europe, Central Asia and 
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protection (eighteen people) in Greece.216 12,095 appeals were lodged against unfavourable 
decisions. They led to 25 people being granted refugee status by virtue of the GRC. The 
respective success rates of appeals were 2.87% and 1.26%. By comparison, in 2008 the 
average success rate at first instance was 36.2% in five of the six countries that, along with 
Greece, receive the largest number of applications.217 
 
Greece also provides an alarming example of the poor quality of the asylum determination 
process. Although Greece acceded to the EU in 1981, it has been increasingly criticised since 
1999 (sic!) due to the danger of absolute denial of access to a determination procedure 
through the practice of “interrupting” claims and by denying access to lodging an asylum 
claim.218 A provision allowing the Ministry of Public Order to interrupt the examination of an 
asylum claim when the applicant “arbitrarily leaves his stated place of residence”219 has been 
used in practice by the Greek authorities to “interrupt” the asylum claims of individuals who 
have transited illegally to other EU MSs to subsequently justify denying these individuals 
access to an asylum procedure once they are returned to Greece under the Dublin 
Regulation.220 The applicant, once back in Greece, is either met immediately with a 
deportation order or, if the imminent interruption decision is still to be issued, will remain for 
a brief period of time legally in the country until it is issued. This happens unless the asylum-
seeker can prove that the arbitrary departure was due to reasons of “force majeure”. As such 
reasons can be rarely invoked to justify illegal departure from Greece, the decision to interrupt 
the asylum examination is very difficult to revoke. This decision always consists of the same 
reasoning: “[the asylum-seeker] arbitrarily left his place of residence and moved to [the name 
of the Member State in question]”. As a consequence, the asylum application is never 
examined substantively in any EU MS. 
 
What is most alarming regarding this practice is that an interruption decision is subsequently 
issued even when Greek authorities have accepted responsibility for an asylum claim 
                                                
216 UNHCR, ‘Observations on Greece as a country of asylum’, December 2009, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b4b3fc82.html [accessed 16 June 2011]. 
217 France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Sweden and Germany, see UNHCR, ‘2008 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum-seekers, 
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218 See Skordas, Achilles, ‘Why Greece is Not a Safe Home Country for Refugees’ (2004) 16 International Journal of 
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following a request by another State.221 The dimensions of the problem provoked the reaction 
of UNHCR already in 2004. In its “Position on important aspects of refugee protection in 
Greece”, UNHCR stressed that interrupting the examination of asylum applications means 
that these applicants will never have the “chance to have their application examined in 
substance either by Greece or by the sending country” warning that “this [practice] often 
amounts to a breach of the 1951 Refugee Convention”.222 On 15 April 2008, UNHCR 
expressed again concern asylum claims were deemed to be “interrupted” as a result of 
applicants leaving Greece before their claims had been decided: 
 
“While a number of positive changes in the practice have been noticed in 2007, the legal framework 
underpinning the practice of 'interruption' continues to leave room for different interpretations and 
fails to guarantee that 'Dublin returnees' with 'interrupted claims' are granted access to the 
procedure. This situation calls into question whether 'Dublin returnees' will have access to an 
effective remedy as foreseen by Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights as well as 
Article 39 of the Asylum Procedures Directive. Of relevance is the decision taken by the European 
Commission on 31 January 2008 to refer a case to the European Court of Justice against Greece for 
the infringement of the Dublin Regulation based on Greece's failure to enact legislative 
amendments to abolish the practice of 'interruption'.”223  
 
It has also been reported that lodging an asylum claim in the Greek asylum procedure has 
been denied to would-be applicants: In October 2005, allegations were raised by Amnesty 
International that people without documents were denied the possibility of lodging an asylum 
claim and were subsequently forced to swim across a river to Turkey.224 On 9 April 2008, the 
Norwegian Organisation for Asylum Seekers, the Norwegian Helsinki Committee and Greek 
Helsinki Monitor called on other EU MSs to apply Art 3 (2) DR and on the Greek authorities 
to review their asylum policy to bring into compliance with Greece's international obligations. 
Their report stated: “In our opinion the deficiencies in the Greek asylum process, documented 
through this report, entail that there is a discord between the preconditions on which the 
Dublin II Regulation was founded and procedural practices followed in Greece. In our 
opinion the Greek system does not guarantee even minimum basic legal protection for the 
asylum-seekers”.225 UNHCR’s position paper of 15 April 2008 also characterized the 
                                                
221 In 2004: After having arrived in Greece "illegally", the refugee was, like most others who arrive in a similar manner, 
arrested and placed in detention. Initially no one informed him about his rights and he did not know how to apply for asylum. 
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possible to pursue it any further. He was detained for another three months, then released and told to leave the country within 
a month: UNHCR, ’How a man from Darfur cannot get his asylum claim heard in Europe today’, (6 December 2005), 
available at: http://www.unhcr.org/news/NEWS/4395c3354.html [accessed 16 June 2011]. 
222 UNHCR 2006 5.  
223 Footnotes omitted 
224 Amnesty International 2005. 
225 “A gamble with the right to asylum in Europe-Greek asylum policy and the Dublin 2 Regulation”, 43. 
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percentage of asylum-seekers who were granted refugee status as “disturbingly low” and 
criticized the quality of asylum decisions, noting in particular their short, standardized format 
and the absence of legal reasoning in some decisions. UNHCR advised the EU MSs to refrain 
from returning asylum-seekers to Greece under the Dublin Regulation until further notice. It 
also recommended that they make use of Art 3(2) DR and examine asylum applications 
themselves. 
 
On 22 May 2008, the European Commission brought treaty violation proceedings against 
Greece for not adopting the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to 
comply with the Qualification Directive.226  
 
After his mission to Greece in October 2010, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture 
concluded that “[t]he asylum procedure has collapsed and refugees are denied access to any 
meaningful refugee determination procedure. This puts them at a serious risk of refoulement, 
aggravated by the Readmission Agreement with Turkey allowing for the forcible return of 
aliens to Iran, Iraq and Syria”.227 The Special Rapporteur welcomed the steps taken by some 
EU States to halt all returns to Greece under the Dublin II Regulation and urged other States 
to “immediately suspend all returns under the Dublin II Regulation and to proceed with the 
refugee determination procedure”.228 
 
As of January 2011, UNHCR maintains its position that transfers of asylum-seekers to Greece 
should not take place, due to ongoing concerns about systemic problems in the Greek asylum 
and reception systems, and the resulting situation of asylum-seekers, including those subject 
to the application of the Dublin Regulation.229 
 
bb. Rebuttal of safety presumption 
 
National jurisprudence on “Dublin” has been considerably diverse, allowing for the asylum 
applicant to rebut the safety presumption (1) or denying it to him (2).  
 
 
                                                
226 Case C-220/08. 
227 Report submitted by the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment to 
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229 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Asylum Situation in Greece Including for Dublin II Transferees, 31 January 
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1. Possibility of rebuttal vis-à-vis the following circumstances   
 
In the course of enlargement of the EU, national courts and administrative tribunals have 
expressed doubts about whether all EU MSs can be considered STCs, due to precarious 
conditions awaiting the asylum-seeker (a) as well as deficiencies of certain countries’ refugee 
determination procedures (b). 
 
a. Precarious conditions  
 
In February 2008, Norway became the first country to suspend the return of asylum-seekers to 
Greece following concerns about possible breaches of their rights. Amnesty International 
reacted on this decision with a press release: “We consider the decision to be particularly 
important in light of the poor conditions in which immigration detainees are held in Greece, 
and the lack of legal guarantees with regard to examination of their asylum claim. We call on 
Member States to make use of Article 3.2 of the Dublin II Regulation allowing Member 
States to examine an asylum application”.230 Some weeks later, a Swedish court refused the 
extradition of a (handicapped) Iraqi asylum-seeker to Greece, following concerns that he 
would not receive proper treatment in the Mediterranean country. In March of that year, a 
Swedish court stopped the transfer of a disabled Iraqi man to Greece, and in May, the 
Swedish Migration Board suspended returns of unaccompanied children to Greece, citing the 
Greek practice of detaining them for three weeks upon return.231  In October 2010, Austria's 
Constitutional Court restricted the return of asylum-seekers to Greece under the DR, judging 
the return of vulnerable asylum seekers to Greece unconstitutional and accepted the petition 
of an Afghan mother with three small children that she remain in Austria.232 The court said 
that Austrian authorities must first obtain assurances from Greece that individuals requiring 
special protection - such as mothers with small children, sick people or unaccompanied 
minors - will receive adequate care, otherwise the readmission process must be discontinued. 
According to the ruling, due to the poor conditions for the care of asylum seekers, their return 
to Greece could lead to a violation of Art 3 ECHR. 
 
                                                
230 28 February 2008 and entitled “No place for an asylum-seeker in Greece”. 
231 The Swedish Migration Board appealed the decision, and the Migration Court of Appeals sent the case back to the lower 
court for a new hearing.  The head of the Swedish Migration Board, Dan Eliasson, said, "We can't stop deportations to 
Greece simply because they have lousy conditions in their reception centres, such as dirty mattresses, poor toilets, and 
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"Sweden Halts Return of Child Asylum Seekers to Greece", TT/The Local, May 7, 2008, 
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b. Deficiencies in the asylum procedure  
 
Only British courts have decided that Dublin removals should be generally precluded when 
onward removal to unsafe countries is likely.233 In the United Kingdom, from September 1994 
through December 1995, 43.6% of Home Office determinations that another EU MS 
constituted a STC were referred back to the Home Secretary on appeal on grounds of safety. 
All challenges of the STC presumption with regard to Austria were successful, as were 90.2% 
concerning Italy, 66.6% concerning Sweden, 50% concerning both Spain and Portugal, 44% 
concerning France, 43.8% concerning the Netherlands, and 25% concerning Germany”.234 
Success in the appeals procedure depends on the decision maker’s opinion on the general 
safety of the country, and sometimes on the day of decision, as the officer may change his 
opinion from day to day.235 
 
This early British “Dublin”-sceptical jurisprudence was hindered by the introduction of an 
irrebuttable statutory presumption that EU MS are safe for the purpose of return.236 
 
However, again in the case of Greece, a number of national decisions to transfer the applicant 
there were successfully challenged in 2005 due its aforementioned practice of “interrupting 
decisions”.237 
 
In late April 2008, Finland announced that it would suspend transferring migrants to Greece 
unless it received written assurances from Greece that they would be fairly processed.238 In 
Austria, the second instance ruled in October 2008 that, due to the knowledge of the situation 
in Greece and the need for individual assessment, it had become necessary to instigate more 
detailed inquiries into the problems claimed by the applicant and requested that information 
be provided via a statement from the Greek authorities.239  
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2. Impossibility of rebuttal vis-à-vis the following circumstances 
 
Some domestic jurisprudence have stuck to the Dublin Regulation’s fiction; others have again 
reversed their position that certain EU MS are not STC and again do not allow applicants to 
rebut the safety presumption regarding both the precarious conditions awaiting the asylum-
seeker (a) and deficiencies of the country’s refugee determination procedure (b).  
 
a. Precarious conditions in the “safe” third country 
 
The German Constitutional Court’s Decision of 14 May 1996 upheld the constitutionality of 
the STC concept in German law. The decision declared that the safety presumption in third 
countries cannot be refuted in individual cases and stated that the decision on return can be 
implemented immediately.240 It stated that the principle of “normative Vergewisserung” 
(normative assurance) and the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on Art 3 ECHR meant that a legal 
challenge would only be successful when the individual concerned could bring forward a 
“highly substantiated claim” and “attested exceptional circumstances” to make additional 
investigations necessary or unsettle the principal safety presumption. The reasons claimed by 
the applicant must be evidence of a “real risk” of persecution for the individual applicant.241 
In this sense, general situation reports or a possible arrest in case of transfer were not enough 
to substantiate the probability of a human rights violation. The necessity for these high 
demands was argued by the danger of having the effective implementation of the Dublin 
Regulation undermined by a lower threshold. 
 
b. Deficiencies in the asylum procedure  
 
At present, some States do not permit challenges to be raised on protection grounds. This is 
the case in Germany, Greece, Hungary and Austria as well as, after the discussed change of 
jurisprudence by introduction of an irrebuttable safety presumption, the United Kingdom.  
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The British Government amended the UK Immigration and Asylum Act, stating that a 
Member State of the EU with which there are standing arrangements, such as the Dublin 
Convention, for determining which State is responsible for considering applications for 
asylum, is to be regarded as a place from which a person will not be sent to another country 
otherwise than in accordance with the GRC.242 Besides this change of legislation, the House 
of Lords retreated from its “Dublin”-sceptical jurisprudence in the later decisions (R 
(Yogathas) v Secretary of State for the Home Department and R (ex p Zeqiri) v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department.243 The House of Lords stressed in these cases the importance 
of the “anxious scrutiny test”, but argued that courts should not interfere with a sovereign 
State Party to the GRC, even if that State would not perform the obligations it had solemnly 
undertaken. According to these later decisions, only “significant differences” should be 
allowed to prevent return in such cases. 
 
In the judgment Yogathas, the House of Lords considered the issue of the acceptability of an 
expedited or summary procedure, in which procedural safeguards are compromised in order to 
achieve efficiency. Lord Hutton noted the “tension between the need to make use of an 
accelerated procedure to enable the arrangements under the Dublin Convention to operate 
effectively and the duty to recognize the human rights of a person who, once he is in the 
United Kingdom, is entitled to the protection given by [relevant human rights guarantees]”.244 
The concerns regarding efficiency won out, but it must be added that they at least were found 
not to obviate the need for the court to subject the decision to transfer a refugee "to a rigorous 
examination."245 However, in R (ex p Zeqiri) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
the effective operation of the Dublin Convention was the only pivotal prerogative: “While 
therefore I entirely accept that Mr Zeqiri’s wish to remain in the United Kingdom is an 
important matter to be taken into account, I do not think that it justified the courts in placing 
unnecessary obstacles in the way of the administration of the Dublin Convention”.246 
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To refer to the example presented in the introduction to this thesis, it may be added that, by 
the jurisprudence of the national courts of Austria, the “new” EU MSs Slovakia, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Slovenia were not considered STCs for asylum-seekers before their 
accession to the EU. Since their accession to the EU, the safety presumption could have been 
disproved, as the asylum authorities were obliged to apply the sovereignty clause, which is 
understood as a self-executing provision which has to be applied when constitutional rights 
are violated.247 However, since the EU enlargement on 1 May 2004, the first and second 
instances have never ruled that any of these new EU MSs is unsafe for the applicant with the 
argumentation cited in the introduction to this thesis.  
 
For the procedure of STC in general, it must be added that its repeated application leads to 
“refugee in orbit”-situations. These cases are not rare. For instance, UNHCR described the 
situation in March 1995 of a group of more than 100 would-be asylum-seekers who were 
shuffled several times between Latvia, Russia, and Lithuania as none of the countries would 
accept responsibility for examining the asylum claims.248 Even within the Dublin region, orbit 
situations continue. For example, cases have been reported in which asylum-seekers have 
entered Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece in transit to the United Kingdom, which has 
returned them to these "first asylum" States, which have then returned the asylum-seekers 
back to the United Kingdom.249 Another striking example of chain-removal must also be 
cited: an Iraqi woman had fled from Iraq to Germany, via Turkey and Greece in 1997. Upon 
arrival in Germany, the border police refused the woman access to refugee status 
determination procedures on the grounds that Greece was considered a "safe” country and she 
could have applied there, despite the fact that she spent only a few hours there in transit to 
Germany. However, Greece does not accept asylum applications from persons who do not 
come directly from the country of persecution, so her travel through Turkey disqualified her 
from access to asylum procedures in Greece. Instead, Greece would return the woman to 
Turkey. Yet, Turkey applies the geographical limitation of the GRC (limiting refugee status to 
European applicants) and as an Iraqi, the woman was therefore ineligible for refugee status 
under Turkish law. Through a chain-removal back to Turkey, therefore, the woman was 
subjected to refoulement back to her country of origin and feared persecution.250 
 
                                                
247 Higher Administrative Court to the Dublin Agreement, 99/01/0446 of 18 February 2003. 
248 Dunstan 611. 
249 Amnesty International 5. 
250 Vevstad, Vigdis, ‘Refugee Protection: A European Challenge’ 148 (1998), 267-8. 
 65 
“Refugee in orbit” situations are further exacerbated by the existence of readmission 
agreements between EU MS and non-EU MS that govern not only the readmission of a 
country’s own citizen but also in general the expulsion of citizens of third countries and the 
transit of third-country citizens through the territory of the contracting State to a destination 
State. The non-EU MS again have concluded similar agreements with other States that 
“foreshadow an endless sequence of deportations for asylum-seekers who seek refuge in a 
distant country”251 and who can end up being returned to the persecuting State.252 The 
situation has developed as foreseen by Achermann and Gattiker in 1995: there are two circles, 
an inner circle consisting of the Dublin Regulation signatories who acknowledge their 
obligation to examine asylum applications but do not conduct asylum procedure because they 
send the asylum-seekers to host third countries; and an outer circle of non-signatory States 
that accept asylum-seekers but are themselves not obliged to carry out asylum procedures. 
They in turn will try to send back the aliens to another country, producing “refugees in 
orbit”.253 
 
Conclusion 
 
It can be concluded that it is asylum officers with an often prejudiced approach towards the 
asylum-seeker and/or biased sources at hand who determine the need for refugee and 
refoulement protection with the legal possibilities of the “safe country” concepts- which they 
have been instructed to apply.  
However, as analyzed in this chapter, precarious conditions that put the life of the individual 
concerned at risk can indeed exist in the assumed safe country. While a presumably safe 
country can in realiter be precarious due to the living or detention conditions awaiting the 
asylum-seeker there, a declared STC can, because of deficiencies of its asylum procedure, 
pose the risk of chain-refoulement. In contrast to the STC legislation for non-EU MSs, the 
STC procedure for EU MSs (the Dublin Regulation) is almost persistently applied. The 
“Dublin” system is not only questionable in terms of the factual conditions, but also regarding 
the individual procedure on asylum and refoulement awaiting the asylum-seeker in the STC. 
As shown by research, some asylum-seekers may be sent back to a “safe” third EU MS where 
they have either had no access to a substantive asylum- and hence refoulement- procedure, or 
the asylum procedure offered has not been fair, e.g. with highly restrictive recognition rates 
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for asylum-seekers from a certain region compared to other EU MSs. Therefore, when 
entering the EU, asylum-seekers enter the space of the Dublin Regulation’s “protection 
lottery”.  
In the face of this reality, asylum-seekers have often been hindered from rebutting the safety 
presumption in the removal procedure. As for SCO procedures for non-EU MSs, the 
possibility of having a substantive interview has been reduced in some Member States and 
divergence was revealed with regard to the opportunity given to applicants to rebut the safety 
presumption. As for SCO procedures on EU MSs, the impossibility of challenging the safety 
presumption was exemplified by cases concerning politically active or Roma citizens of new 
EU MS, such as Romania and Slovakia.  
As for STC procedures for non-EU MSs, the omission of the interview is possible in some 
Member States, and the impossibility of rebuttal commonly relies on formal ratification of the 
GRC as the sole criterion justifying removal. As for STC procedures for EU MSs, numerous 
domestic jurisprudences have adhered to the Dublin Regulation’s fiction and, regarding 
deficiencies of the STC’s asylum procedure, have not permitted challenges to be raised on 
protection grounds- the respective STC sometimes having become safe overnight following 
its accession to the EU.  
Hence, in its practical application, the “safe country” concepts have led to the introduction of 
fast-tracked single procedures on asylum and refoulement that in practice cause interviewers 
to neglect their fact-finding responsibilities on both issues and make it more difficult for 
genuine refugees to demonstrate the validity of their claims.254 In other words: where the 
“safe country” concept does not serve as an absolute bar to the submission of claims by 
asylum-seekers from specified States by denying them an effective opportunity to have their 
claims on asylum and refoulement assessed,255 it may nevertheless produce damaging 
consequences for both issues.256  
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III. The 
“direct balancing approach” and the 
“complicity principle” 
 
 
The previous chapters have supplied evidential proof that the application of the EU’s SCO 
and STC concepts have been used by EU Member States to the detriment of asylum-seekers 
due to a wide margin of appreciation regarding the facts of the case, the assessment of the 
conditions in the receiving State, and the assessment of the risks at stake,257 raising the same 
fundamental concern: the protection from refoulement.258 In this chapter, the author presents 
analytical tools for the further discussion of necessary safeguards to guarantee the 
compatibility of these “safe country” concepts with the principle of non-refoulement, namely 
the “direct balancing approach” and the “complicity principle”.  
 
It is well-known that the “safe country” procedure is not unlawful per se, as there is no right 
to asylum guaranteed under international law. In the case of human rights law, Art 14 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) provides only a right to “seek” and to 
“enjoy” asylum, not per se a right to asylum.259 The right to “seek” is interpreted by Battjes to 
be the right to request, not to receive asylum: “it is a right vis-à-vis the country of origin, not 
the requested state”.260 Likewise, neither the UN human rights treaties nor the ECHR contain 
the right to admission to a certain country.261 According to the ECtHR’s case-law, Contracting 
States have the right to control the entry, residence and removal of aliens.262 In addition, 
neither the ECHR nor its Protocols confer the right to political asylum.263 The GRC, which 
defines the concept of asylum and refugee status, also does not provide for a right to asylum.  
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The principle of non-refoulement implies both negative and positive obligations. The negative 
obligation not to remove is also called “indirect” protection, because it aims to prevent 
Contracting States of the ECHR from putting persons under their jurisprudence in concrete 
danger in another State. Indirect protection creates a peculiar legal situation whereby effects 
of Convention rights can be related to the domestic jurisprudence of a State which is not party 
to the ECHR.264 Regarding the extent of this negative obligation, the ECtHR stated, on the 
one hand, in Soering v. the United Kingdom, that, “in so far as a measure of extradition has 
consequences adversely affecting the enjoyment of a Convention right, it may, assuming that 
the consequences are not too remote, attract the obligations of a Contracting State under the 
relevant Convention guarantee”.265 This formulation indicates the possibility, but also 
exceptionality of the imposition of this negative obligation by the ECHR.266 In the latter 
sense, the ECtHR clarified in F. v. the United Kingdom that in the context of asylum and “on 
a purely pragmatic basis, it cannot be required that an expelling state only returns an alien to a 
country which is in full and effective enforcement” of all the ECHR rights.267 And in 1989, 
the Court reiterated: “Article 1 […] cannot be read as justifying a general principle to the 
effect that, notwithstanding its extradition obligations, a Contracting State may not surrender 
an individual unless satisfied that the conditions awaiting him in the country of destination are 
in full accord with each of the safeguards of the Convention”.268 
 
However, positive obligations can also be derived from the principle of non-refoulement. 
According to an interpretation of the ECHR, protection from refoulement can be safeguarded 
by developing positive obligations regarding the removal procedure. As it more correctly 
reflects countries as contractual parties in the context of international law, this paper will use 
in this following analysis the synonymous term “State” instead of “country”.  
The “direct balancing approach”, as an analysis tool for the discussion, encompasses two 
steps: one of abstract balancing (A) and one of individual balancing (B).  
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A. Abstract balancing: gravity 
 
In the first step, Convention rights that could be violated upon removal must be qualified. 
Noll seconds Zühlke and Pastille, who suggest that all rights are principally capable of 
possessing non-refoulement properties which are limited by a “direct balancing” of the 
interest of the persons to be removed against those of the removing State:  
 
“The legitimate interests of the State must be held directly against the freedoms the individual 
derives from every provision. […] Foreseeable extraterritorial effects of extradition are imputed to 
the State and described in terms of all the Conventional freedoms, but may be justified by the 
interests of the State pertaining to extradition and expulsion. In other words: The Court expanded 
the scope of the Convention into extradition, but contained the expansion by directly balancing the 
State’s interest against those of the individual.”269  
 
States’ interest in limiting of their responsibility-taking is clear here. The ECtHR’s 
formulation in Soering v. the United Kingdom supports this approach: 
 
“[I]nherent in the whole of the Convention is a search for a fair balance between the demands of the 
general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s 
fundamental rights.”270 
 
For clarification, the important difference between this form of direct balancing and that 
proposed by the dissenting judges in Chahal v. the United Kingdom should be underlined:271 
While Zühlke and Pastille balance in order to analyze whether an ECHR right was violated, 
the dissenters in Chahal v. the United Kingdom wanted to balance an established violation of 
an ECHR right against State interest. This would take place after a first balancing to establish 
the existence of a violation, which would be contrary to Art 15 ECHR.272 
 
The first step of Noll’s search for non-refoulement properties in an ECHR right regards the 
question of its applicability, hence the gravity of the risked violation. If a provision has been 
found to be applicable, this means that it reached the respective gravity in the balancing 
process of the interest of the State. In such a case, the second step follows.  
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B. Individual balancing: probability and predictability 
 
In this second step, the parameters of the obligations of the respective right to impede removal 
are analysed.273 This step is crucial, as it brings in two important limitations taking into 
account the State’s possibilities: the probability of the risk and its predictability. The question 
on the necessary probability and predictability of the risk brings in the considerations of the 
individual case and concerns the standard of proof (1) and burden of proof (2).  
 
1. Standard of proof 
 
As stated by Goodwin-Gill: 
 
“How is the existence of a violation to be determined, but on the evidence, on the facts, and 
according to a particular standard of proof. And the standard? Yes, that is the question.” 274 
 
The term “standard of proof” means, in considering an applicant’s responsibility to prove 
facts in support of his refugee claim, the threshold to be met by the claimant in persuading the 
decision-maker of the truth of his factual assertions.275 Legomsky’s “complicity principle” 
with its “variable standard of proof” comes to the aid for the answer on the crucial question 
which level of standard of proof is to be met by the applicant.  
 
The “complicity principle” focuses on Art 16 (a) of the International Law Commission’s Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility: “A State which aids or assists another State in the 
commission of an internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for 
doing so if […] that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally 
wrongful act“. 
 
As the discussion of a possible threat in the receiving State can only be initiated by 
information, the parameter of predictability is examined first: The crucial parameter in Art 
16’s analysis is knowledge. However, knowledge is difficult to define. In 1996, the previous 
version of Art 16, Art 27, was adopted in a version requiring that the aid be “rendered for the 
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commission” of the other State’s internationally wrongful act.276 This wording was replaced 
by the requirement that the assisting State act “with knowledge of the circumstances”. 
However, the Official Commentary to the Articles on State Responsibility interprets Art 16 in 
at least three places as requiring aid to be given “with a view toward facilitating” the 
internationally wrongful act,277 and suggests even in two other places that the aid must be 
“intended to facilitate” the violation.278 For Legomsky, the change in the wording suggests a 
deliberate decision to replace a purpose requirement with a knowledge requirement.279 
Furthermore, the fact that the commentary is not reconcilable with the text leads for him to the 
assumption that the text is the relevant source.280 Consistency can even be possible if the term 
“intended” is understood in the broad sense in which Anglo-American criminal law and tort 
law use that term, i.e. one “intends” a consequence if one either consciously desires its 
occurrence or “knows” that the consequence is practically certain to result from the actor’s 
conduct.281 Hence, only awareness of an internationally wrongful act is required. 
 
This leads us to the parameters of probability and predictability: what degree of awareness is 
required? Awareness of a probability of 25%, 50% or 75%? Or in again unclear wording that 
is open to interpretation: Awareness of a high or significant probability? That the violation by 
the third country is reasonably foreseeable by the destination country? That, as worded in Art 
3 CAT, there are “substantial grounds for believing that [the person] would be in danger” of 
the particular violation? Or, to use the terminology from Soering v. the United Kingdom, 
“substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk” that the third country will violate the 
person’s rights?282 Or a “deep conviction” (“intime conviction” in French law)?283 
 
The most convincing approach, from an argumentative as well as a practical point of view, is 
Legomsky’s: It draws on the literature that considers how best to determine the proper 
standard of proof for finding facts in civil as well as criminal courts of law:284 Justice Harlan 
of the United States Supreme Court once observed that  
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“The selection of a particular standard of proof – balance of probabilities, proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, etc.- influences the relative distribution of the opposing types of errors that can 
occur. The higher the standard of proof, the higher becomes the probability of an error in favour of 
the defendant, but the lower becomes the probability of an error in favour of the plaintiff or 
prosecution. That being the case, he said, a rational way to select the appropriate standard of proof 
for any category of case would be to ask how harmful an error in either direction would be. In a 
criminal case, where the legal system makes the judgment that an erroneous conviction is worse 
that an erroneous acquittal, for example, the standard of proof is set high.”285 
 
Legomsky further refers to analogous reasoning in the law of negligence. To measure the 
reasonableness of an actor’s conduct, a court generally balances the social utility of the 
conduct against the probability and the gravity of the harm it might cause. For a given level of 
social utility, therefore, the more serious the potential harm, the lower the acceptable 
probability of its occurrence.286 
 
The result of this approach is a “variable standard of proof”: The question on the necessary 
probability of risk can only be answered in a relative manner, because proportionality must 
persist between the predictability and the gravity of the respective anticipated violation.287 
The probability of risk hence does not vary between the different protective provisions of a 
treaty, but between the degrees of violation of each provision in the respective case: “If the 
right is unusually important, then perhaps any reasonable basis for fearing that the third 
country will violate the right should be regarded as ‘knowledge’ for purposes of the 
destination country’s responsibilities.”288 In other words: “The level of knowledge about a 
risk required will vary inversely with the seriousness of the potential harm”.289 
 
However, it is unclear how this variable standard of proof should be applied. A categorisation 
of rights and a respective application of a fixed standard for each category seem unpractical. 
Legomsky mentions the objection that a continuum approach has the one large disadvantage 
that the lack of any clear principles of international law for specific standards of proof for 
specific rights would mean that, until such standards evolve, the decision by destination 
countries in which violation is “foreseeable” would be “indeterminate, unpredictable, and 
therefore, subject to manipulation”;290 the process of selecting the standards of proof would 
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leave too much power in the hands of unelected judges and other- in our case- refugee 
adjudicators. However, this “sea of discretion”291 of adjudicators is a reality that has already 
had detrimental consequences: without much hard law or training to lead them, their 
discretion is endemic throughout the whole refugee determination procedure: they decide 
what standard of proof is necessary for the “well-founded fear” of a refugee, whether “life 
would be threatened” by refoulement (Art 33 GRC), and juggle with probabilities.292 Not only 
the different States’ high courts have applied various wordings,293 but also within a State, 
differences from office to office, even from adjudicator to adjudicator are reality.  
 
 
2. Burden of proof 
 
It is well-established in the ECtHR’s case-law on Art 3 ECHR that “the fundamentally 
important prohibition against torture and inhuman and degrading treatment under Article 3, 
read in conjunction with Article 1 of the Convention to secure to everyone within their 
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention”, imposes an obligation on 
Contracting States not to expel a person to a country “where substantial grounds have been 
shown for believing that he would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to 
Article 3”.294 The term “substantial grounds have been shown” seems to have the connotation 
of a high burden of proof on the side of the applicant. Also on the discussion of the level of 
burden of proof, Legomsky’s “complicity principle” is the most convincing approach, from an 
argumentative as well as a practical point of view. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
As “safe country” concepts are not unlawful per se, an analysis tool for the discussion of 
necessary safeguards to guarantee their compatibility with the principle of non-refoulement 
was presented: the “direct balancing approach” and the complicity principle’s “variable 
standard of proof” will provide a framework for the discussion of the protection of asylum-
seekers from refoulement by the ECHR by developing positive obligations regarding the 
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removal procedure, being within the EU except in Ireland combined with the asylum 
procedure in one single procedure. 
The “direct balancing approach” encompasses two steps: The first step of abstract balancing 
for the search for non-refoulement properties in an ECHR right regards the question of its 
applicability, hence the gravity of the risked violation. If a provision has been found to be 
applicable, this means that it reached the respective gravity in the balancing process with the 
interest of the State. In such a case, the second step of individual balancing follows: the 
parameters of the obligations of the respective right to impede removal are analysed. This step 
is crucial, as it brings in two important limitations taking into account the State’s possibilities: 
the probability of the risk and its predictability. The question on the necessary probability and 
predictability of the risk brings in concerns on the standard of proof and burden of proof. On 
the discussion of their level, Legomsky’s “complicity principle” is the most convincing 
approach, from an argumentative as well as a practical point of view. It defends a “variable 
standard of proof”: The question on the necessary probability of risk can only be answered in 
a relative manner, because proportionality must persist between the predictability and the 
gravity of the respective anticipated violation. The probability of risk hence does not vary 
between the different protective provisions of a treaty, but between the degrees of violation of 
each provision in the respective case. 
 
 
 
 
 75 
IV. Protection from refoulement by Art 3 ECHR in the 
removing State’s single procedure: 
Development of positive procedural obligations by the 
“direct balancing approach” 
 
 
This chapter will develop positive obligations regarding the removing State’s single procedure 
on asylum and refoulement by critically analyzing the ECtHR’s relevant jurisprudence 
through the lenses of the direct balancing approach. The approach’s parameters of gravity, 
probability and predictability can be identified in the ECtHR’s wordings that "substantial 
grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned [...] faces a real risk of 
being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment". The first 
element concerns the particular treatment constituting a human rights violation in the target 
country, i.e. gravity (A). The second element concerns a certain probability and predictability 
that this situation occurs, i.e. the issues of standard and burden of proof (B).  
 
 
A. Gravity equals insecurity 
 
The logic of the concept of “gravity” is that a State into which a transfer is prohibited by 
refoulement is not safe in the opinion of the ECtHR. Hence, the term “gravity” coincides with 
the non-existence of “safety” in the receiving state. In other words, gravity addresses the 
material scope of protection by the principle of non-refoulement and hence defines insecurity. 
The question is: What kind of situation in the target country prohibits the State from sending a 
person back to such a country?295 The CAT Committee, which is also critical of the concept 
of “safe countries”, has often asked what criteria were applied in determining whether a third 
country was safe.296 
 
While there is no express provision relating to asylum contained in the ECHR, the 
jurisprudence of the Convention organs has prohibited removal of the applicant by applying 
numerous provisions of the ECHR indirectly, i.e. giving them non-refoulement-properties. In 
this context, Art 3 ECHR is the crucial provision to be discussed. The ECHR’s other absolute 
                                                
295 Suntinger, Walter, ‘The Principle of non-refoulement: Looking rather to Geneva than to Strasbourg?’, 9. 
296 Nowak 156, referring to Nowak/C/SR.234,§40. 
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provision, Art 2 ECHR, contains a requirement of intent, as it prohibits only the intentional 
deprivation of life.297 Due to this requirement, its protective ambit has been less relevant in 
expulsion cases than that of Art 3 ECHR.298 Also the relative Arts 5, 6299 and 8 ECHR have 
not gained relevance in the context of removal cases. From those rights, it is therefore only 
Art 13 ECHR that will be discussed due to importance for this thesis by its procedural 
demands.  
 
For this reason, only the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on Art 3 ECHR and Art 13 ECHR will be 
analyzed. Due to its importance, Art 3 ECHR will be discussed in detail. The European 
Commission on Human Rights (ECommHR) has a long history of indirect protection through 
                                                
297 Bahaddar v. the Netherlands, application no. 25894/94, Council of Europe: European Commission on Human Rights, 22 
May 1995, para 78; X and Y v. the Netherlands, application no. 8978/80, Council of Europe: European Court of Human 
Rights, 26 March 1985. 
298 To take the most recent example, the ECtHR concluded in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece that after having found the 
applicant's removal by Belgium to Greece to violate Art 3 ECHR, there was no need to examine the applicant's complaints 
under Art 2 ECHR (M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece para 361). The ECtHR’s relevant jurisprudence focuses on insecurity due 
to unfair trials: In expulsion cases, Art 2 ECHR became independent from Art 3 ECHR only in connection with Art 6 ECHR, 
established in Bader v. Sweden. Although the ECtHR recognized that State practice had yet to amend Art 2 ECHR so as to 
abolish the death penalty in all circumstances, it did acknowledge that a “deprivation of life pursuant to an ‘execution of a 
sentence of a court’” would need to comply rigorously with the standards enshrined in Art 6 ECHR (Bader and others v. 
Sweden, application no. 13284/04, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 8 November 2005, para 42, citing 
Öcalan v. Turkey, application no. 46221/99, 12 May 2005). For the Court, it followed that an issue may arise under Art 2 
(and 3) ECHR if a Contracting State “deports an alien who has suffered or risks suffering a flagrant denial of a fair trial in the 
receiving State, the outcome of which was or is likely to be the death penalty” (Bader and others v. Sweden para 42). 
  
 
299 Art 6 ECHR is of relevance in extradition cases: Concerning the trial procedure awaiting the person in the receiving State, 
the Court expressly refuted the ECommHR’s opinion “that the proposed extradition could not give rise to [a] 
responsibility”299 under the provision by stating since Soering v. the United Kingdom: “The right to a fair trial in criminal 
proceedings [in the SCO], as embodied in Article 6, holds a prominent place in a democratic society […]. The Court does not 
exclude that an issue might exceptionally be raised under Article 6 by an extradition decision in circumstances where the 
fugitive has suffered or risks suffering a flagrant denial of a fair trial in the requesting country”: Soering v. the United 
Kingdom, para 113; Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, application no.s 46827/99 and 46951/99, Council of Europe: 
European Court of Human Rights, 4 February 2005, para 88; Bader .v Sweden, para 42. This is particularly valid when there 
is the risk of execution: Tomic, see, mutatis mutandis, Ocalan v. Turkey, no. 46221/99, judgment of 12 March 2003, §§ 199-
213) The ECtHR repeated in later cases that the obligation not to extradite applies regarding States that flagrantly abuse the 
most fundamental principles of fair trial: Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain, M.A.R. v. the United Kingdom, Hilal v. 
the United Kingdom, application no. 45276/99, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 6 June 2001. In Al-
Moayad v. Germany, the Court set out a list of factors to be considered in order to determine whether a flagrant denial of the 
right to fair trial could occur: “where a person is detained because of suspicions that he has been planning or has committed a 
criminal offence without having any access to an independent and impartial tribunal to have the legality of his or her 
detention reviewed and, if the suspicions do not prove to be well-founded, to obtain release. Likewise, a deliberate and 
systematic refusal of access to a lawyer to defend oneself, especially when the person concerned is detained in a foreign 
country, must be considered to amount to a flagrant denial of a fair trial”: Al-Moayad v. Germany, application no. 35865/03, 
Council of Europe, European Court of Human Rights, 20 February 2007, para 101, referring to see, a fortiori and among 
many other authorities, Papon, cited above, § 90, see, a fortiori and among many other authorities, John Murray   v. the 
United Kingdom, judgment of 8 February 1996, Reports 1996-I, pp. 53-56, §§ 59-70; and Öcalan v. Turkey paras 131-137, 
148. In Ismoilov v. the Russian Federation, the applicants’ extradition was ordered for the purpose of their criminal 
prosecution; such a close link between the impugned statements made in the context of the extradition proceedings and the 
criminal proceedings pending meant that Art 6 (2) ECHR was to be applied and had been violated: Ismoilov v. the Russian 
Federation paras 163-4. 
However, Art 6 ECHR is, as decided by the ECtHR in Maaouia v. France (application no. 39652/98, Council of Europe: 
European Court of Human Rights, 5 October 2000) and Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey (application no.s 46827/99 and 
46951/99, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 4 February 2005), not applicable to asylum proceedings as 
they are seen as an act of public authorities governed by public law. While the same is true of removal proceedings, it should 
still be mentioned that the ECtHR only refrained in Soering v. the United Kingdom from an examination under Art 6 ECHR 
regarding removal decisions taken in the course of a negatively decided asylum procedure after determining that Art 3 ECHR 
was violated (see para. 113). 
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its implicit prohibition of refoulement,300 The ECommHR embraced this concept as early as 
1962 in X. v. the Federal Republic of Germany, which, in the context of a removal to Egypt, 
determined the principle that a decision to deport, extradite or expel an individual can give 
rise to a question under Art 3 ECHR if the applicant might be subjected to torture or inhuman 
treatment or punishment in the receiving State.301 In the Cemal Kemal Altun v. the Federal 
Republic of Germany case, the applicant, a Turkish citizen, had applied for political asylum in 
the Federal Republic of Germany, contending that he would be at risk of ill-treatment and 
torture in Turkey. The application was declared admissible by the Commission, with respect 
to the question whether deportation would constitute inhuman treatment within the meaning 
of Art 3 ECHR.302 
In the first, already mentioned, landmark case concerning an asylum-seeker and Art 3 ECHR 
before the ECtHR, Soering v. the United Kingdom, the protective potential of Art 3 ECHR for 
asylum-seekers was unlocked. The case concerned the imminent extradition of the applicant 
from the United Kingdom to the United States of America, where he feared that he would be 
sentenced to death on the charge of capital murder and subject to the "death row 
phenomenon". In this case, the ECtHR also traced off the Art 3 ECHR’s negative obligation 
of “not subjecting” for the positive obligation “securing”. It ruled that extradition could 
violate Art 3 ECHR, although the treatment contrary to the provision would be inflicted by 
the receiving non-Contracting State.303 However, the Court limited the positive obligation 
immediately.304 Shortly after the judgment Soering v. the United Kingdom, the case of Cruz 
Varas v. Sweden came before the Court. It was the first case that concerned a refused asylum-
seeker. The Court held that the principle enunciated in Soering v. the United Kingdom applied 
to decisions to expel as well as to extradite.305 This view was re-affirmed in the judgments 
Vilvarajah and others v. the United Kingdom306 and Chahal v. the United Kingdom. The cases 
will be discussed in detail later. 
 
                                                
300 Alleweldt, Ralf, ’Refoulement-Verbote im Völkerrecht und im deutschen Recht unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von 
Artikel 3 der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention und Artikel 1 des Grundgesetzes’ (Berlin, Springer, 1996);  Chahal v. 
the United Kingdom, application no. 70/1995/576/662, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 15 November 
1996, para 80. 
 
301 Application No. 1465/62, 5 Yearbook of the ECHR, 256-261; the case was declared inadmissible as manifestly ill-
founded. 
302 Application no. 10308/83, Stocktaking on the ECHR, Supplement 1984 (1985), pp. 45-7; after the applicant committed 
suicide in a hearing of the case before the Berlin administrative Court, the Commission stroke the application off its list. 
303 Zühlke and Pastille 749. 
304 Noll, Negotiating Asylum, 397. 
305 Cruz Varas and others v. Sweden, application no. 46/1990/237/307, Council of Europe: European Court of Human 
Rights, 20 March 1991, para 70. 
306 Vilvarajah and others, para 103. 
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For the case of removal by a Contracting State, this means that it may “give rise to an issue 
under Article 3, and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention, where 
substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if deported, 
faces a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3. In such a case Article 3 
implies an obligation not to deport the person in question to that country”.307 Hence, 
refoulement occurs when two factors coincide: a relevant violation of the rights of the person 
concerned in the receiving State308 and the removal to this State.  
 
The first step of the search for non-refoulement properties is unique in the case of Art 3 
ECHR: Unlike most of the substantive clauses of the Convention and of Protocols Nos. 1 and 
4, Art 3 ECHR makes no provision for exceptions and no derogation is permissible under Art 
15 ECHR- even in the event of a public emergency threatening the security of the nation.309 
As Art 3 ECHR is absolute and there is no paragraph (2) for consideration of the State’s 
interests, the necessary level of gravity cannot be increased by the State’s interests in the 
concrete case. Hence, no balancing is undertaken between the right and the interest of the 
respective State. This is proven by the fact that the protection afforded by Art 3 ECHR is also 
not excluded by clauses, such as Art 1F GRC, or limited like Art 33 (2) GRC.310 This was 
stated by the ECtHR in Soering v. the United Kingdom, the abovementioned case concerning 
the extradition of the applicant to face charges of a brutal murder allegedly committed before 
admission into the territory of the respondent State. The Court held in Para. 88: 
                                                
307 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, para 125, referring to Soering v. the United Kingdom, paras 90-91; Vilvarajah and others 
v. the United Kingdom, para 103; Ahmed v.Austria , para 39; H.L.R. v. France, application no. 11/1996/630/813, Council of 
Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 22 April 1997, para 34; Jabari v. Turkey, application no. 40035/98, Council of 
Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 11 July 2000, para 
38; Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 11 January 2007, para 135. 
308 Hence, the direct physical or mental effects resulting from the removal itself are not implying a violation in the receiving 
state and are therefore not relevant for the thesis. For a violation of Art 3 ECHR by such circumstances, the Strasbourg case 
law indicates the application of rather strict criteria. The Commission has held that extradition withih a day afer a second 
attempt to commit suicide did not violate Art 3 ECHR (Appl no. 25342/94, Raidl, D & R 82-A (1995), para 134). In the Cruz 
Caras case the Court did not consider that the applicant’s expulsion to Chile exceeded the threshold set by Art 3 ECHR, 
although he suffered from a pos-traumatic stres disorder prior to his expulsion and his mental health deteriorated follwoing 
his return to Chile (para 84, cf. also the decision of 22 October 2002, Ammari). And in the Nsona case the return of a nine-
year-old child to Zaïre that took seven days, part of which was unaccompanied was not regarded as inhuman or degrading 
treatment (Judgment of 28 November 1996, para 99). The Strasbourg jurisprudence has thus far identified examples such as 
the expulsion or deportation of an ill person, or deportation arousing grave suffering: Bulus v. Sweden, application no. 
9330/81, Council of Europe: European Commission of Human Rights, 19 January 1984, paras 57, 62. In particular cases, the 
anguish likely to be caused by the anticipation of impending violence may be considered as inhuman treatment: Soering, 
para. 100. This may be even the case with regard to torture victims suffering trauma when confronted with the possibility of 
forced return to the land in which they were tortured: Cruz Varas and others v. Sweden, para 83-4. Accordingly, the 
circumstances of expulsion may eo ipso constitute inhuman or degrading treatment: Hailbronner 491. 
309 See Ireland v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 8 January 1978, para 163; Chahal v. the United Kingdom, para 79; 
Selmouni v. France [GC], application no. 25803/94, para 95; Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC], application no. 
35763/97, para 59; and Shamayev and others v. Georgia and Russia, application no. 36378/02, para 335; Noll, Negotiating 
Asylum, 371 with further references in footnotes 1088 and 1089. 
310 “The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for 
regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgement of a 
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.” 
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“It would hardly be compatible with the underlying values of the Convention, that "common 
heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law" to which the Preamble refers, 
were a Contracting State knowingly to surrender a fugitive to another State where there were 
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture, however 
heinous the crime allegedly committed. Extradition in such circumstances, while not explicitly 
referred to in the brief and general wording of Article 3, would plainly be contrary to the spirit and 
intendment of the Article, and in the Court’s view this inherent obligation not to extradite also 
extends to cases in which the fugitive would be faced in the receiving State by a real risk of 
exposure to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment proscribed by that Article”.311 
 
The ECtHR clarified the issue in Chahal v. the United Kingdom.312  
 
In the context of Art 3 CAT as well, the absolute nature of the non-refoulement principle rules 
out any balancing of interest between the individual right not to be subjected to torture by 
means of removal and national security concerns.313 
 
                                                
311 Para 88, emphasis added. 
312 The four applicants were members of the same family and Sikhs. The first applicant became involved in organising 
passive resistance in support of autonomy for Punjab. After detention in India, he was able to return to his place of residence 
in the United Kingdom, where he became a leading figure in the Sikh community. Since that time he had been arrested on 
several occasions and he was convicted and served concurrent sentences of six and nine months. The Home Secretary 
decided that Mr Chahal ought to be deported because his continued presence in the United Kingdom was not conducive to the 
public good for reasons of national security and other reasons of a political nature, namely the international fight against 
terrorism. Mr Chahal subsequently applied for political asylum; he claimed that he would be subjected to torture and 
persecution if returned to India. His request was refused; the United Kingdom relied on Grotius’ De Iure Belli ac Pacis to 
support the proposition that asylum is to be enjoyed by people “who suffer from undeserved enmity, not those who have done 
something that is injurious to human society or to other men” (Para 98). The ECtHR rejected the argument, reaffirmed the 
absolute character of Art 3 ECHR and continued: 
“The prohibition provided by Article 3 against ill-treatment is equally absolute in expulsion cases.  Thus, whenever 
substantial grounds have been shown for believing that an individual would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment 
contrary to Article 3 if removed to another State, the responsibility of the Contracting State to safeguard him or her against 
such treatment is engaged in the event of expulsion  […].  In these circumstances, the activities of the individual in question, 
however undesirable or dangerous, cannot be a material consideration. The protection afforded by Article 3 is thus wider than 
that provided by Articles 32 and 33  [GRC]. Paragraph 88 of the Court's  [also here] above-mentioned Soering judgment, 
which concerned extradition to the United States, clearly and forcefully expresses the above view. It should not be inferred 
from the Court's remarks concerning the risk of undermining the foundations of extradition, as set out in paragraph 89 of the 
[also here cited above] same judgment, that there is any room for balancing the risk of ill-treatment against the reasons for 
expulsion in determining whether a State's responsibility under Article 3 is engaged. It follows […] that it is not necessary for 
the Court to enter into a consideration of the Government's untested, but no doubt bona fide, allegations about the first 
applicant's terrorist activities and the threat posed by him to national security.” (Para 80-20).  
Any further debate on the issue was laid to rest in Saadi v. Italy in which the applicant had been prosecuted, but not 
convicted, in Italy for participation in international terrorism but had also been sentenced in Tunisia, in his absence, to 20 
years’ imprisonment for membership in a terrorist organisation. The ECtHR stated: 
“As the prohibition of torture and of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is absolute, irrespective of the victim's 
conduct […], the nature of the offence allegedly committed by the applicant is therefore irrelevant for the purposes of Article 
3”. (Saadi v. Italy, application no. 37201/06, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 28 February 2000, para 
127, referring to Indelicato v. Italy, application no. 31143/96, para 30, 18 October 2001, and Ramirez Sanchez v. France 
[GC], application no. 59450/00, paras 115-116, 4 July 2006). 
The Court continued: “The Court considers that the argument based on the balancing of the risk of harm if the person is sent 
back against the dangerousness he or she represents to the community if not sent back is misconceived. The concepts of 
“risk” and “dangerousness” in this context do not lend themselves to a balancing test because they are notions that can only 
be assessed independently of each other. Either the evidence adduced before the Court reveals that there is a substantial risk if 
the person is sent back or it does not” (Para 138-9). In this sense, the ECtHR rejected the argument that the risk to the 
individual should be balanced against the State’s interest to protect its citizens from a possible risk emanating from the 
applicant. This argumentation was reaffirmed on numerous occasions, the most recent of which regarded expulsion to the 
country of origin A v. the Netherlands on 20 July 2010, para 142.  
313 Nowak 210-1, referring to Agiza v. Sweden, no. 233/2003. 
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While no abstract balancing is made between the right and the interest of the respective State 
in the case of Art 3 ECHR, it is clear that a necessary level of gravity must be met for the 
ECtHR to apply Art 3 ECHR. According to the ECtHR's case-law, the necessary level of 
gravity is termed “minimum level of severity”. While it is clear that an act must reach a 
certain minimum level of severity to be an act of torture, the ECtHR has emphasized more 
often regarding inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment that “ill-treatment must attain 
a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3 […]. The assessment of 
this minimum is, in the nature of things, relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the 
case, such as the nature and context of the treatment, the manner and method of its execution, 
its duration, its physical or mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of 
health of the victim”.314 In order for a punishment or treatment associated with it to be 
“inhuman” or “degrading”, the suffering or humiliation involved must in any event go beyond 
that inevitable element of suffering or humiliation connected with a given form of legitimate 
treatment or punishment.315 The Court continued in Cruz Varas and others v. Sweden:  
“What amounts to "inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" depends on all the 
circumstances of the case (see paragraph [on minimum of severity]). Furthermore, inherent in the 
whole of the Convention is a search for a fair balance between the demands of the general interest 
of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights. As 
movement about the world becomes easier and crime takes on a larger international dimension, it is 
increasingly in the interest of all nations that suspected offenders who flee abroad should be 
brought to justice. Conversely, the establishment of safe havens for fugitives would not only result 
in danger for the State obliged to harbour the protected person but also tend to undermine the 
foundations of extradition. These considerations must also be included among the factors to be 
taken into account in the interpretation and application of the notions of inhuman and degrading 
treatment or punishment in extradition cases.”316 
 
In this sense, Zühlke and Pastille noted that “Article 3 like all ‘absolute’ rights hosts a 
balancing process, located in the interpretation of the provision’s scope and in itself not much 
different from the application of express limitations. This understanding is frequently 
reflected in the jurisprudence of the Court”317 and perfectly illustrated in the example used by 
Zühlke and Pastille: two police officers march a handcuffed and sparsely clad person over a 
public square. Whether or not this is degrading treatment in the sense of Art 3 ECHR depends 
on the circumstances – the person having committed a minor traffic offence or being a suicide 
assassin suspected of carrying explosives on his body. Hence, on the fringes of Art 3 ECHR, 
                                                
314 Para 83; see, among other authorities, Price v. the United Kingdom, application no..33394/96, para 24; Mouisel v. France, 
application no. 67263/01, para 37; Jalloh v. Germany [GC], application no. 54810/00, para 67; see also Kudła v. Poland 
[GC], application no. 30210/96, para 91. 
315 See Labita v. Italy [GC], application no. 26772/95, para 120. 
316 Cruz Varas and others v. Sweden, para. 89, emphasis added. 
317 Zühlke and Pastille 783. 
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the concept of absoluteness is materially empty:318 “The choice between express limitations 
and absoluteness does not per se derive from any notion of hierarchy. It is much more likely 
that the nature and specific historical background of each freedom accounts for the shape in 
which it is protected”.319 
 
The focus of this analysis will now turn to the examination of which of the “precarious” 
situations stated in the previous chapter have been ruled by the ECtHR as going beyond the 
threshold of Arts 3 and 13 ECHR, thus making a State “unsafe” and removal to that State 
thereby impermissible. It can be distinguished between, first, the factual conditions (1) and, 
second, the procedural conditions (2). 
 
1. Factual conditions: Art 3 ECHR 
 
Serious factual harm can derive from living conditions (a), from detention conditions (b) or 
from conditions amounting to persecution (c), 
 
a. Living conditions 
 
In the context of living conditions, Art 3 ECHR extends to situations where the danger 
emanates from the consequences to health from the effects of serious illness.320 The effect of 
expulsion on the medical condition of the applicant has been often considered by the 
jurisprudence’s ECtHR, which set the minimum level of severity extremely high for 
qualification for a violation of Art 3 ECHR: In D. v. the United Kingdom, it found that the 
circumstances of the case must be “exceptional”; the expulsion of D., who was already 
irremediably dying of AIDS, to his home country where he had no familiar or material 
resources, where there was no social welfare provision available to him and no treatment for 
AIDS, was such a case. Since this judgment, the Court has not found a proposed removal of 
an alien from a Contracting State to give rise to a violation of Art 3 ECHR on grounds of the 
applicant’s ill health. Even psychiatric patients have advanced arguments under Art 3 ECHR 
unsuccessfully; in Bensaid v. the United Kingdom, the applicant was a schizophrenic suffering 
from a psychotic illness and feared treatment contrary to Art 3 ECHR should he be returned to 
                                                
318 Noll, Negotiating Asylum, 463. 
319 Zühlke and Pastille 560. 
320 see H.L.R. v. France para 40, D. v. the United Kingdom para 49. 
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Algeria. The ECtHR found that suffering to fall within Art 3 ECHR’s scope, but the 
exceptional circumstances as in D. v the United Kingdom to be missing.321 
 
However, ten years later in N. v. the United Kingdom,322 the ECtHR declared the 
circumstances to have to be “very exceptional”; it found that N’s removal did not violate Art 
3 ECHR, because her claim was based solely on her serious medical condition and the lack of 
adequate treatment available for it in Uganda. The Court stated: 
 
“The Court observes that since D. v. the United Kingdom it has consistently applied the following 
principles. Aliens who are subject to expulsion cannot in principle claim any entitlement to remain 
in the territory of a Contracting State in order to continue to benefit from medical, social or other 
forms of assistance and services provided by the expelling State. The fact that the applicant's 
circumstances, including his life expectancy, would be significantly reduced if he were to be 
removed from the Contracting State is not sufficient in itself to give rise to breach of Article 3. The 
decision to remove an alien who is suffering from a serious mental or physical illness to a country 
where the facilities for the treatment of that illness are inferior to those available in the Contracting 
State may raise an issue under Article 3, but only in a very exceptional case, where the humanitarian 
grounds against the removal are compelling”.323  
 
Recently, in M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, the ECtHR ruled that the living conditions in 
Greece, combined with the prolonged uncertainty of the applicant and the total lack of any 
prospects of his situation improving, attained the level of severity required to fall within the 
scope of Art 3 ECHR: for several months, the applicant had been “living in the street, with no 
resources or access to sanitary facilities, and without any means of providing for his essential 
needs”. This treatment was humiliating, “showing a lack of respect for [the applicant’s] 
dignity and that this situation has, without doubt, aroused in him feelings of fear, anguish or 
inferiority capable of inducing desperation”. 324 Based on these facts, the ECtHR ruled that, by 
transferring the applicant to Greece, Belgium had knowingly exposed him to living conditions 
that amounted to degrading treatment and thereby violated Art 3 ECHR.325 
 
                                                
321 Application no. 44599/98, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 6 May 2001. 
322 Application no. 26565/05, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 27 May 2008. 
323 N. v. the United Kingdom para. 42. 
324 M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece paras 263-4. 
325 Para 362-8. 
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b. Detention conditions 
 
On detention conditions, the ECtHR has held that confining an asylum-seeker to a 
prefabricated cabin for two months without allowing him outdoors or to make a telephone 
call, and with no clean sheets and insufficient hygiene products, amounts to degrading 
treatment within the meaning of Art 3 ECHR.326 Similarly, a period of detention of six days, 
in a confined space, with no possibility of taking a walk, no leisure area, sleeping on dirty 
mattresses and with no free access to a toilet is unacceptable with respect to Art 3 ECHR.327 
The detention of an asylum-seeker for three months on police premises pending the 
application of an administrative measure, with no access to any recreational activities and 
without proper meals has also been ruled as degrading treatment.328 Furthermore, the Court 
found in A.A. v. Greece that the detention of an applicant, who was also an asylum-seeker in 
Greece, for three months in an overcrowded place in appalling conditions of hygiene and 
cleanliness, with no leisure or catering facilities, where the dilapidated state of repair of the 
sanitary facilities rendered them virtually unusable and where the detainees slept in extremely 
filthy and crowded conditions amounted to degrading treatment prohibited by Art 3 ECHR.329 
 
Recently, the ECtHR ruled again in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece that the detention 
conditions in Greece experienced by the applicant were unacceptable. UNHCR reported 
unacceptable detention conditions with no fresh air, no possibility of taking a walk in the open 
air and no toilets in the cells.330 The Court concluded that, despite the fact that he was kept in 
detention for a relatively short period of time, “the feeling of arbitrariness and the feeling of 
inferiority and anxiety often associated with it, as well as the profound effect such conditions 
of detention indubitably have on a person's dignity, constitute degrading treatment contrary to 
Article 3 of the Convention. In addition, the applicant's distress was accentuated by the 
vulnerability inherent in his situation as an asylum seeker”.331 Thus, the ECtHR considered 
that Belgium had violated Art 3 ECHR by knowingly exposing the applicant to detention 
conditions that amounted to degrading treatment by transferring him to Greece.332 
                                                
326 S.D. v. Greece, application no. 53541/07, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 11 June 2009, paras 49 to 
54.  
327 S.D. v. Greece para 51. 
328 Tabesh v. Greece, application no. 8256/07, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 26 November 2009, 
para 38. 
329 A. A. v. Greece, application no. 12186/08, Council of Europe: European Commission on Human Rights, 22 July 2010, 
paras 57-65. 
330 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece para 213. 
331 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece para 233. 
332 Para 362-8. 
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c. Persecution 
 
Strasbourg cases on possible persecution, i.e. in which the reasons for well-founded fear in 
case of removal were relevant for the violation of Art 3 ECHR, have raised a fundamental 
question: the relation between Art 3 ECHR and Art 1 (A) GRC. As van Dijk submits, these 
norms overlap insofar that if a person has a well-founded fear of being persecuted in his 
country of origin in the sense of Art 1 (A) GRC, his forced return to this country would 
violate Art 3 ECHR. For a long time, the Strasbourg case law strictly differentiated between 
these norms. The ECommHR has held that the question whether or not a deportation decision 
is covered by the GRC “is not an issue as such”333 and has ruled that “the risk of political 
persecution, as such, cannot be equated to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment”.334 The 
ECommHR has often stressed that the right to asylum does not figure among the ECHR 
rights, and that the expulsion or extradition of an individual could prove to be a breach of Art 
3 ECHR only in exceptional cases or circumstances.335 This case law “implies that 
refoulement only raises an issue under Article 3 if the ensuing persecution will reach a high 
level of severity”.336 Consequently, refoulement of refugees leading to persecution that does 
not reach the necessary level of severity, has been held by the Commission to be compatible 
with Art 3 ECHR.337  
 
As to the ECtHR, one case shall be considered in which the SCO was an EU MS. In 
Iruretagoyena v France, an ETA member feared reprisals from the Spanish police on his 
return. His application for a Rule 36 (now Rule 39) indication was refused and he was handed 
over to the Spanish police. His complaint was rejected, among other reasons, because the CPT 
had recently reported a decrease in the well-documented practices of the Spanish police 
contrary to Art 3 ECHR and hence, at the time of expulsion, did not believe that there were 
serious reasons for believing that he would be submitted to the ill-treatment which he 
subsequently suffered.338 As the safety presumption contained in the Spanish Protocol is 
absolute, the ECtHR has not even discussed the safety of the EU MS since its entry into force. 
However, this decision not to examine the safety of an EU MS had serious consequences in 
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this case, as the applicant was subjected to ill-treatment including the administration of 
electric shocks.  
 
Cases in which an EU MS was the STC are more numerous. The ECtHR found in two crucial 
cases that the situation had changed so considerably, that persecution could not still be 
assumed. In the case Cruz Varas and others v. Sweden, the applicants were Chilean citizens 
who came to Sweden in 1987 and unsuccessfully applied for asylum. The first applicant 
subsequently claimed that he had worked in Sweden for a radical organization which had tried 
to kill General Pinochet and that he ran the risk of political persecution if he returned to Chile; 
he also claimed to have been tortured on several occasions in Chile. 
In addition to doubting the first applicant’s credibility, the ECtHR decided that in any event, a 
democratic evolution was in process in Chile, which had led to improvements in the political 
situation and, indeed, to the voluntary return of refugees from Sweden and elsewhere.339 A 
violation of Art 3 ECHR could hence not be found. 
 
In Vilvarajah and others v. the United Kingdom, the applicants were Tamils from Sri Lanka 
who came to the United Kingdom in 1987 and applied for political asylum. They contended 
that they had a genuine fear of persecution if returned to Sri Lanka where they and their 
families had suffered from the excesses of the Sri Lankan army against the Tamil community. 
Their applications were considered and rejected, and the applicants were removed to Sri 
Lanka. The first, second and third applicant claimed that they were arrested, detained and ill-
treated (second and third applicants) by members of the Indian Peace Keeping Force. The 
fourth applicant claimed that he was arrested and beaten by the police. The applicants were 
finally allowed to return to the United Kingdom and granted exceptional leave to remain for 
12 months. 
For the ECtHR, it seemed clear that by February 1988, there had been an improvement in the 
situation in the north and east of Sri Lanka,340 which – together with the fact that the UNHCR 
voluntary repatriation programme had begun to operate at the end of December 1987 – led the 
Court to conclude that there had been no breach of Art 3 ECHR. 
 
In Chahal v. the United Kingdom, the ECtHR found insecurity to prevail in the receiving 
State. When the first applicant became involved in organizing passive resistance in support of 
autonomy for Punjab, he was arrested by the Punjab police and was taken into detention and 
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held for 21 days, during which time he was, he contended, kept handcuffed in unsanitary 
conditions, beaten to unconsciousness, electrocuted on various parts of his body and subjected 
to a mock execution. He was subsequently released without charge. As already stated, his 
application for political asylum was refused. 
The ECtHR held in its judgment that “it would appear that, despite the efforts of that 
Government, the NHRC [Indian National Human Rights Commission] and the Indian courts 
to bring about reform, the violation of human rights by certain members of the security forces 
in Punjab and elsewhere in India is a recalcitrant and enduring problem”.341 Against this 
background, the Court was not persuaded that the given assurances would provide Mr Chahal 
with an adequate guarantee of safety. The Court further considered that the applicant's high 
profile (as supporter of the cause of Sikh separatism) would be more likely to increase the risk 
to him of harm than otherwise.342 For these reasons and in particular the attested involvement 
of the Punjab police in killings and abductions outside their State and the allegations of 
serious human rights violations which continue to be leveled at members of the Indian 
security forces elsewhere, the Court found that it “substantiated that there is a real risk of Mr 
Chahal being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 if he is returned to India”, i.e. that 
such a situation makes India an insecure country for the applicant.343  
 
The facts of the case Saadi v. Italy were the following: the applicant was a Tunisian national 
living in Italy. There, the applicant was prosecuted for participation in international terrorism 
and the deportation order against him was issued by virtue of a legislative decree entitled 
“urgent measures to combat international terrorism”. He was also sentenced in Tunisia, in his 
absence, to twenty years imprisonment for membership of a terrorist organization operating 
abroad in time of peace and for incitement to terrorism.344 Mr Saadi made a request for 
political asylum, which was rejected. 
For the ECtHR, the facts spoke of numerous and regular cases of torture and ill-treatment 
meted out to persons accused under the 2003 Prevention of Terrorism Act. The practices 
reported- said to be often inflicted on persons in police custody with the aim of extorting 
confessions- include “hanging from the ceiling, threats of rape, administration of electric 
shocks, immersion of the head in water, beatings and cigarette burns, all of these being 
practices which undoubtedly reach the level of severity required by Art 3 ECHR”.345  
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Finally, this thesis will thoroughly analyze the case M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece. The 
applicant in this case, an Afghan national, had travelled overland to Greece and continued 
onward to Belgium, where he applied for asylum. By virtue of the Dublin Regulation, the 
Belgian authorities submitted a request for the Greek authorities to take charge of the asylum 
application. The applicant protested, arguing that the detention conditions were appalling and 
that there were deficiencies in the asylum system which could lead him to be sent back to 
Afghanistan without any examination of his claim. The applicant was nonetheless transferred 
to Greece. Upon arriving at Athens airport, the applicant was immediately placed in detention 
in an adjacent building, where he says the conditions were overcrowded and insalubrious. 
Following his release, he lived on the street, with no means of subsistence. After subsequently 
attempting to leave Greece with a false identity card, the applicant was arrested and again 
placed in the detention facility next to the airport for one week, where he alleges the police 
beat him. After his release, he continued to live on the street, occasionally receiving aid from 
local residents and the church. On renewal of his asylum-seeker card in December 2009, steps 
were taken to find him accommodation, but according to his submissions no housing was ever 
offered to him. 
The reader should note that when the ECtHR considered the situation in the applicant’s 
country of origin Afghanistan, it found that the evidence showed that “the situation in 
Afghanistan has posed and continues to pose a widespread problem of insecurity and that the 
applicant belongs to a category of persons particularly exposed to reprisals at the hands of the 
anti-government forces because of the work he did as an interpreter for the international air 
forces”.346 The Court thus concluded that the applicant had an “arguable claim” under Art 3 
(or 2) ECHR.347  
 
The analysis of the level of gravity of the factual conditions in the receiving State that has 
been demanded by the ECtHR in its jurisprudence for Art 3 ECHR’s prohibition of 
refoulement obliging the removing State to abstain from removal leads to the conclusion that, 
as to living conditions, the ECtHR declared that the circumstances of medical treatment must 
be “exceptional” or even “very exceptional. Furthermore the lack of accommodation, 
resources, access to sanitary facilities and provision of essential needs must be severe to 
constitute a violation of Art 3 ECHR. Detention conditions were found by the ECtHR to 
constitute a violation of Art 3 ECHR when confinement is long and takes place in an 
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overcrowded place in appalling conditions of hygiene and cleanliness with no leisure or 
catering facilities, where the dilapidated state of repair of the sanitary facilities renders them 
virtually unusable and where the detainees sleep in extremely filthy and crowded conditions.  
As to claims of persecution, the Strasbourg case law implies that refoulement only raises an 
issue under Art 3 ECHR if the ensuing persecution will reach a high level of severity. In this 
sense, successful were before the ECtHR allegations of continued serious human rights 
violations, numerous and regular cases of torture and ill-treatment as well as widespread 
insecurity due to the applicant being a person particularly exposed to reprisals. 
 
2. Procedural conditions  
 
Procedural conditions in the receiving State of relevance for the ECtHR include the 
implementation of death penalty (a) and deficiencies in the removal procedure in the third 
State (b). 
 
a. Implementation of death penalty: Art 3 ECHR 
 
In a number of early decisions, the ECommHR expanded the scope of Art 3 ECHR, as Zühlke 
puts it, “under the pressure of circumstance”,348 i.e. where removal would result in a “flagrant 
breach” of a, as Mole puts it, “qualified” ECHR right, particularly where the denial of a fair 
trial would result in a risk of execution.349 In Amekrane v. the United Kingdom, a Moroccan 
officer who fled to Gibraltar after a failed coup d’état was surrendered by the British 
authorities and promptly executed after a mock trial. The ECommHR found the case brought 
by the officer’s widow admissible on the grounds of an alleged violation of Art 3 ECHR.350 
Here, the prohibition of inhuman punishment and degrading treatment was apparently held to 
include violations that would fall within Art 2 or Art 6 ECHR in any other context.  
Zühlke found a similar tendency in Brueckmann v. Germany. Mrs. Brueckmann was sought 
by the East German authorities for the murder of her father. The ECommHR again found the 
complaint admissible as to a possible breach of Art 3 ECHR.351 The evidently questionable 
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trial practice in the former communist State qualified as a potential breach of Art 3 ECHR, an 
obvious expansion of the scope traditionally associated with the provision.352  
In cases of non-refoulement, the ECtHR has not expanded the protection of Art 3 ECHR to 
issues on the criminal procedure awaiting the individual concerned in the receiving State. 
However, the ECommHR developed the view on the death penalty in the Kirkwood case and 
in the Soering case that, since Art 2 ECHR expressly permits the imposition of the death 
penalty, removal of a person to a country where he risks the death penalty cannot, in itself, 
raise an issue under either Art 2 or 3 ECHR; however, this does not exclude the possibility of 
an issue arising under Art 3 ECHR in respect of the manner and circumstances in which the 
death penalty is implemented. In both cases, the respective delay during the appeal procedure, 
i.e. “death row phenomenon”, amounted to inhuman treatment.353 
 
b.Third States: Deficiencies in the removal procedure 
 
Gravity can arise from deficiencies in the removal procedure of the third, i.e. intermediary 
State. Such risk of chain-refoulement only possibly emanates from a presumably safe third 
State if the assessment of the risk of persecution or serious harm awaiting the individual 
concerned in the final State results in the affirmation of the existence of a risk. In this case, 
the removal procedure of the third State is only safe if it prevents this danger. 
The ECtHR has only examined EU MSs as safe third States in T.I. v. the United Kingdom, 
K.R.S. v. the United Kingdom and M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece.  
The case T.I. v. the United Kingdom concerned a Sri Lankan national who had unsuccessfully 
sought asylum in Germany and had then submitted a similar application in the United 
Kingdom. In application of the Dublin Convention, the United Kingdom had ordered his 
removal to Germany.  
K.R.S. v. the United Kingdom was the first case to analyze the compatibility of the Dublin 
procedure with the ECHR. The case concerned the removal by the United Kingdom 
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authorities, in application of the Dublin Regulation, of an Iranian asylum-seeker to Greece, 
through which he had passed before arriving in the United Kingdom in 2006. Relying on Art 
3 ECHR, the applicant complained of the deficiencies in the asylum procedure in Greece and 
the risk of being sent back to Iran without the merits of his asylum application being 
examined. In analyzing the risk of removal to Iran by Greece, the ECtHR discussed the 
“Contracting States' obligations under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention”.  
Four years after K.R.S. v. the United Kingdom, the Court was again asked in M.S.S. v. Belgium 
and Greece to judge the alleged violation of Art 3 ECHR as well as Art 13 ECHR by the 
removing State for exposing the applicant to the risks arising from the deficiencies of the 
procedure in Greece. Before the ECtHR, the applicant alleged that by sending him back to 
Greece, the Belgian authorities exposed him to a risk of inhuman and degrading treatment and 
that he was indeed subsequently subjected to such treatment. He also complained that he was 
sent back to Greece in spite of the risk that the authorities there could order his expulsion to 
Afghanistan without examining the reasons that made him flee that country. He further 
contended that he had no real guarantee that his asylum application would follow its normal 
course in Greece, in particular because of the deficiencies in the Greek asylum system. 
Regarding the review procedure in Greece, the applicant complained that he had not had a 
remedy that met the requirements of Art 13 ECHR for his complaints under Arts 2 and 3 
ECHR, and maintained, in this context, that the remedies in question were not effective within 
the meaning of that provision.354 The ECtHR decided to apply Rule 39 of the Rules of Court 
against Greece pending the outcome of the proceedings before the Court.  
 
In these cases of removal due to a respective decision taken in a Dublin procedure, the Court 
examined a possible violation of the ECHR by the third States’ single procedure, regarding its 
review procedure (aa) and its procedure of first instance (bb).  
 
aa. Review procedure 
 
In its judgments, the ECtHR has considered the issue through two lenses, namely either under 
Art 13 ECHR in conjunction with Art 3 ECHR (1) or under Art 3 ECHR alone (2).  
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1. Art 13 ECHR in conjunction with Art 3 ECHR 
 
In M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, the ECtHR stated in regard to the STC of Greece that “[i]ts 
primary concern is whether effective guarantees exist in the present case to protect the 
applicant against arbitrary removal directly or indirectly back to his country of origin.”355 It 
examined whether, as the Government alleged, an application to the Supreme Administrative 
Court for judicial review of a possible rejection of the applicant's request for asylum could be 
considered as a safety net protecting him against arbitrary refoulement.356 In the concrete case, 
lodging an appeal against an expulsion order issued following the rejection of an application 
for asylum does automatically suspend enforcement of the order.357 However, due to the 
ineffectiveness of the system elaborated by the Court (see under (bb) (1)) in practice, the 
Court considered the access to the remedy for asylum-seekers to be hindered.358 Lastly, the 
length of proceedings was evidence for the ECtHR that an appeal to the Supreme 
Administrative Court does not offset the lack of guarantees surrounding the examination of 
asylum applications on the merits.359 Therefore, the Court concluded by finding that “there 
has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 3 
because of the deficiencies in the Greek authorities' examination of the applicant's asylum 
request and the risk he faces of being returned directly or indirectly to his country of origin 
[…] without having access to an effective remedy.”360 
 
2. Art 3 ECHR 
 
In its decision on T.I. v. the United Kingdom, the ECtHR trusted the assurances of the German 
Government that it would apply Section 53 (6) of the German Aliens Act which grants the 
authorities discretion to suspend deportation in cases when there is substantial danger to an 
alien’s life, personal integrity or liberty, including such emanating from non-State agents.361 
Furthermore, it found “effective protection” to have been granted: “As the previous 
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deportation order against the applicant was made more than two years earlier, the applicant 
could not be removed without a fresh deportation order being made, which would be subject 
to review by the [German] Administrative Court, and to which the applicant could make an 
application for interim protection within one week. He would not be removed until the 
Administrative Court had ruled on that application".362  
Surprisingly, the theoretical demands of Art 3 ECHR articulated in T.I. v. the United 
Kingdom, obliging the availability of an effective remedy and the suspensive effect of 
proceedings against a deportation order, were translated into the real opportunity applying to 
the Court for a Rule 39 measure in K.R.S. v. the United Kingdom. In this case, after a 
discussion of the evidence and with the safety presumption in mind, the ECtHR came to the 
conclusion that asylum-seekers who are returned to Greece under the Dublin Regulation will 
be afforded a real opportunity, on the territory of Greece, of applying to the Court for a Rule 
39 measure to prevent removal in violation of Art 3 ECHR. Hence, “the applicant's 
complaints under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention arising out of his possible expulsion to 
Iran should be the subject of a Rule 39 application lodged with the Court against Greece 
following his return there, and not against the United Kingdom”. By accepting in fact the 
argument initiated by the Government of the United Kingdom that the right of appeal to the 
ECtHR satisfies at least the basic requirements for a judicial remedy to be effective, the 
ECtHR seems to take the position that each Contracting State can offer “effective procedural 
safeguards” by virtue of being party to the ECHR.363 Regarding the number of Rule 39 
requests for interim measures as a relevant parameter for the ECtHR, the author would like to 
highlight the fact that the ECHR always places the primary and unconditional responsibility to 
comply with their Convention obligations on the Contracting States; the Court’s supervision 
of States’ observance of the Convention is, as by all international human rights bodies,364 only 
of a subsidiary nature.365 Vermeulen points out rightly that “reliance on eventual appeal to the 
Court for undoing the risk of an expulsion possibly at variance with Article 3 ECHR would 
shift that responsibility to the Court”. Hence, the author finds this narrow parameter for 
gravity for an effective judicial remedy pursuant to Art 3 ECHR questionable and defends the 
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availability of an effective remedy and the suspensive effect of proceedings against a removal 
decision as the only relevant parameter.366  
In M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, the ECtHR did not discuss the risk of refoulement from 
Greece deriving from the lack of access to an effective remedy under Art 3 ECHR alone.   
 
While the author understands that the Court had to rely primarily on Art 13 ECHR for the 
procedural issue of remedy, she finds it highly important to clarify that it is Art 3 ECHR alone 
that poses the defended direct exigencies of the availability of an effective remedy and the 
suspensive effect of proceedings against the removal decision of the receiving State. By 
refusing to examine Art 3 ECHR separately in respect to Greece but doing so in respect to the 
applicant's removal by Belgium to Greece, the ECtHR created not only a formal discrepancy 
in its judgment,367 but also opened itself for criticism of its argumentation. The author follows 
the concurring opinion of Judge Villiger in this matter: While the Court had no hesitations in 
previous cases in examining whether a risk of treatment contrary to Art 3 ECHR existed in the 
applicant's country of origin and then discussing the issue of refoulement under Art 13 ECHR 
to find violations under both provisions,368 its approach in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece is, as 
Judge Villiger called it, “innovatory” and its introduction not comprehensible.  
The complaint of a violation of Art 3 ECHR lies at the basis of the case,369 and it would have 
merited per se to be treated on its own- a fortiori as this complaint was found “arguable” 
under Art 3 ECHR.370 Additionally, the judgment contains a whole page on the situation in 
Afghanistan371 and numerous referrals to the dangers awaiting the applicant there.372 It is 
therefore incomprehensible that the judgment refused to acknowledge such a complaint about 
Greece under Art 3 ECHR. The judgment points out on various occasions that there is a clear 
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danger of the review proceedings in Greece malfunctioning.373 This risk of being expelled 
actually constitutes the very reason why the Court determined that Art 13 ECHR had been 
violated together with Art 3 ECHR. Had the Court found that there was a risk of treatment 
contrary to Art 3 ECHR in the event of the applicant's return to Afghanistan, the Court's 
conclusion in the operative part of the judgment would have been as in Chahal v. the United 
Kingdom that “in the event of [the respondent State's] decision to deport [the applicant] to [the 
particular State], there would be a violation of Article 3 of the Convention”. The effect would 
have been that the Court would have prolonged its measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of 
Court and hence prevented the Greek authorities from deporting the applicant to his home 
country.  
The dangerous practical implication of the Court’s approach for future cases is that it would 
leave open a “legal loophole”374 whereby a person, in spite of the finding by the Court of a 
violation only under Art 13 ECHR taken together with Art 3 ECHR, could nevertheless be 
deported to a country where he could be subjected to ill-treatment contrary to Art 3 ECHR, a 
situation amounting to a petitio principii to invoke Art 46 ECHR in order to prevent 
deportation. Such deportation would be possible because the finding that an identified 
violation of Art 13 ECHR would prohibit a State to deport the applicant to his home country 
would definitely overstretch the potential of a complaint under this provision.375 This loophole 
can only be filled by taking the honest position to declare the obligation of the availability of 
an effective remedy and the suspensive effect of proceedings against a removal decision on 
the receiving State as deriving from Art 3 ECHR alone.  
 
For these numerous reasons, the author argues that the availability of an effective remedy and 
the suspensive effect of proceedings against a removal decision in the receiving third State is 
as such relevant for the protection from chain-refoulement and hence is a factor of gravity 
under Art 3 ECHR alone. 
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319). 
374 Judge Villiger in his dissenting opinion. 
375 Judge Villiger also points to the consequence for all state parties of this innovatory approach that the judgment that bases 
the finding of a violation solely on Article 13 of the Convention taken together with Article 3, is binding for the parties 
according to Article 46 of the Convention, and they are obliged to comply with it. But equally clearly, it hardly follows from 
the finding of a violation under Article 13 that a State is not allowed to deport the applicant to his home country. Such a 
finding would be overstretching the potential of a complaint under Article 13. 
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bb. Single procedure of first instance: Protection discrepancies 
 
On this issue as well, the ECtHR’s approach diverged, focusing either on Art 13 ECHR in 
conjunction with Art 3 ECHR (1) or on Art 3 ECHR alone (2).  
 
1. Art 13 ECHR in conjunction with Art 3 ECHR 
 
The ECtHR made a risk assessment of the asylum procedure’s quality in the third State only 
in its discussion of a violation of Art 13 ECHR in conjunction with Art 3 ECHR; and this only 
occurred in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece. As shortcomings of the Greek asylum procedure, 
the Court noted access to the asylum procedure and in the examination of asylum 
applications, insufficient information for asylum seekers about the procedures to be followed, 
difficult access to the Attica police headquarters, no reliable system of communication 
between the authorities and the asylum-seekers, shortage of interpreters and lack of training of 
the staff responsible for conducting the individual interviews, lack of legal aid effectively 
depriving the asylum seekers of legal counsel, and excessively lengthy delays in receiving a 
decision. These shortcomings affect asylum-seekers arriving in Greece for the first time as 
well as those sent back there in application of the Dublin Regulation.376 Hence, the ECtHR 
observed that the Greek asylum procedure of first instance was marked “by such major 
structural deficiencies that in the absence of an effective remedy, at the end of the day they 
are not protected against arbitrary removal back to their countries of origin”.377  
Regarding the asylum decisions themselves, the Court was concerned about the findings of 
the different surveys carried out by UNHCR, which showed that “almost all first-instance 
decisions are negative and drafted in a stereotyped manner without any details of the reasons 
for the decisions being given. In addition, the watchdog role played by the refugee advisory 
committees at second instance has been removed and UNHCR no longer plays a part in the 
asylum procedure”.378 The ECtHR concluded that the applicant had “no guarantee that his 
asylum application would be seriously examined by the Greek authorities”.379 Therefore, the 
Court concluded by finding that “there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention 
taken in conjunction with Article 3 because of the deficiencies in the Greek authorities' 
examination of the applicant's asylum request and the risk he faces of being returned directly 
                                                
376 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, paras 173-188. 
377 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, para. 300. 
378 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, para 302. 
379 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, para 358. 
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or indirectly to his country of origin without any serious examination of the merits of his 
asylum application”.380 
 
2. Art 3 ECHR 
 
Regarding a possible violation of Art 3 ECHR, the ECtHR trusted in T.I. v. the United 
Kingdom the assurances of the third State’s government that it would grant the applicant the 
allowance to stay. Subsequently, a positive refugee status determination by the third State was 
the crucial option for the applicant for not being removed in both K.R.S. v. the United 
Kingdom and M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece. In K.R.S. v United Kingdom, the Court trusted 
the Greek asylum system based on the safety presumption. In M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 
the ECtHR did not discuss the risk of refoulement from Greece deriving in the single 
procedure from the lack of any serious examination of the applicant’s asylum application 
under Art 3 ECHR alone.   
 
The author wants to point out that, although there is no right to asylum guaranteed under 
international law and, hence, the STC procedure is not unlawful per se, for the EU level, Art 
II-78 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights provides for a right to asylum, but continues 
that it shall be “guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 
1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees and in accordance 
with the Constitution”.381 Such recognition of the right to asylum is a remarkable step in 
international law and could mean that when expelling asylum-seekers to a third country, the 
EU MS must “guarantee” they have access to an asylum procedure.382  
As to the question of the quality of the single procedure, the author would like to reiterate her 
criticism of the Court’s approach to relying primarily on Art 13 ECHR for procedural issues 
regarding a STC. The judgment points out on various occasions that there is a clear danger of 
the proceedings in Greece malfunctioning and the applicant being sent back to Afghanistan 
during the proceedings without a complete examination of his complaints having taken 
place.383 This risk of being expelled actually constitutes the very reason why the Court 
                                                
380 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, para 321. 
381 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 2010/C 83/02. Official Journal. C 83, 30.03.2010. 
382 Battjes, European Asylum Law, 114. 
383 For instance, it is stated in the judgment that “[s]everal reports highlight the serious risk of refoulement as soon as the 
decision is taken to reject the asylum application, because an appeal to the [Greek] Supreme Administrative Court has no 
automatic suspensive effect ” (para. 194). And again, “[o]f at least equal concern to the Court are the risks of refoulement the 
applicant faces in practice before any decision is taken on the merits of his case. The applicant did escape expulsion in 
August 2009. […] However, he claimed that he had barely escaped a second attempt by the police to deport him to Turkey” 
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eventually found a violation of Art 13 ECHR taken together with Art 3 ECHR. Hence, also on 
the issue of the risk of refoulement, it is incomprehensible that the judgment refused to 
acknowledge such a complaint about Greece under Art 3 ECHR alone. As for the review 
procedure, the Court’s omission of allowing Art 3 ECHR alone to pose direct exigencies on 
the single procedure in the receiving State has to be criticized also in the face of the quality of 
the examination of the applicant’s asylum application- in whose context also the refoulement 
assessment is taken. 
 
Besides the cardinal importance of Art 3 ECHR, negative practical consequences also speak 
against the approach taken by the Court. This is demonstrated by the Court’s statement that 
“[i]t is in the first place for the Greek authorities, who have responsibility for asylum matters, 
themselves to examine the applicant's request and the documents produced by him and assess 
the risks to which he would be exposed in Afghanistan. The Court's primary concern is 
whether effective procedural guarantees exist in the present case to protect the applicant 
against arbitrary removal directly or indirectly back to his country of origin”.384 By requiring 
the national authorities first to examine the issue of refoulement before the Court can do so, 
the Court inappropriately applies the principle of subsidiary. Tribute has already sufficiently 
been paid to this principle in this case by testing the complaint expressly or implicitly with 
various admissibility conditions and in particular with that of the exhaustion of domestic 
remedies. While the principle of subsidiary plays an important part, for instance, in applying 
the second paragraphs of Arts 8 to 11 ECHR, its role must be more restricted in the light of a 
crucial provision such as Art 3 ECHR and in view of the central importance of the applicant's 
refoulement for this case. This principle cannot permit such a complaint to be “downgraded” 
so that it is – as in other cases385 – no longer independently examined.386 
In fact, only the position to declare the obligations on the single procedure as deriving from 
Art 3 ECHR is doing justice to reality: when the applicant’s claim not to be refouled is 
considered in the context of and hence depends solely on the quality of the examination of the 
                                                                                                                                                   
(para. 316). Moreover, “[t]hat fact, combined with the malfunctions in the notification procedure in respect of 'persons of no 
known address' reported by the European Commissioner for Human Rights and the UNHCR […] makes it very uncertain 
whether the applicant will be able to learn the outcome of his asylum application in time to react within the prescribed time-
limit” (para. 319). 
384 Para. 299. 
385 In the case of Saadi v. Italy, concerning deportation to Tunisia, the domestic authorities' reasons for allowing that 
applicant's refoulement concerned mainly assurances which the Tunisian Government had given to Italy – assurances which 
the Court in its judgment found to be insufficient. The Court was then obliged to examine itself, and in detail, the situation in 
Tunisia, relying inter alia on Reports of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (see Saadi v. Italy [GC], 
no. 37201/06, ECHR 2008). These arguments had not been examined by the Italian courts. This is precisely what the Court 
could and should have done in the present case. 
386 Villiger, para. 245. 
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applicant’s asylum application, the right to an asylum procedure of a certain quality is a “side 
effect of the prohibition of refoulement”.387  
Therefore, the author believes that the Court should have identified as relevant for the 
protection from refoulement under Art 3 ECHR in a single procedure the quality of the 
asylum procedure. Hence, it should have separately examined the deficiencies in the Greek 
authorities' examination of the applicant's asylum request and the consequential risk he faced 
of being returned directly or indirectly to his country of origin without any serious 
examination of his asylum application.388 
 
But which quality of asylum procedure guarantees in a single procedure the protection from 
and hence does justice to the principle of non-refoulement? Does safety only exist where the 
result of the asylum procedure is in conformity with the GRC, i.e. a genuine refugee’s claim is 
declared admissible and he is granted asylum? In other words, are detrimental protection 
discrepancies between the removing and the receiving State a factor for gravity, making the 
third State unsafe and hence obliging the responsible State to abstain from removal?  
The GRC provides a uniform and non-derogable definition of the term “refugee”, but in 
practice, States have taken both more liberal and more restrictive stands. Thus, a claim that 
would be successful in one State might be rejected in the neighboring State. A sharp cleavage 
dissociates the uniformity of the procedure and divergent state practices regarding the 
substance of the refugee definition. In other words, the State where an applicant can claim 
refugee status is imposed on the claimant, but States remain free to apply their idiosyncratic 
interpretation of the refugee definition. In this system, the examination of the applicants claim 
remains within the exclusive realm of state sovereignty. 
 
Domestic authorities have reacted to protection discrepancies with approaches reaching from 
particularistic to universalistic. In SC procedures, particularistic argumentations have led 
domestic bodies to partly absurd formalistic arguments as a response to decisive 
dissimilarities in the protection systems. The most radical particularistic view argues that 
respect of the GRC is provided for in the savings clause in Art 2 DC and, hence, no situation 
could compel EU MS to use Art 3 (4) DC.389 This position has evidently no ground in the 
VTC and is hence to be discarded.  
                                                
387 Battjes, European Asylum Law, 401. 
388 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, para 321. 
389 The U.K. Secretary of State argued in this sense in R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Jahangeer 
and others, [1993] Imm AR 564, United Kingdom: High Court (England and Wales), 11 June 1993, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b65e2c.html [accessed 24 June 2011]. 
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Particularistic views fleeing into formalism in cases where the receiving EU MS has a less 
protective interpretation of the GRC argue that “[w]ith reference to the legislation in [the 
receiving EU MS], its international obligations and its notorious conduct with regard to 
persons seeking asylum there, it must be ruled out that [the receiving EU MS] would not 
follow its obligations under the conventions”390 or state that “the fact that, compared to [the 
responsible EU MS], [the receiving EU MS] may judge the question of an international flight 
alterative differently than Sweden, and thus exclude an asylum seeker from the possibility to 
receive refugee status […], does not imply that [the responsible EU MS] violates Art 33 of the 
Geneva Convention by sending the asylum seeker to [the receiving EU MS] for a 
determination of his claim”.391  
A moderate particularistic view argues that there is a permissive tolerance for deviating 
interpretation and, hence, no situation that could compel EU MSs to use Art 3 (4) DC. The 
interesting issue is that a moderate particularistic approach also needs the definition of the 
tolerable deviation of interpretation what only the most radical universalistic approach can 
offer: a unitary interpretation of the GRC and especially its Art 33 by the rules in the VTC, 
and hence no margin of appreciation at all.392 
Thus, a universalistic approach is the only defendable way. Probably the most 
comprehensively argued example of a universalistic approach to date is from the British 
House of Lords in Adan and Aitseguer, a jurisprudence from which the House of Lords 
regrettably retreated in later decisions. It raised the question of whether a Dublin removal is 
legitimate when British courts consider persecution by non-State agents393 to fall within the 
protective scope of the refugee definition and German and French courts do not. After 
underscoring the relevance of the canon of interpretation enshrined in Arts 31 and 32 VTC, 
Lord Steyn concluded:  
“[T]here can only be one true interpretation of a treaty. If there is disagreement on the meaning of 
the Refugee Convention, it can be resolved by the International Court of Justice: article 38. It has, 
however, never been asked to make such a ruling. The prospect of a reference to the International 
Court of Justice is remote. In practice it is left to national courts, faced with a material disagreement 
on an issue of interpretation, to resolve it. But in doing so it must search, untrammelled by notions 
of its national legal culture, for the true autonomous and international meaning of the treaty. And 
there can only be one true meaning.“394  
                                                
390 Noll, Negotiating Asylum, 500. 
391 The responsible EU MS being Sweden, the receiving EU MS being Germany, Translation by Noll, Negotiating Asylum, 
501. Minority Bosnians Decision, Swedish Aliens Appeals Board (AAB) exhibited incompetence regarding Sweden’s non-
refoulement obligations within the context of the European Union, UD98/780/MP. 
392 Noll, Negotiating Asylum, 496-499. 
393 Adan originated from Somalia and feared persecution at the hands of another clan than his own, while Aitseguer was an 
Algerian citizen and was threatened by the Groupe Islamique Arm´e – a threat which state authorities could not protect him 
from. 
394 House of Lords, Adan and Aitseguer, Lord Steyn. The Court of Appeal argued in an analogous fashion; Court of Appeal, 
Adan and Aitseguer, para. 68. In its judgment of 23 July 1999 in the case of R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department 
ex parte Adan, Subaskaran and Aitsegeur, the Court of Appeal examined as a question of general importance whether the 
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Hence, supported by earlier dicta of the Court of Appeal in Kerrouche395 and Iyadurai396, the 
House of Lords rejected the existence of a “range of permissible meanings” in interpreting the 
GRC397 and considered in this case the removal of the claimants to Germany and France to 
contravene the law, as the German and French interpretations of Art 1(A) (2) GRC were too 
narrow with regard to persecution by non-State agents.398 By this argumentation, the House of 
Lords effectively defended the notion that refugee law has a determinate content even in the 
face of dissimilarities of interpretation within the EU and that this content has to be 
guaranteed. In fact, “the holistic approach of the U.K. Courts is respectful of the degree of 
harmonisation already attained through the 1951 Refugee Convention, and should be 
endorsed as a model for the future scrutiny of removals under the Dublin Convention”.399 
Also from a political point of view, this is a very valuable result: not only would the danger of 
the vicious circle of restrictionism be stopped, the canon of interpretation laid down in Art 31 
and 43 VTC could also be a tool for harmonization of the EU MSs’ protection systems.400 
UNHCR can also be referred to in this context: “The primary responsibility to provide 
protection remains with the state where the claim is lodged. Transfer of responsibility for an 
asylum application might be envisaged in some circumstances, but only between states with 
comparable protection systems, on the basis of an agreement which clearly outlines their 
respective responsibilities”.401 
Hence, it has become clear that the universalistic approach is the only tenable as long as 
Member States interpret their international obligations towards asylum-seekers differently.  
                                                                                                                                                   
Secretary of State was entitled to return asylum-seekers to France and Germany under section 2 (2) c of the Asylum and 
Immigration Act 1996, as being countries which did not recognise as refugees those who feared persecution from non-State 
agents. Adan was a citizen of Somalia who had been refused asylum in Germany prior to her arrival in the United Kingdom; 
Subaskaran was a Sri Lankan national who claimed asylum in the United Kingdom on account of his ill-treatment by both the 
LTTE and the Sri Lankan army but whose claims had been rejected by the German authorities; and Aitsegeur was a citizen of 
Algeria whose asylum application had been rejected by French authorities. The Court of Appeal held that the Geneva 
Convention extended protection to persons who feared persecution by non-State agents, where, for whatever cause, the State 
was unwilling or unable to offer protection itself. As the German and French authorities subscribed to the “accountability 
theory” – i.e. refugee status was limited to those who feared persecution emanating from State or quasi-State authorities or 
persecution from non-State agents where it was shown that it was tolerated or encouraged by the State, or at least that the 
State was unwilling to offer protection - the Secretary of State could not as a matter of law certify the claimants for return to 
these countries as safe third countries because these countries did not give effect to the Convention’s core values: 
“If a party to the Geneva Convention were to take a position which was at a variance with the Convention’s true 
interpretation, and act upon it, it could not be regarded as a safe third country; not merely because the ““real risk”” test is not 
breached (though certainly it would be) but because in the particular case the Convention was not being applied at all.” (para 
68) 
The Secretary of State has petitioned the House of Lords for leave to appeal against this decision as regards Adan and 
Aitsegeur, no separate petition being pursued in respect of Subaskaran due to the similarity of the issues. 
395 Kerrouche v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [1997] Imm. A.R. 610, 615. 
396 Iyadurai v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [1998] Imm. A.R. 470, 476.  
397 House of Lords, Adan and Aitseguer, Lord Steyn and Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough. For a critique of the tolerance 
model developed in Kerrouche and Iyadurai, see Noll, 1997, pp. 503–510.  
398 House of Lords, Adan and Aitseguer (all Lords rejecting the government’s appeals). Court of Appeal, Adan and Aitseguer, 
paras. 71 and 72. 
399 Noll, Formalism versus Empiricism, 175-6. 
400 For an example for non-state agents see Noll, Negotiating Asylum, 511-534. 
401 UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, 5. 
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How has the ECtHR treated the issue? The Court stated in T.I. v. the United Kingdom that, in 
general, its primary concern is not to monitor the performance of Contracting States with 
regard to their observance of their obligations under the GRC, i.e. in this case the fact that the 
German authorities exclude sources of risk of ill-treatment by non-State agent from 
consideration of asylum claims. However, in this concrete case the Court raised the issue of 
protection discrepancies by considering the claim of T.I. that the asylum proceedings would 
not offer him effective protection since they would, in all likelihood, result in a further 
rejection of his claims and an order of removal. The Court noted that the German authorities 
would not find the applicant’s probable persecution by non-State agents relevant for the 
purposes of asylum or protection under Art 3 ECHR. This fact was thus one of three factors – 
the other two being procedural reasons – that made the Court find that there was 
“considerable doubt that the applicant would either be granted a follow up asylum hearing or 
that his second claim would be granted”. Protection discrepancies have hence been declared 
to make a third state unsafe, i.e. to be a factor for the risk of refoulement.  
Additionally, the author would like to recapitulate that in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, a 
crucial part of the Court’s reasoning for a violation of Art 13 in conjunction with Art 3 ECHR 
because of the deficiencies in the Greek authorities' examination of the applicant's asylum 
request was that almost all first-instance decisions were negative and hence, the applicant had 
no guarantee that his asylum application would be seriously examined by the Greek 
authorities. While giving the results of the asylum procedure crucial weight only regarding 
Art 13 ECHR, the author sees it again as a side effect of the prohibition of refoulement, hence 
of the protection under Art 3 ECHR alone that, in the third State’s asylum procedure, the 
treatment of the admissibility and the merits of the individual case is not more restrictive than 
in the removing State. In this sense, Elspeth Guild and Jean Allain find that there is no need of 
proof by individual cases to see that, “unless asylum applications are determined in an 
equivalent manner across the EU and subject to a supervisory appellate structure to ensure 
consistency among Member States (and any other States to which asylum seekers are sent), 
the protection against refoulement may not be guaranteed”.402 Hence, until then, the notion of 
STC fails to provide adequate protection against the individual’s right not to be refouled.403 
  
For these numerous reasons, the author argues that, the third State’s single procedure being of 
a certain quality both on asylum and removal is relevant for the protection from chain-
refoulement. Hence, a factor of gravity under Art 3 ECHR alone is the lack of such quality 
                                                
402 Guild 321. 
403 Allain 553. 
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even only as to the examination of the applicant’s asylum claim, having as result a more 
restrictive protection scope in the respective case than foreseen by the universal refugee 
definition.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
It can be concluded that gravity can arise from deficiencies in the removal procedure of the 
third State, namely due to its review procedure or its procedure of first instance. The ECtHR 
has examined these questions in T.I. v. the United Kingdom, K.R.S. v. the United Kingdom and 
M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece. While the Court comprehensively relied primarily on Art 13 
ECHR in its examination of these procedural issues, the author has defended with reference to 
the cardinal importance of Art 3 ECHR, its prohibition also of chain-refoulement and with 
formal and manifestly logical arguments that deficiencies in the review procedure or in the 
single procedure of first instance must be a factor of gravity under Art 3 ECHR alone.  
 
As to the review procedure, the author argued that the availability of an effective remedy and 
the suspensive effect of proceedings against a removal decision in the receiving third State is 
as such relevant for the protection from chain-refoulement and hence derive as exigencies 
from Art 3 ECHR alone. As to the third State’s single procedure both on asylum and removal, 
relevant for the protection from chain-refoulement and hence a factor of gravity under Art 3 
ECHR alone is the lack of a certain procedural quality- even only as to the examination of the 
applicant’s asylum claim with the result of a more restrictive protection scope in the 
respective case than foreseen by the universal refugee definition.  
 
While it is clear that situations of gravity oblige the responsible State not to remove the 
individual concerned to the unsafe State, are there also positive procedural demands arising 
for the removing State out of this obligation? 
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3. Positive procedural obligation: Rebuttal of safety presumption 
 
This section will address whether positive procedural obligations can be developed for the 
removal procedure of the responsible State from the precedent defense of the factual and 
procedural factors of gravity amounting to a violation of Art 3 ECHR. 
The author will defend that, while in general the obligation of empirical assessment of the 
danger of refoulement exists (a), the SC concept suffices this obligation with its possibility to 
rebut the safety presumption (b).  
 
 
a. In general: Empirical assessment of the danger of chain-refoulement  
 
A removing State can never act on the assumption that pacta sunt servanda is satisfied. As 
was shown in Chapter II, a violation of Art 3 ECHR in a presumed SCO, even if it is an EU 
MS, is not a theoretical issue. As Goodwin-Gill states: “How can we be sufficiently sure that 
even the most respectable and reputable of regimes has not, just this once, produced a 
refugee?”404 Therefore, Boutillon’s opinion that “a more subtle analysis might show that this 
exclusion is acceptable” and that “it seems extremely unlikely that a European national would 
have a valid refugee claim”405 cannot be followed.  
The author defends a radical obligation: As a removing State can never act on the assumption 
that pacta sunt servanda is satisfied by absolute harmony in the application of the GRC in all 
Member States,406 the removing State must take an empirical approach in its single procedure 
on asylum and refoulement. Such empirical assessment is to be taken on refoulement because 
it “is inherent in the prohibitions of refoulement contained in international law. The decision-
maker has to establish the international meaning of relevant prohibitions of refoulement to 
measure the indirect risk against its benchmarks”.407 Even further assessment might be 
necessary, such as in cases as the Minority Bosnians case: To know about the differences in 
the granting of residence permits, a decision-maker has to “embark on an empirical 
assessment of the claimants’ prospects for protection”,408 i.e. compare the German and 
Swedish practice relevant for the individual concerned.409  
                                                
404 Goodwin-Gill, Safe Country, 248. 
405 Boutillon 140. 
406 Gilbert 973-4, referring to Cf. R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p Adan, [1999] 1 AC 293; and [2001] 2 
AC 477. 
407 Noll, Formalism versus Empiricism, 181-2. 
408 Noll, Formalism versus Empiricism, 171. 
409 Ibidem. 
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A result from the universalistic approach to be taken vis-à-vis protection discrepancies in the 
third State’s asylum procedure for the protection from chain-refoulement is that an empirical 
assessment is also demanded of the compliance of the receiving State’s protection scope with 
the universal refugee definition. If not, manifest denials of reality would win as those that 
were brought forward by the British Government before the ECtHR in T.I. v. the United 
Kingdom, in which Germany as receiving country would, at that time not in breach of EU 
law,410 not grant protection in cases of persecution by non-State agents: “It would be wrong in 
principle for the United Kingdom to have to take on a policing function of assessing whether 
another Contracting State such as Germany was complying with the Convention. It would 
also undermine the effective working of the Dublin Convention, which was brought into 
operation to allocate in a fair and efficient manner State responsibility within Europe for 
considering asylum claims”.411 However, in an empirical assessment the ECtHR scrutinized 
the direct risk of ill-treatment in Sri Lanka (which it affirmed) and the indirect risk of ill-
treatment upon return to Germany.412 In fact, in the end, the ECtHR destroyed in its decision 
the efficiency of the Dublin Convention without using the word refoulement, but by taking an 
empirical approach: Bosnian asylum-seekers who qualify for refugee status or a 
complementary form of protection shall not be returned to another EU MS under the Dublin 
Convention, if the latter does not grant them a residence permit.413 Hence, although the Court 
rejected the argument that the fact that Germany was a party to the ECHR absolved the 
United Kingdom from verifying the fate that awaited an asylum-seeker it was about to 
transfer to that State, if a residence permit does not solve the issue, only the fact that the 
asylum procedure in Germany apparently complied with the ECHR enabled the Court to 
reject the allegation that the applicant's removal to Germany would make him run a real and 
serious risk of treatment contrary to Art 3 ECHR.  
 
As to domestic authorities, they have prevented removals based on a finding that a particular 
refugee's rights will not be protected in another State, highlighting the importance of the 
removing State's inquiry into particular circumstances vis-à-vis asylum-seekers. In this sense, 
the Michigan Guidelines state that a State is under a duty "to inform [itself] of the facts and 
                                                
410 Since the adoption of the Qualification Directive, all EU MS are required to recognise persecution by non-state agents as 
falling within the refugee definition (Art 6 (c)). However, in practice, whilst the refugee definition in the QD has led some 
countries that previously did not include persecution by such groups to provide protection, other countries have adopted a 
more restrictive approach: European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), ‘The Impact of the EU Qualification Directive 
on International Protection’, (October 2008) 
411 T.I. v. the United Kingdom, under “Submissions before the Court“, “The United Kingdom Government”. 
412 That Art 3 ECHR also applies in situations where the danger emanates from persons or groups of persons who are not 
public officials, was lastly stated by the ECtHR in Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, para 147 and reiterated in N. v. the 
United Kingdom paras 31-32. 
413 Noll, Formalism versus Empiricism, 170. 
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monitor the decisions made by a third country in order to satisfy [itself] that the third country 
will not send the applicant to another country otherwise than in accordance with the 
convention."414  
However, how can this obligation for an empirical assessment not be seen as being breached 
by a procedure as the SC procedure that foresees the absolute contrary, namely no meritorious 
assessment of the case by the removing State? The author holds that this obligation and the 
SC concepts can be reconciled by the rebuttal of the safety presumption. 
 
b. For SC procedures: Rebuttal of safety presumption 
 
How can it be guaranteed in a SC procedure that refoulement is prevented in a situation of 
insecurity in the “safe” State due to factual conditions or procedural protection discrepancies? 
It has already been established that a SC procedure is not unlawful per se, as there is no right 
to asylum guaranteed under international law. While the safety presumption is, therefore, not 
a prohibited concept, the author defends that it is prerogative that is rebuttable.    
 
For the presumption of safety, ratification of the same treaties is not a sufficient basis for 
inter-state trust. Thus, the mere fact that a State has ratified relevant instruments of 
international law or assurances does not allow for absolute trust that it is indeed safe.415 
Regarding ratification of the ECHR, it was made clear already in Soering v. the United 
Kingdom that expulsion to a contracting State of the ECHR is not permitted generally or 
under easier conditions than to a State that is not a member of the ECHR.416 In this sense, the 
ECtHR stated in T.I. v. the United Kingdom:  
 
“The Court finds that the indirect removal in this case to an intermediary country, which is also a 
Contracting State, does not affect the responsibility of the United Kingdom to ensure that the 
applicant is not, as a result of its decision to expel, exposed to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the 
Convention. Nor can the United Kingdom rely automatically in that context on the arrangements 
made in the Dublin Convention concerning the attribution of responsibility between European 
countries for deciding asylum claims. Where States establish international organisations, or mutatis 
mutandis international agreements, to pursue co-operation in certain fields of activities, there may 
be implications for the protection of fundamental rights. It would be incompatible with the purpose 
                                                
414 R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Yogathas, [2002] UKHL 36, United Kingdom: House of 
Lords, 17 October 2002 p.9, 4 Eng. Rep. 800 (Eng.) (Lord Bingham of Cornhill). This is also the approach in the Australian 
case-law, despite its representing one of the least protective approaches to "safe third countries." See, e.g., Al Toubi v. 
MIMA (2001) F.C.A. 1381, p 32.  
415 Battjes, European Asylum Law, 409.  
416 Alleweldt, Ralf, ‘Protection Against Expulsion Under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (1993) 4 
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and object of the Convention if Contracting States were thereby absolved from their responsibility 
under the Convention in relation to the field of activity covered by such attribution”417 
 
In Korban v Sweden, the Committee against Torture opined that the third State, in this case 
Jordan, was unsafe even though it was party to the CAT.418 In Alan v. Switzerland as well, the 
argument that the removing State would not be in violation of its non-refoulement obligation 
in returning the individual to a State that is “party to [a] Convention” was rejected.419 
Regarding the GRC as well, a State should not be considered safe simply because it has 
ratified the Geneva Convention: “The country may not implement the Refugee Convention in 
good faith, may apply an extremely restrictive interpretation, or may have adopted measures 
that cast in doubt its observance of the terms of the Refugee Convention. Nor does the fact 
that a country has signed the Refugee Convention offer a guarantee against refoulement”.420 
Reality proves that, in many instances, "returning asylum applicants to a third host country 
[that is a signatory to or intends to sign the Refugee Convention] has resulted in refoulement 
to the country where they faced persecution and ultimately in their death, disappearance or 
persecution".421  
On the other hand, ratification of the same treaties is not mandatory for interstate trust, i.e. the 
non-ratification of the GRC or human rights treaties does not justify declaring a State to be 
unsafe. In this sense, the ECtHR spoke in Amuur v France of “protection comparable” and the 
possibility of expulsion to Syria not being party to the GRC after “guarantees” by the Syrian 
authorities (a condition to be discussed later).422 A State that has not assumed by treaty or 
agreement an obligation to provide for comparable protection can, according to a decision of 
the German Constitutional Court, be assumed to provide such if it co-operates with 
UNHCR.423 The author opposes this argumentation due to the fact that UNHCR’s role is 
limited to supervising only.424 Mere state practice, i.e. obligations being absent, or co-
operation with UNHCR does not provide for a basis for interstate trust. 
 
As to the rebuttal of the safety presumption, it is logical that while the mere fact that a State 
has ratified relevant instruments of international law or assurances does not allow for absolute 
                                                
417 See, among other authorities, also Waite and Kennedy v. Germany, application no. 26083/94, Council of Europe: 
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trust that it is safe, the argumentum e contrario that the sending State is obliged to perform an 
individual examination of the merits to establish that the respective State is safe for the 
particular applicant would also be unreasonable,425 as it would render the fact that the State is 
party to the same instruments of international law irrelevant. Hence, an intermediate position 
should be defended: Upon an application for asylum, the removing State can refuse to 
examine the merits of the claim on the assumption that the receiving state is prima facie safe. 
However, under this legal situation, the applicant must have the opportunity to present 
evidence supporting his claim that the receiving State is not safe. If he succeeds, the safety 
presumption must be seen as rebutted.426 The ECtHR evidently also follows this 
argumentation as, for example, it stated: 
 
 “On the legal situation, the Court observed that the existence of domestic laws and accession to 
international treaties guaranteeing respect for fundamental rights in principle are not in themselves 
sufficient to ensure adequate protection against the risk of ill-treatment where, as in the present 
case, reliable sources have reported practices resorted to or tolerated by the authorities which are 
manifestly contrary to the principles of the Convention”.427 
 
In this sense, based on Art 3 ECHR alone, the ECtHR criticized one issue of the asylum 
procedure in Belgium in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, namely that “the procedure followed 
by the Aliens Office in application of the Dublin Regulation left no possibility for the 
applicant to state the reasons militating against his transfer to Greece: The form the Aliens 
Office filled in contains no section for such comments”.428 This argumentation is a positive 
case-law development after the ECtHR had not even discussed the possibility of rebuttal in 
the case Tomic v. the United Kingdom after the Spanish Protocol had determined the safety of 
the United Kingdom as a SCO.  
 
It can hence be established that, upon an application for asylum, the removing State can refuse 
to examine the merits of the claim on the assumption that a specific State, whether it be a STC 
or a SCO, is prima facie safe only if the applicant is given the opportunity to rebut the safety 
presumption, i.e. present counter evidence to the effect that the state is not safe.429 The 
circumstances under which rebuttal should be allowed consider the question of standard and 
burden of proof, a most crucial issue to be discussed in the following chapter. 
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B. Probability and predictability equals standard of proof and 
burden of proof 
 
In the second step of the direct balancing, it must be analyzed under which circumstances 
removal is impeded by the principle of non-refoulement as inherent in Art 3 ECHR. 
Abstractly, this step means balancing the interest of the removing State and the danger for the 
applicant in the receiving State. As this at the outset may seem inadequate for the absolute 
provision of Art 3 ECHR, it shall be reiterated that this means nothing more than that two 
important limitations are introduced to take into account the State’s limited possibilities: the 
probability and the predictability of the risk.430  
As already discussed, the question on probability and predictability of a risk can, in the sense 
of the “variable standard of proof” of Legomsky’s complicity principle, only be answered in a 
relative manner, because proportionality must exist between the probability and predictability 
and the gravity of the anticipated violation. In other words: not every probability and 
predictability can trigger the responsibility of the removing State, not even for torture. In this 
sense, the wording of Art 3 (1) CAT refers to the " danger of being subjected to torture" (in 
French "risque d'être soumise a la torture"), and according to the Committee’s first General 
Comment of November 1998, Art 3 CAT is confined to cases where there are “substantial 
grounds for believing” that the applicant would be in danger of being subjected to torture as 
defined in Art 1 CAT.431 This wording replaced the original Swedish proposal for the 
expression "reasonable grounds to believe that he may be in danger" of being subjected to 
torture. In Motumbo v. Switzerland432, its first decision on the merits, the Committee referred 
to circumstances as evidently being of relevance which would have the “foreseeable and 
necessary consequence” of exposing the subject to torture. Furthermore, in Hayden v. 
                                                
430 Hence, also in this balancing process, the absoluteness of Art 3 ECHR wins out: In Chahal v. the United Kingdom, the 
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the person in question, if expelled, would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 in the receiving 
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Sweden,433 recalling that, for the purposes of Art 3 CAT the individual concerned must face a 
foreseeable, real and personal risk of being tortured in the country to which he is returned, the 
Committee pointed out that “the requirement of necessity and predictability should be 
interpreted in light of its general comment on the implementation of article 3 which reads: 
‘Bearing in mind that the State party and the Committee are obliged to assess whether there 
are substantial grounds for believing that the author would be in danger of being subjected to 
torture were he/she to be expelled, returned or extradited, the risk of torture must be assessed 
on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. However, the risk does not have to meet 
the test of being highly probable’”.434 This concept was frequently recalled in the subsequent 
jurisprudence of the Committee.435  
 
Through its case-law, the ECtHR has also developed certain demands on proportionality and 
predictability for the respective gravity of risk that must be attained to “trigger” the positive 
obligation to impede removal. These demands define the standard of proof and are also 
consequential for the burden of proof to be carried by the asylum-seeker. According to the 
ECtHR's settled case-law, the Court’s demands on proportionality and predictability for the 
respective gravity of risk are the following: substantial grounds must exist for believing that 
there is a real risk of exposure to ill-treatment, either in the State of proposed destination or 
through chain-refoulement. On the assessment of the risk of ill-treatment of an individual 
upon return to his country of origin, the ECtHR noted first in Nsona v. the Netherlands:  
“Expulsion - or removal - by a Contracting State of a non-national may give rise to an issue under 
Article 3, and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention, where substantial 
grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned faced a real risk of being 
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the country to which he 
or she was returned”.436 
 
These parameters set out by the ECtHR have become continuous jurisprudence of the Court 
since Soering v. the United Kingdom also for chain-refoulement:437 It has already been well-
established through case-law that the removal of an asylum-seeker by a Contracting State may 
give rise to an issue under Art 3 ECHR, and hence engage the responsibility of that State 
under the Convention, where “substantial grounds” have been shown for believing that the 
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person concerned faces a “real risk” of being subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment in the receiving State.438 In such circumstances, Art 3 ECHR implies 
an obligation not to expel the individual to that State.439 This coherent jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR clarifies the confusion raised by exceptions of the ECommHR that rarely applied a 
stricter “serious risk” test.440  
 
The issues of standard of proof (1) and burden of proof (2) will now be separately analyzed. 
 
1. Standard of proof 
 
In the context of the standard of proof, the issues of probability and predictability are both 
relevant and will be discussed together under the term “knowledge”. According to the 
complicity principle’s variable standard of proof, the required level of knowledge about a risk 
varies inversely with the seriousness of the potential harm. This concept is in conformity with 
the GRC, according to which the degree of certainty implied by the word “knowingly” is 
assumed to vary inversely with the importance of the right.  
As the concept of the variable standard of proof indicates that the gravity of the foreseeable 
ill-treatment is decisive with respect to the degree of probability and predictability applicable 
in different classes of cases, a relatively low level of knowledge ought to be required in the 
case of an alleged violation of Art 3 ECHR for the proof of a violation. In this sense, 
Legomsky has been quoted as arguing on the issue of the risk of a violation as grave as e.g. 
torture and degrading treatment existing in a third state, that, “If the right is unusually 
important, then perhaps any reasonable basis for fearing that the third country will violate the 
right should be regarded as ‘knowledge’ for purposes of the destination country’s 
responsibilities”.441 In comparison, a higher level of probability and predictability would 
have to be proven if the applicant would “merely” be exposed to a certainly degrading, but 
yet fairly light corporal punishment in a society generally governed by the rule of law.442 
 
How has the ECtHR handled the parameters of probability and predictability? The fact that 
the absoluteness of Art 3 ECHR has prevailed not only regarding the level of gravity but also 
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the level of probability can be rated positively: the Court has reiterated in its jurisprudence 
that the fact that the person is perceived to be a danger to the national security of the 
respective State is not a material consideration in its risk assessment regarding refoulement.443 
It argued:  
“The prospect that he may pose a serious threat to the community if not returned does not 
reduce in any way the degree of risk of ill treatment that the person may be subject to on return. 
For that reason it would be incorrect to require a higher standard of proof, as submitted by the 
intervener, where the person is considered to represent a serious danger to the community, since 
assessment of the level of risk is independent of such a test.”444  
 
However, the ECtHR’s threshold for the predictability and probability necessary for a 
violation appears on first sight misguided: “substantial grounds” must be shown to prove that 
the person concerned faces a “real risk” of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment in the country of potential return. Such high demands on 
the probability and predictability for all levels of gravity of violation of Art 3 ECHR seem 
rather restrictive. However, what is relevant is not which terms the ECtHR has used, but how 
it has in realiter set the level in its case-by-case jurisprudence. Indeed, it is possible that the 
wording of the demanded level of knowledge is misleading and in its application, the 
approach of the ECtHR is congruent with Legomsky’s complicity principle’s variable 
standard of proof. 
 
While the degree of predictability recognized by the ECtHR in the Soering v. the United 
Kingdom judgment can only be applied to similar cases where the “death row phenomenon” is 
involved, it is nonetheless of great interest, as it indicates the standard setting the Court has 
intended to follow in its risk assessments in other cases. In this case, the Court assumed at the 
starting point that it was not certain nor even probable that Soering would be convicted of 
capital murder as charged.445 However, in the particular case, a “significant” risk existed,446 
since the risk could not be eliminated by reason of the wishes of the UK and the rather strong 
legal arguments available under US law against imposing the death penalty.447 The Court 
emphasized that the prosecuting authorities in Virginia had decided to seek the death penalty 
because they believed that the evidence of the criminal case supported such action. That being 
so, “it is hardly open to the Court to hold that there are no substantial grounds for believing 
that the applicant faces a real risk of being sentenced to death and hence experiencing the 
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‘death row phenomenon’”.448 Thus, the sufficient degree of predictability was attained, even 
though explicitly no assumption could be made that Mr Soering would probably be convicted 
of capital murder as charged, i.e. the necessary probability of exposure to the “death row 
phenomenon” existed in this case.449 
A cautious reading of this argumentation leads to the understanding that it seems reasonable 
to assume that the Court tacitly considered the risk to be quite small in this case.450 Therefore, 
this case confirms that if the foreseeable consequences are very serious, even the probability 
of a small risk can be significant and thus “real” for the Court.451 Indeed, through a thorough 
analysis of the presented cases, the author comes to the conclusion that the ECtHR has linked 
the level of probability and predictability to the foreseeable consequences in each particular 
case and varied its demands depending on the gravity of the violation feared. In other words, 
the degree of probability to pass the “substantial grounds” test and the degree of predictability 
necessary to pass the “real risk” test may be either lower or higher, depending on the gravity 
of the asserted violation feared. Therefore, as lower levels of probability and predictability 
can also be sufficient to pass the test, the terminology for the “substantial grounds” test and 
“real risk” test can be wrong and misleading. Hence, the author will refer to these terms in 
quotation marks and look for the respective levels used in the following analysis. 
 
The following analysis will be made separately for the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on direct 
refoulement (a) and indirect refoulement (b).  
 
a. Direct refoulement: Factual conditions: Focus on persecution 
 
As the jurisprudence of the ECtHR on serious factual harm deriving from living or detention 
conditions is scarce, the analysis of factual conditions of gravity will focus on situations of 
risk of persecution. On living and detention conditions, the ECtHR has almost always allowed 
a possible protection by Art 3 ECHR to fail in the first step due to its high demands for the 
necessary level of gravity not being reached. The first step has only been completed positively 
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in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, where the Court cited the observations of the Council of 
Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, the CPT and UNHCR, as well as numerous reports 
of NGOs.452 It also took into consideration the applicant's allegations that the police subjected 
him to brutality and insults during his second period of detention. As information on the 
conditions in Greece were freely ascertainable from these sources, the ECtHR noted that the 
disastrous living and detention conditions were well known before the transfer of the 
applicant. The Court considered that ”by transferring the applicant to Greece the Belgian 
authorities knowingly exposed him to conditions of detention and living conditions that 
amounted to degrading treatment”.453 Besides that the adverb “knowingly” suggests that the 
level of knowledge was more than satisfied, not much can be analyzed by this scarce 
argumentation for the standard of proof demanded by the Court.  
 
In the removal cases concerning applicants claiming individual persecution, the ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence has developed from focussing on general danger with high demand on the 
standard of proof on the individual persecution (aa) towards taking a more individual 
approach (bb). 
aa. General danger 
 
In cases of removal concerning applicants claiming to come from States suffering from 
situations of general violence, Strasbourg jurisprudence has developed the following 
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regarding the demands on standard of proof: The ECommHR indicated that a particular 
general human rights situation can possibly constitute a risk sufficient to make expulsion or 
extradition impermissible under Art 3 ECHR. The Commission stated that "an issue under 
Article 3 of the Convention [is raised] in cases where a person is extradited to a country 
where, due to the very nature of the regime of that country or to a particular situation in that 
country, basic human rights, such as are guaranteed by the Convention, might be either 
grossly violated or entirely suppressed".454 However, the Commission has never found such a 
situation to exist, not even in Iran.455  
The ECtHR, on the other hand, recognized in Vilvarajah and others v. the United Kingdom 
the possibility of detention and ill-treatment of young Tamil males returning to Sri Lanka.456 
However, it insisted that the applicants show that special distinguishing features existed in 
their cases that could or ought to have enabled the United Kingdom authorities to foresee that 
they would be treated in a manner incompatible with Art 3 ECHR.457 The ECtHR found no 
breach of Art 3 ECHR in the concrete case despite the fact that the applicants, who had been 
returned to Sri Lanka before the case was examined by the ECommHR and the Court, had in 
fact been subjected to treatment contrary to Art 3 ECHR on their return. Equally, in Sultani v. 
France, the Court took notice of the general situation of violence at that time in Afghanistan 
but found that this alone was not sufficient to find a violation of Art 3 ECHR.458 Moreover, in 
the Thampibillai v. the Netherlands and Venkadajalasarma v. the Netherlands judgments, the 
Court considered the improvement in the security situation in Sri Lanka and the “very real 
progress” in the peace process at the material time as relevant factors in its finding that there 
were no substantial grounds for believing that the applicants would be exposed to a real risk 
of ill-treatment contrary to Art 3 ECHR.459  
This jurisprudential development of the Court was open to criticism: Van Dijk found the 
“substantial grounds” test to be applied by the Court in this case in “a rather restrictive 
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way”:460 the crux of the judgment was that the ECtHR found special distinguishing features to 
be absent and that there was therefore only a general risk – “a mere possibility” – that the 
asylum-seekers would be treated in a manner inconsistent with Art 3 ECHR upon their return. 
The author follows Van Dijk’s opinion that it is “difficult to understand why the Court held 
that these facts were not sufficient as special distinguishing features justifying the conclusion 
that there was indeed a real risk of treatment” contrary to Art 3 ECHR after the deportation to 
Sri Lanka. In fact, after the applicants had been removed to Sri Lanka in February 1988, 
appeals were instituted on their behalf; in March 1989 the Adjudicator concluded that the 
applicants had had a well-founded fear of persecution, and that they were entitled to political 
asylum and should be returned to the United Kingdom; in fact, they were allowed to return. 
The Adjudicator largely believed the accounts given by the applicants of their personal 
situations.461 Neither the Government nor the ECtHR contested these findings. Van Dijk 
diagnoses that the Court “applied a standard of assessment that was even more restrictive than 
the already very strict test in refugee law that the asylum-seeker has to show that he is 
‘singled out for persecution’. Such a restrictive approach would seem to be incompatible with 
the Court’s position that its examination of a risk of ill-treatment in breach of Article 3 must 
be a rigorous one in view of the absolute character of this provision”.462 Indeed, this 
unsatisfactory reasoning by the Court seems to suggest that if, because of a general situation, 
the possibility of ill-treatment is generally high, individuals must still face an even higher risk 
of ill-treatment in order to be protected by Art 3 ECHR. Hence, a general situation of violence 
does not normally in itself entail a violation of Art 3 ECHR in the event of a removal.463 
Indeed, the Court has rarely found a violation of Art 3 ECHR on that ground alone. For 
example, in Müslim v. Turkey, where the Court considered the removal of an Iraqi national of 
Turkmen origin to Iraq, it found the mere possibility of ill-treatment because of the unstable 
situation in that country at the material time would not in itself amount to a breach of Art 3 
ECHR.464 This application of the standard of proof was considered so high that it seemed to 
render the protection from refoulement "somewhat illusory".465 The only exception of this 
level of standard of proof was made in the most extreme cases of general violence which 
would expose an individual to ill-treatment of a sufficient level of intensity to entail a breach 
of Art 3 ECHR simply by virtue of being returned there. 
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However, the situation has improved as the ECommHR, and mainly the ECtHR, have leaned 
towards a more individual approach, also for applicants from States with a poor human rights 
record. 
 
bb. Individual danger 
 
Happily, both European organs have taken a more individual approach in later judgments. 
First, in a situation of general violence, the ECtHR has also indicated membership of a 
specifically “targeted” group – a concept also known to the GRC – as valid proof for relevant 
danger. In a second development, purely individual persecution became more relevant. This 
has rendered possible the assumption that “returning a person to his country of origin where 
he has a well-founded fear of being persecuted ipso facto violates Art 3 ECHR“.466 
As to membership of a specifically “targeted” group, the ECtHR stated in its assessment of 
the risk of ill-treatment in Chahal v. the United Kingdom, that “it would appear that, despite 
the efforts of that Government, the NHRC and the Indian courts to bring about reform, the 
violation of human rights by certain members of the security forces in Punjab and elsewhere 
in India is a recalcitrant and enduring problem”.467 Against this background, the Court, 
despite the Government's comments relating to the material, attached weight to some of the 
most striking allegations contained in those reports, particularly with regard to extrajudicial 
killings468 and was not persuaded that the assurances would provide Mr Chahal with an 
adequate guarantee of safety. However, such a guarantee was found to be crucial due to the 
personal situation of the applicant: Chahal had a high profile as a leading figure supporting 
the cause of Sikh separatism. Therefore, in particular the attested involvement of the Punjab 
police in killings and abductions outside their State and the allegations of serious human 
rights violations which continue to be leveled at members of the Indian security forces 
elsewhere, the Court found it “substantiated that there is a real risk of Mr Chahal being 
subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 if he is returned to India”.469 Hence, while 
particular weight was accorded to the general situation in this judgment, especially the (non-
)observance of human rights,470 also the very individual personal situation of the applicant as 
being member of a vulnerable group was of relevance for the standard of proof to be satisfied 
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for a positive risk assessment. The ECtHR clarified its position on membership in a 
specifically “targeted” group in its Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands judgment: 
“[T]he applicant cannot be required to establish the existence of further special distinguishing 
features concerning him personally in order to show that he was, and continues to be, personally 
at risk. … in the present case, the Court considers, on the basis of the applicant's account and the 
information about the situation in the “relatively unsafe” areas of Somalia in so far as members 
of the Ashraf minority are concerned, that it is foreseeable that on his return the applicant would 
be exposed to treatment in breach of Article 3.” 471 
 
Highly important, the ECtHR continued: 
“It might render the protection offered by that provision illusory if, in addition to the fact of his 
belonging to the Ashraf – which the Government has not disputed –, the applicant were required to 
show the existence of further special distinguishing features.”472  
 
The Court added in N.A. v. the United Kingdom: 
“Exceptionally, however, in cases where an applicant alleges that he or she is a member of a group 
systematically exposed to a practice of ill-treatment, the Court has considered that the protection of 
Article 3 of the Convention enters into play when the applicant establishes that there are serious 
reasons to believe in the existence of the practice in question and his or her membership of the 
group concerned. In those circumstances, the Court will not then insist that the applicant show the 
existence of further special distinguishing features if to do so would render illusory the protection 
offered by Article 3.”473 
 
Hence, in the circumstances that the applicant could substantiate the claim of membership of a 
vulnerable group through relevant documentation as well as the treatment he would likely 
experience as a result, the ECtHR has confirmed on several occasions that it will not insist 
that the applicant prove the existence of further special distinguishing features if doing so 
would render illusory the protection offered by Art 3 ECHR. In this sense, the ECtHR found 
in N. v. Sweden474 that, while the Court was aware of reports of serious human rights 
violations in Afghanistan, these alone did not demonstrate that there would be a violation of 
the Convention if N. were to return to that State. In examining N.’s personal situation, 
however, the Court noted that women were at a particularly heightened risk of ill-treatment in 
Afghanistan if they were perceived as not conforming to the gender roles ascribed to them by 
society, tradition or the legal system there. Consequently, the Court found that if N. were 
deported to Afghanistan, Sweden would be in violation of Art 3 ECHR. 
 
The Commission had rarely applied concepts related to the refugee definition in earlier case 
law on individual persecution until it found it necessary in Cemal Kemal Altun v. the Federal 
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Republic of Germany to determine whether “there would be a certain risk of prosecution for 
political reasons which could lead to an unjustified or disproportionate sentence being passed 
on the applicant and as a result inhuman treatment“.475 This criterion is often applied in 
refugee cases.476 Further, an explicit reference to the concept of refugee can be found in the 
Commission’s report concerning a Somali national, Ahmed, whose refugee status was 
forfeited by the Austrian authorities on the ground that he was convicted for particularly 
serious crimes within the meaning of Art 33 (2) GRC.477 The ECommHR “attached particular 
weight to the fact that the applicant was granted asylum in May 1992”478 and continued for 
the Austrian asylum proceedings as being a single procedure that “the Austrian Ministry for 
the Interior […] found that he would risk persecution in Somalia. In the asylum proceedings, 
the Austrian authorities had to consider basically the same elements under Austrian law as 
the Commission must consider under Article 3”.479 As the situation in Somalia had not 
changed fundamentally since the time when the applicant was granted asylum, the 
ECommHR concluded that he would still risk persecution, if returned to Somalia, and found 
that substantial grounds had been shown for believing that the applicant would then face a real 
risk of being subjected to treatment in breach of Art 3 ECHR.480 The ECtHR followed the 
same reasoning and conclusion. In Jabari v. Turkey as well, the ECtHR attached great weight 
to the finding of UNHCR that the applicant qualified as a refugee and, as a consequence, 
concluded that expulsion would give rise to a violation of Art 3 ECHR.481  
Hailbronner found that the Strasbourg jurisprudence on the absolute character of Art 3 ECHR 
frequently raised “difficult problems of distinguishing between the danger of political 
persecution and the danger of inhuman or degrading treatment”482 and that no distinction 
would be possible, particularly in the light of this jurisprudence. The author, however, holds 
the opinion that the ECtHR has not put an effort into a distinction between the danger of 
political persecution and the danger of inhuman or degrading treatment in these cases in 
which it has found both dangers as possibly coinciding. The author follows Van Dijk’s thesis 
that the removal of an individual to a country where he has a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted in principle always amounts to a violation of Art 3 ECHR.483 This does not 
contradict our findings from the last chapter that persecution in the sense of Art 1 (A) GRC 
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does not always attain the minimum level of severity required to fall within the scope of Art 3 
ECHR. As Van Dijk clarifies, such a counter-argument misunderstands such thesis which 
“does not equate ‘persecution’ with ‘treatment prohibited by Article 3’, but posits that the 
deportation of a person to a country where he has a well-founded fear of being persecuted will 
in general amount to a real risk of being exposed to ill-treatment in the sense of Article 3”. In 
other words: It may be true that not every act of persecution can be qualified as torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, but it is plausible to assume that when a well-
founded fear has been established that a person, if returned to his country, will suffer from 
such an act of persecution, there is a real risk that he will be subjected to harsh treatment that 
falls within the scope of Art 3 ECHR.484 The conclusion is that a person who has a well-
founded fear of persecution within the meaning of Art 1 (A) GRC can also claim that he may 
not be returned to his country of origin because that would expose him to a real risk of being 
subjected to treatment prohibited by Art 3 ECHR. Such a claim under Art 3 ECHR has even a 
wider scope of protection than Art 1 GRC with its exclusion clause in Para (F) and than Art 
33 (1) GRC due to its exception clause in Para (2) and due to its precondition of existence of 
state authority and persecution grounds.  
 
The ECtHR’s jurisprudence has developed a risk assessment that has led to a similar scope of 
protection as provided by the CAT Committee. For its risk assessment, the CAT Committee 
takes into account both the general situation in the receiving State, above all the possible 
existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights as 
indicated in Art 3 (2) CAT, as well as the particular situation of the applicant.485 For this 
double test with its objective and subjective part, the Committee developed a particular 
formula in Mutombo v. Switzerland486 (the first case decided on the merits and in which the 
Committee found a violation of Art 3 CAT) which it has followed in all subsequent decisions: 
“The aim of the determination, however, is to establish whether the individual concerned would 
be personally at risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he would return. It 
follows that the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human 
rights in a country does not as such constitute a sufficient ground for determining that a person 
would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon his return to that country; additional 
grounds must exist that indicate that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. 
Similarly, the absence of a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights does not mean 
that a person cannot be considered to be in danger of being subjected to torture in his specific 
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circumstances”.487 
On the basis of this formula, the Committee usually first examines the general situation in the 
country and afterwards the particular risks for the individual applicant.488 Only in relatively 
few cases of systematic torture in the receiving State did the Committee arrive at the 
conclusion that the applicant was not personally at risk of torture.489 On the other hand, it is 
not rare for the Committee to find a violation of Art 3 CAT on the basis of a personal risk 
assessment in the absence of a consistent pattern of torture or other gross or mass human 
rights violations in the receiving State.490 
As to references to refugee law, the Committee, for instance, in 1998 noted in Hayden v. 
Sweden the serious human rights situation in Turkey and pointed to reports from ‘reliable 
sources’ that persons suspected of having links with the PKK were frequently tortured in the 
course of interrogations by law enforcement officers, and agreed with reports of the UNHCR 
that no place of refuge was available for such persons within the entire country.491  
 
b. Indirect refoulement via a presumably safe third State 
 
A risk only possibly emanates from a presumably safe third State if the assessment of the risk 
of persecution or serious harm awaiting the individual concerned in the final State results in 
the affirmation of the existence of a risk. Hence, the assessment of the risk emanating from 
the third State includes two assessments: one of the danger of persecution or serious harm in 
the final State (aa) and one of the procedural deficiencies in the refugee determination 
procedure of the third State that fail to prevent the danger (bb).  
 
 
As to the chronology of the assessments, the ECtHR considered in T.I. v. the United Kingdom 
that “the materials presented by the applicant at this stage give rise to concerns as to the risks 
faced by the applicant, should he be returned to Sri Lanka”.492 The fact that the ECtHR first 
considered the “alleged risk of ill treatment in Sri Lanka”, concluding that “concerns as to the 
risk” exist, and, only second, addressed the effectiveness of Germany’s protection from 
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refoulement as well as the German safeguards in the circumstances of the concrete case, led 
some authors to the conclusion that this reasoning implies an obligation to examine the merits 
of the claim.493 Battjes took the contrary position: T.I. prima facie rebutted interstate trust, as 
she calls it, because he provided strong evidence before the ECtHR and alleged that this 
evidence would not be granted due importance in the German removal proceedings.494  
In Battjes’ sense, the ECtHR acted in K.R.S. v. the United Kingdom where interstate trust was 
not prima facie rebutted and, hence, the ECtHR, in analyzing the risk of transfer to Iran by 
Greece, did not examine the merits of the claim, i.e. torture in Iran, for which reason the 
application on Art 3 ECHR was declared inadmissible. 
 
However, in M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, the ECtHR changed the sequence of analysis: the 
ECtHR again considered the situation in the applicant’s country of origin, Afghanistan. As the 
evidence was that “the situation in Afghanistan has posed and continues to pose a widespread 
problem of insecurity and that the applicant belongs to a category of persons particularly 
exposed to reprisals at the hands of the anti-government forces because of the work he did as 
an interpreter for the international air forces”,495 the Court concluded that the applicant had an 
“arguable claim” under Art 3 (or 2) ECHR.496 It was only then that the Court discussed the 
rebuttal of the safety presumption regarding the Greek asylum procedure, i.e. whether, in spite 
of the K.R.S. v. the United Kingdom case-law, “the Belgian authorities should have regarded 
as rebutted the presumption that the Greek authorities would respect their international 
obligations in asylum matters”.497  
 
In theory, both sequences of risk assessment used by the ECtHR are defendable: Either that, 
as in T.I. v. the United Kingdom and K.R.S. v. the United Kingdom, interstate trust on the 
removal procedure has to be prima facie rebutted as condition for the merits of the claim to be 
examined; or that, as in M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, the claim of a violation of Art 3 ECHR 
in case of return to the final State has to be found “arguable” for the ECtHR before it will 
discuss the rebuttal of the safety presumption regarding the removal procedure. This issue will 
now be discussed on the basis of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece because, first, it is the most 
recent of the cases. Second, it was the only case until now in which the safety presumption of 
a receiving “Dublin” State was rebutted, i.e. the whole direct balancing was undertaken. 
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Third, the analysis in this case follows the well-established jurisprudence on Art 13 ECHR in 
conjunction with Art 3 ECHR in the case that the person concerned claims that there exist 
substantial grounds for fearing a real risk of treatment contrary to Art 3 ECHR; in this 
jurisprudence, the Court clarifies whether the applicant has an arguable claim under Art 3 
ECHR498 before it addresses the relevant parameters for the effectiveness of a remedy. 
 
aa. Persecution in the final State 
 
The author hails the reduction of the Court’s analysis to the existence of an “arguable claim” 
and hence does not follow Noll in his demands that the decision-maker must assess the direct 
risk for the claimant in the country of origin “by a full-fledged material assessment”. In fact, 
the assessment of the existence of an “arguable claim” demands a relatively low level of 
knowledge in line with the variable standard of proof and hence provides more protection: 
more cases will fall under “arguable claim” than under the stricter test of “direct risk”. 
Furthermore, such assessment is more workable for the asylum officer in the removal 
procedure, as the examination of the harm feared in the country of origin is required only as 
far as necessary to be able to properly assess the safety of the third State.499  
This approach is in conformity with the respective decision-making on Art 3 CAT of the 
Committee against Torture which, when assessing the compatibility of removal to a third 
State with Art 3 CAT, has proceeded in two steps: First, it assessed the risk of whether the 
applicant would be submitted to torture in his country of origin.500 If substantial grounds for 
assuming that risk existed, the risk of removal to that country of origin from the third state 
was assessed.501 It is not entirely clear which standard of risk applies to expulsion by the third 
to the first State. In Avedes Hamayak Korban v. Sweden, the Committee spoke of “substantial 
grounds for believing” that the applicant “would be subjected to torture”, apparently a more 
lenient standard than the usual “foreseeable, personal and real risk”; but in a later view, the 
Committee applied as standard that it should be “foreseeable that he may subsequently be 
expelled” from the third State.502  
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As for the asylum procedure, the GRC also allows for an assessment of the existence of an 
“arguable claim”, namely by the “presumption doctrine”. The initial question is under which 
circumstances an asylum-seeker is entitled to a full examination of his request. Some authors 
defend the position that State Parties to the GRC generally are under no obligation to consider 
requests for recognition of status. They find the only obligation in respect to Art 33 GRC 
being not to remove him to a country of persecution. Other authors are of the opinion that a 
State in which a person appeals to the GRC will first of all have to determine if the alien can 
appeal to the GRC- in other words, if he is a refugee in the sense of Art 1 GRC.503 These 
commentators tend to see in the prohibition of refoulement more the duty of the state rather 
than a right for the asylum-seeker504 and by such practice a conflict between the safe country 
concepts and important obligations under the GRC: Under the GRC, each signatory has the 
obligation to make its own judgment regarding recognition or refusal of an asylum application 
and maintain the proper procedures to assure that, in refusing the applicant's request to 
remain, it is not returning him to danger. Thus, the attempt of safe third country concepts to 
identify a single "responsible" State for an asylum applicant conflicts with each Member 
State's obligation under the GRC requirements.505 Both positions are reconciled in the 
“presumption doctrine”: they agree on the observance of the principle of non-refoulement 
without exception. However, if a State abstains from refugee status determination, the refugee 
status of the asylum seeker must be presumed.506 The fact that the presumption of the refugee 
status is conditioned by whether or not the claim is argued is acceptable as long as the level of 
probability and predictability demanded for this argumentation is considerably low. This is 
the case in the assessment of the existence of an “arguable claim”. 
 
Therefore, if the claim of feared harm in the final State is assessed to be “arguable”, the case 
of the applicant is prima facie found to fall under the protection from refoulement. In the 
contrary case, the applicant is not found to require protection.  
 
This is now the crucial question: Has the concrete standard of proof of the level of probability 
and predictability of danger in the final State demanded by the ECtHR in the relevant cases 
been acceptably low? 
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As the safety presumption on the STC Greece was not prima facie rebutted in K.R.S. v. the 
United Kingdom (see hence under (bb)), the merits of the claim, i.e. persecution in the final 
State, were only discussed in T.I. v. the United Kingdom M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece. In T.I. 
v. the United Kingdom, the evidence adduced by the applicant and provided by Amnesty 
International, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on extra-judicial, summary or arbitrary 
executions and the United States Department of State was elaborate and hence gave “rise to 
concerns as to the risks faced by the applicant, should he be returned to Sri Lanka”.507 
In M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, the Court’s assessment was the following: When 
ascertaining whether the applicant can “arguably assert” that his removal to Afghanistan 
would infringe Art 2 or 3 ECHR, the Court only referred to the copies of certificates showing 
that the applicant had worked as an interpreter, general information about the current situation 
in Afghanistan and to the Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of 
Asylum-Seekers from Afghanistan published by the UNHCR. For the Court, “this 
information was prima facie evidence that the situation in Afghanistan has posed and 
continues to pose a widespread problem of insecurity and that the applicant belongs to a 
category of persons particularly exposed to reprisals at the hands of the anti-government 
forces because of the work he did as an interpreter for the international air forces”.508 
The author finds the Court’s positive assessment in T.I. v. the United Kingdom and M.S.S. v. 
Belgium and Greece sufficiently simple to do justice to the prerogative of a low demand on 
probability and predictability: easily accessible documentation from the applicant and general 
reports of international organizations and NGOs fulfilled the Court’s demands on the standard 
of proof to assess the harm feared in the final States to be “arguable” and, hence, made it 
necessary for the Court to address the danger of refoulement to this State from the STC. 
 
If the claimant has been found to have an “arguable” claim regarding the risk in the final State 
and, hence, to prima facie fall under the scope of international norms protecting from 
refoulement, the decision-maker must then assess the risk for the claimant of indirect 
refoulement via the third State.  
For this assessment of indirect risk, it became clear in the last chapter that the presumption of 
its non-existence, i.e. the presumption of safety must be rebuttable. It will now be examined 
whether the proof demanded by the ECtHR also has a sufficiently low level of probability and 
predictability for the assessment of the chain-refoulement to the presumably STC. 
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bb. Procedural deficiencies in the presumably safe third State’s removal procedure  
 
The ECtHR has ruled that indirect removal to a final State via an intermediary State, which is 
also a Contracting Party, does not negate the responsibility of the removing State “not to 
expel a person to a country where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that he 
would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3”.509  Therefore, the 
Court has stated in well-established case-law the same wording for the standard of proof also 
for the assessment of the risk emanating from a presumably STC. The ECtHR formulated its 
position on the usage of this terminology as to the standard of proof for procedural 
deficiencies in EU MSs as STCs in T.I. v. the United Kingdom, from which it diverged in 
K.R.S. v. the United Kingdom and in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece.  
  
Regarding Art 3 ECHR, the ECtHR had already clarified in T.I. v. the United Kingdom that 
removing States are not absolved from any responsibility, but have to ensure that “the 
intermediary country's asylum procedure affords sufficient guarantees to avoid an asylum 
seeker being removed, directly or indirectly, to his country of origin without any evaluation of 
the risks” he faces from the standpoint of Art 3 ECHR alone.510 This statement proves that the 
ECtHR sees as another parameter for gravity a certain lack of quality of the removal 
procedure of first instance.  After ruling that the presented materials gave rise to concerns as 
to the risks faced by the applicant, should he be returned to Sri Lanka, the ECtHR discussed 
the real risk of transfer to Sri Lanka by Germany, i.e. the position of the applicant as a failed 
asylum-seeker if returned to Germany, because the applicant’s removal to Germany “is [...] 
one link in a possible chain of events which might result in his return to Sri Lanka where it is 
alleged that he would face the real risk of such treatment”.511 The assurances given by 
Germany, in the Court’s opinion, negated the risk arising from the asylum procedure awaiting 
the applicant in Germany. However, this risk would have been seen as considerable: “there is 
considerable doubt that the applicant would either be granted a follow up asylum hearing or 
that his second claim would be granted”.512 Still, the Court seemingly defended the safety 
presumption in comments that deal with the asylum procedure in Germany in a very detailed 
manner: On the applicant’s claim that the asylum proceedings would not offer him effective 
protection since they would, in all likelihood, result in a further rejection of his claims and an 
order of removal, the Court noted, first, that the strict limitations on the admission of a new 
                                                
509 T.I. v. the United Kingdom; M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece para 342, emphasis added. 
510 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece para 342 on T.I. v. the United Kingdom.  
511 T.I. v. the United Kingdom, under “The responsibility of the United Kingdom”. 
512 T.I. v. the United Kingdom, under “The position of the applicant as a failed asylum-seeker if returned to Germany”. 
 126 
application would appear to exclude the medical evidence now provided before the Court as 
well as letters provided by members of the applicant’s family to substantiate his account. 
Second, the Court noted that even assuming that a fresh asylum hearing was granted, the 
previous decision of the Bavarian Administrative Court that the applicant lacked credibility 
would be given significant weight in a further consideration of his claims. And third, the 
German authorities would not find the applicant’s possible persecution by non-State agents to 
be relevant for the purposes of asylum or protection under Art 3 ECHR. In the end, diplomatic 
assurances and safety presumption won out against evidence, as the ECtHR found due to the 
allowance to stay that there was “no basis on which the Court could assume in this case that 
Germany would fail to fulfil its obligations under Article 3 of the Convention to provide the 
applicant with protection against removal to Sri Lanka if he put forward substantial grounds 
that he faces a risk of torture and ill-treatment in that country. To the extent therefore that 
there is the possibility of such a removal, it has not been shown in the circumstances of this 
case to be sufficiently concrete or determinate”.513  
The Court concluded that "it is not established that there is a real risk that Germany would 
expel the applicant to Sri Lanka in breach of Article 3 of the Convention".514 Hence, while the 
ECtHR signalled in T.I. v. the United Kingdom its general preparedness to scrutinize future 
claims related to the Dublin Convention and protection discrepancies, it was not clear after the 
decision if, as Battjes put it, this was possible with a standard of proof for rebuttal lower than 
the “real risk”-test for the question of direct refoulement515- and that hence the procedural 
position of the applicant was not adversely affected, but in accordance with international 
law.516  
 
The author does not find it sensible to introduce another test on the standard of proof for 
rebuttal of safety presumption besides the test on the assessment of the risk of refoulement by 
the third State. Rather, the author sees the safety presumption only as one factor in the risk 
assessment next to evidence and assurances. Therefore, the author suggests rephrasing the 
question for the further analysis: What weight can be given to the safety presumption in the 
assessment of the risk of refoulement by the third State not to heighten the standard of proof 
for its rebuttal unacceptably?  
In fact, reality overtook the Court’s presumption of Germany being safe for Sri Lankan 
refugees for T.I. v. the United Kingdom: Some two weeks after the decision of the ECtHR, 
                                                
513 Ibidem, emphasis added 
514 Ibidem. 
515 Battjes, European Asylum Law, 412. 
516 Battjes, European Asylum Law, 352-3. 
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another asylum-seeker was removed from the United Kingdom to Germany. Despite the 
assurances given to the ECtHR by the Government of Germany in T.I. v. the United Kingdom, 
this applicant was permitted neither to submit a fresh claim nor to access the discretionary 
procedure and was sent onward by the border guards to his own State, where he was arrested 
and subsequently ill-treated. Concern has thus been expressed that the decision in T.I. v. the 
United Kingdom did not meet the ECHR’s requirement that the rights guaranteed must be 
“practical and effective, not theoretical and illusory”.517 The author shares this opinion, 
referring to the ECtHR’s wording that, “to the extent […] that there is the possibility of such a 
removal, it has not been shown in the circumstances of this case to be sufficiently concrete or 
determinate”.518 The author finds such an assessment to be evidence of very high prerogatives 
on the level of standard of proof: the applicant brought forward all the aforementioned 
arguments on the risk arising from the asylum procedure awaiting him in Germany. While 
these arguments raised “considerable doubt” for the Court on a possibility to stay, diplomatic 
assurances and the safety presumption won out in the end against this evidence. The ECtHR 
summarised under its term “real risk” that such did not exist as there was “no basis on which 
the Court could assume” in this case that Germany would refoule the applicant to Sri Lanka if 
he put forward substantial grounds that he faces a risk of torture and ill-treatment in that 
country. The author deplores that assurances and the safety presumption had been given the 
decisive weight despite considerable hints of concerns. 
 
In K.R.S. v. the United Kingdom as well, the Court trusted Germany’s assurances, assuming 
that Greece would comply with the obligations imposed on it by the Minimum Standards 
Directives. The author sees one reason for the negative risk assessment in K.R.S. v. the United 
Kingdom in the fact that, due to the contrary sequence of analysis in M.S.S. v. Belgium and 
Greece, the Court did not examine the merits of the claim, i.e. torture in Iran. To have 
identified an “arguable claim” under Art 3 (or 2) ECHR due to the dangers awaiting the 
applicant in Iran would possibly have increased the ECtHR’s impetus to discuss the rebuttal 
of the safety presumption regarding the Greek asylum procedure more cautiously, i.e. set the 
level for the standard of proof against the safety presumption and assurances so low as to let 
the evidence win. As to this evidence- illustrated in Chapter II-, the author cannot 
comprehend why the ECtHR not already for December 2008 (the time being critical in its 
decision K.R.S. v. the United Kingdom), but only for June 2009 came in its judgment M.S.S. v. 
Belgium and Greece to the conclusion that there was a “real risk” that the asylum procedure 
                                                
517 Artico v. Italy, para 123. 
518 Ibidem, emphasis added 
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awaiting applicants in Greece was unsafe. In the view of the author, the relevant parameters 
for the risk assessment were fulfilled at a lesser, but in any case sufficient level to confirm the 
existence of the risk already in K.R.S. v. the United Kingdom. This evidence will be referred 
to in the course of the following analysis of the judgment M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece. 
 
In M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, the Court concluded its discussion of the rebuttal of the 
safety presumption regarding the Greek refugee determination procedure by stating that the 
applicant's transfer by Belgium to Greece gave rise to a violation of Article 3 ECHR because, 
at the time of the applicant's removal, the Belgian authorities knew or ought to have known 
that he had no guarantee that his asylum application would be seriously examined by the 
Greek authorities. What evidence was necessary for the applicant to be successful? What can 
be identified as the most relevant parameters in the following detailed analysis of the 
ECtHR’s risk assessment? What is the level demanded of them to be able to counter the safety 
presumption?  
As having been relevant for the ECtHR to rebut the safety presumption, the parameters of 
statistical evidence on recognition rates (1) and of reports by international organizations, 
NGOs and state organizations (2) will be discussed.  
 
1. Statistics on recognition rates 
 
The first evidence taken into account by the ECtHR was the extremely low rate of asylum or 
subsidiary protection granted by the Greek authorities compared with other European Union 
Member States. The statistics presented by the Court were the following: 
 
“For 2008, the UNHCR reports a success rate at first instance (proportion of positive decisions in 
relation to all the decisions taken) of 0.04% for refugee status under the Geneva Convention 
(eleven people), and 0.06% for humanitarian or subsidiary protection (eighteen people).519 12,095 
appeals were lodged against unfavourable decisions. They led to 25 people being granted refugee 
status by virtue of the Geneva Convention and 11 for humanitarian reasons or subsidiary 
protection. Where appeals were concerned, the respective success rates were 2.87% and 1.26%. 
By comparison, in 2008 the average success rate at first instance was 36.2% in five of the six 
countries which, along with Greece, receive the largest number of applications (France, the 
United Kingdom, Italy, Sweden and Germany).520 
Until 2009, 95% of asylum applications went through Attica police headquarters. Since the 
processing of asylum applications was decentralised out to police headquarters all over the 
                                                
519 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Observations on Greece as a country of asylum’, December 2009, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b4b3fc82.html [accessed 16 June 2011]. 
520 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘2008 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum-seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced 
and Stateless Persons’, 19 June 2009, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4caee6552.html [accessed 16 June 
2011]. 
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country, about 79% of the applications have been handled by Attica police headquarters.”521 
 
The ECtHR noted that “the importance to be attached to statistics varies, of course, according 
to the circumstances, but in the Court's view they tend here to strengthen the applicant's 
argument concerning his loss of faith in the asylum procedure”.522 The author holds that only 
a stronger position does justice to reality: In the dissenting part of his opinion, Judge Sajó 
took the position that “[a]n asylum system with a rate of recognition not exceeding 1 percent 
is suspect per se in terms of the fairness of the procedure; the Government failed to provide 
any justification for this apparent statistical aberration”.  
Giving such considerable weight to statistics, even information about past events, is 
defendable for our case considering asylum-seekers: The fear which is the subject of an 
asylum claim relates to sur place or a future possibility and therefore is not capable of being 
demonstrated in the present. In this sense, the author already described in the introduction to 
this thesis that for the (mainly Chechen) she defended, she had no individual evidence on the 
danger of chain-refoulement from Austria via Slovakia to the Russian Federation, but only 
generally available evidence to present. The respective asylum-seeker had normally left 
Slovakia for Austria after a short stay, having only the information that his chance for asylum 
in Slovakia was very small. For the author, the statistics revealing extremely low asylum 
recognition rates provided evidential proof for either the breakdown of the asylum system or 
intentional ignorance in the meritorious decision-making. At that time, in 2005, the 
recognition rates of refugees from the Russian Federation were differed greatly among the 
following EU MSs: 
 
 
 
Through this evidence, it was clear to the author that there was a high risk for the individual 
asylum-seeker to be chain-refouled from Slovakia to his country of origin without a fair 
refugee determination procedure.  
                                                
521 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece paras 125-127. 
522 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece para. 313. 
EU MS 
number of 
applications recognition rates  
    
refugee 
status 
right 
to 
stay 
Slovakia 1,031 0,01% 0% 
Austria 4,362 83.9% 91.3% 
Germany 1,663 93.3% 95.4% 
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After these experiences, the author defends the seemingly radical position taken by Judge 
Sajó in the dissenting part of his opinion that “[t]he well-documented insufficiencies of the 
Greek asylum system (including the extremely low likelihood of success in the applications – 
1% in Greece against more than 60 % in Malta) turn such a system into a degrading one”.523 
This position is also taken in the Michigan Guidelines, which state that, in such a case of an 
insufficient asylum system, the sending State is "disentitled from effecting any further 
transfers to that state under a protection elsewhere policy unless and until there is clear 
evidence that the breach has ceased".524 The quality of degrading treatment is argued by Judge 
Sajó as follows: “Asylum seekers who remain in the asylum procedure for more than two 
years have a significantly higher risk of psychiatric disorders, compared to those who just 
arrived in the country. This risk is higher than the risk of adverse life events in the country of 
origin.”525 Hence, there is a responsibility of the State under Art 3 ECHR in situations as this 
where there is a high likelihood that a medical condition could result from the passivity of the 
State in a procedure that is decisive for the fate of people living in dependency. 
 
The author also sees cases with less dramatic statistics on recognition rates to be a sufficient 
factor for a positive risk assessment. Such an approach has not been obviated by the ECtHR, 
which stated in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece that “the importance to be attached to statistics 
varies, of course, according to the circumstances, but in the Court's view they tend here to 
strengthen the applicant's argument concerning his loss of faith in the asylum procedure”.526 
Moreover, the Court also used statistics with less stark results in T.I. v. the United Kingdom to 
counter the applicant’s arguments concerning the high burden of proof placed on asylum-
seekers in Germany: the record of Germany in granting “large numbers” of asylum claims 
“gives an indication that the threshold being applied in practice is not excessively high”.  
 
2. Reports  
 
In the successive assessment in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, the Court observed to a 
considerable part the general situation of asylum-seekers in Greece. It stated first of all that, 
since it adopted its K.R.S. v. the United Kingdom decision in 2008, numerous reports and 
materials have been added to the information available to it. The authors of these documents 
                                                
523 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, partly concurring and partly dissenting opinion of Judge Sajó, II. 
524 Michigan Guidelines, p. 14.  
525 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, partly concurring and partly dissenting opinion of Judge Sajó, II. 
526 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece para 313. 
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are UNHCR and the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, international NGOs 
like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Pro-Asyl and the European Council on 
Refugees and Exiles, as well as NGOs present in Greece such as Greek Helsinki Monitor and 
the Greek National Commission for Human Rights. The relevant documents, based on field 
surveys, all agree as to the practical difficulties involved in the application of the Dublin 
system in Greece, the deficiencies of the asylum procedure and the practice of direct or 
indirect refoulement on an individual or a collective basis.527 The Court also attached critical 
importance to the letter sent by UNHCR in April 2009 to the Belgian Minister in charge of 
immigration, unequivocally pleading for the suspension of transfers to Greece.528 It was also 
relevant for the Court that, since December 2008, the European asylum system itself “has 
entered a reform phase and that, in the light of the lessons learnt from the application of the 
texts adopted during the first phase, the European Commission has made proposals aimed at 
substantially strengthening the protection of the fundamental rights of asylum seekers and 
implementing a temporary suspension of transfers under the Dublin Regulation to avoid 
asylum seekers being sent back to Member States unable to offer them a sufficient level of 
protection of their fundamental rights”.529 The Court concluded its analysis of the obstacles 
facing asylum-seekers in Greece with the diagnosis that “applications lodged there at this 
point in time are illusory”;530 the applicant had “no guarantee that his asylum application 
would be seriously examined by the Greek authorities”.531 In view of the mentioned 
deficiencies, the Court found that the applicant's transfer by Belgium to Greece gave rise to a 
violation of Art 3 ECHR.532  
For its assessment on the Greek asylum procedure, the ECtHR noted the following parameters 
as relevant: On the one hand, Greek legislation, based on Community law standards in terms 
of asylum procedure, contained a number of guarantees designed to protect asylum-seekers 
from removal back to the countries from which they had fled without any examination of the 
merits of their fears as well as the Government's assurances that the applicant's application for 
asylum would be examined in conformity with the law.533  
On the other hand, however, the Court observed that “for a number of years”,534 it has been 
“repeatedly and consistently revealed” in the aforementioned reports that Greece's legislation 
is not being applied in practice and that in general, the asylum procedure is marked by such 
                                                
527 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece para 347-8. 
528 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece para 349. 
529 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece para 350. 
530 Ibidem. 
531 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece para 358. 
532 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece para 360. 
533 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece para 299. 
534 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece para. 300. 
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major structural deficiencies that asylum seekers have very little chance of having their 
applications and their complaints under the Convention seriously examined by the Greek 
authorities, and that in the absence of an effective remedy, they are not protected against 
arbitrary removal back to their countries of origin.535 On the decisions themselves, the Court 
was concerned about the findings of the different surveys carried out by UNHCR, which 
showed that almost all first-instance decisions were negative and drafted in a stereotyped 
manner without any details of the reasons for the decisions being given.536 
Furthermore, the ECtHR assessed other factors of even more general nature, i.e. the policy of 
returns to Afghanistan organised on a voluntary basis. The Court was not convinced by the 
Greek Government's explanations, but referred again to the general fact that forced returns by 
Greece to high-risk countries have regularly been denounced by the third-party interveners 
and several of the reports consulted by the Court. Also in K.R.S. v. the United Kingdom, the 
author would have found this risk to exist as UNHCR already advised the EU MSs in its 
Position Paper of 15 April 2008 to refrain from returning asylum-seekers to Greece under the 
Dublin Regulation until further notice also due to the described practice of “interrupted” 
asylum claims- which evidently leads to forced return also to high-risk countries. 
While the risk assessment and its parameters on the demanded standard of proof as detailed in 
M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece are a positive development in the case-law of the ECtHR, the 
author fears that the Court only accepted the rebuttal of the safety presumption because it saw 
in the ex post-analysis that the contrary result would be evidently wrong. This feeling is 
drawn from the mentioned facts that the Court, first, also took into consideration numerous 
reports and other information which had become available only in the second half of 2009 and 
in 2010 despite executed removal of the applicant537 and, second, not only lifted the interim 
measures in the numerous cases in which Rule 39 had been applied prior to the decision 
M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, but also consistently declined granting interim measures to 
stop the return of Afghan asylum-seekers to Greece in the period until August 2009. 
 
 
 
                                                
535 Ibidem. 
536 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece para. 302. 
537 Since the nature of the Contracting States’ responsibility under Art 3 ECHR in removal cases lies in the act of exposing an 
individual to the risk of ill-treatment, the material date for the assessment of risk is the time of the proposed removal (Chahal, 
85, M.S.S:, 133.). When the Court examines the case when the applicant has not yet been extradited or deported, the relevant 
time for the ECtHR will be that of the proceedings before it (M.S.S., para. 133, referring to Chahal, cited above, §§ 85 and 
86, and Venkadajalasarma v. the Netherlands, no. 58510/00, § 63, 17 February 2004). In this sense, the Court added in Cruz 
Varas and others v. Sweden that it is not precluded “from having regard to information which comes to light subsequent to 
the expulsion. This may be of value in confirming or refuting the appreciation that has been made by the Contracting Party or 
the well-foundedness or otherwise of an applicant’s fears” (Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden para 76).  
 133 
Conclusion  
 
The ECtHR has never increased the demands on the standard of proof in cases where the 
individual concerned was perceived to be a danger to the national security and, hence, has 
allowed the absoluteness of Art 3 ECHR prevail also regarding the level of probability and 
predictability. On first sight, the necessary threshold appeared misguided: “substantial 
grounds” must be shown to prove that the person concerned faces a “real risk” of being 
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the country of 
potential return. However, the analysis of the Court’s jurisprudence demonstrated that, as 
lower levels of proof have also sufficed to pass the test, this strict terminology is misleading.  
 
In fact, in assessing the risk of direct refoulement due to the factual conditions in the receiving 
state amounting to persecution, the ECtHR’s jurisprudence has developed from focusing on 
the general danger, with high demands on the standard of proof of individual persecution that 
rendered the protection from refoulement illusory, towards a more individual approach 
amounting to the assumption that returning a person to his country of origin where he has a 
well-founded fear of being persecuted ipso facto violates Art 3 ECHR. Hence, the European 
organs’ jurisprudence on the standard of proof has made the danger of inhuman or degrading 
treatment in the sense of Art 3 ECHR frequently difficult to distinguish from the danger of 
political persecution. This, in the opinion of the author, is with good cause: The removal of an 
individual to a country where he has a well-founded fear of being persecuted in principle 
always amounts to a violation of Art 3 ECHR. In other words, a person who has a well-
founded fear of persecution within the meaning of Art 1 (A) GRC can also claim that he may 
not be returned to his country of origin because that would expose him to a real risk of being 
subjected to treatment prohibited by Art 3 ECHR.  
 
In assessing the risk of indirect refoulement via a presumably STC, the ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence has decided in M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece to follow the chronology to assess, 
first, positively the risk of persecution or serious harm awaiting the individual concerned in 
the final State and, second, the risk emanating from the procedural deficiencies in the refugee 
determination procedure of the third State that fail to prevent that danger.  
As to the first step on persecution in the final State, the reduction of the Court’s analysis in 
T.I. v. the United Kingdom and M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece to the existence of an “arguable 
claim” is a positive development. This approach, demanding a relatively low level of 
knowledge in line with the variable standard of proof and hence providing considerable 
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protection in the case of an alleged violation of Art 3 ECHR, is in conformity with the 
respective decision-making on Art 3 CAT of the Committee against Torture and also the GRC 
by its “presumption doctrine”. Also in the concrete execution of the term “arguable claim”, 
the Court’s positive assessment was sufficiently simple to do justice to the prerogative of a 
low demand on standard of proof: documentation easily accessible for the applicant and 
general reports of international organizations and NGOs fulfilled the Court’s demands on the 
standard of proof to assess the harm feared in the final State as “arguable”. 
As to the successive assessment of the risk for the claimant of chain-refoulement via the third 
State, the crucial question is the execution of the terms “substantial grounds“ and “real risk“ 
for the standard of proof for procedural deficiencies in the presumably safe third State, i.e. the 
evidence needed to be submitted to rebut the safety presumption and counter possible 
assurances. The Court’s assessment in T.I. v. the United Kingdom was evidence of very high 
prerogatives on the level of standard of proof: the applicant brought forward numerous well-
developed, detailed arguments on the risk arising from the asylum procedure awaiting him in 
Germany, but this evidence did not prove the possibility of removal to be “sufficiently 
concrete or determinate”. The “considerable doubt” that was raised was overpowered by 
diplomatic assurances and the safety presumption- a deplorable result. 
The Court also trusted Germany’s assurances in K.R.S. v. the United Kingdom. The author 
sees one reason for the negative risk assessment in the fact that, due to the contrary sequence 
of analysis in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, the Court did not examine the merits of the 
claim, i.e. torture in Iran. To have identified an “arguable claim” under Art 3 (or 2) ECHR due 
to the dangers awaiting the applicant in Iran would possibly have increased the ECtHR’s 
impetus to discuss the rebuttal of the safety presumption regarding the Greek asylum 
procedure more cautiously, i.e. set the level for the standard of proof against the safety 
presumption and assurances so low as to let the evidence win. As to the evidence illustrated in 
Chapter II, the author cannot comprehend why the ECtHR did not come to the conclusion that 
there was a “real risk” that the asylum procedure awaiting applicants in Greece was unsafe 
until its judgment M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece in June 2009 and not already in December 
2008 (as seen in the decision K.R.S. v. the United Kingdom). Hence, the level of standard of 
proof was, in the view of the author, also set too high in this judgment. 
In M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, the ECtHR found two kinds of evidence strong enough to 
rebut the safety presumption. First, it was the statistical evidence on extremely low rate of 
asylum or subsidiary protection granted by the Greek authorities compared with other 
European Union Member States, strengthening the applicant's argument concerning his loss of 
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faith in the asylum procedure. Second, all reports by international organizations, NGOs and 
state organizations agreed as to the practical difficulties involved in the application of the 
Dublin system in Greece, the deficiencies of the asylum procedure and the practice of direct 
or indirect refoulement on an individual or a collective basis. 
 
 
 
2. Burden of proof 
 
Burden of proof is not about the plenitude of claims and arguments, but about the issue of 
which party must adduce sufficient evidence. The question of the evidence that must be 
produced in order to determine the real risk or danger of torture or ill-treatment forms the crux 
of the examination of the non-refoulement principle and, as a consequence, for the effective 
protection of persons from becoming victims of severe human rights violations.538 While both 
in cases of future and past events, the situations at hand are never completely cognitively 
accessible, the “evidentiary” problem concerning future events is “far more radical” than 
concerning past events.539  
The ECtHR has formulated its demands on the burden of proof as being grounded in the 
applicant and has used the term “substantial grounds” that “have [to be] shown” for believing 
that the applicant would face refoulement.540 This wording is inspired by Art 3 CAT which 
speaks of "substantial grounds for believing". Comparing these formulations, one sees that the 
expression used by the European organs adds a further element to that of Art 3 CAT: By 
stating that substantial grounds “have been shown” the European organs seem to indicate a 
significant burden of proof on the side of the applicant.541 Cases such as Y. v the Netherlands 
gave rise to the fear that the level of burden of proof is very high. In this case, the ECommHR 
noted that the applicant first had not shown any case where a person had been convicted and 
subjected to the death penalty in Malaysia following his conviction for the same offence 
                                                
538 Suntinger, 16. 
539 Concurring opinion in Saadi v the United Kingdom, Judge Zupančič, continuing: “From time immemorial the legal 
process has dealt with these problems and has invented a way of resolving situations despite this cognitive insufficiency. I 
refer to the use of presumptions in Roman law where the magistrate (praetor) was required to make a decision about the past 
event although the evidence adduced was insufficient. The formula concerning presumptions, therefore, referred to situations 
of doubt and it required the decision-maker to assume a particular position when in doubt, as indicated by the legally 
mandated presumption. In other words, this enabled the system to reach a res judicata level even without being able to 
ascertain the whole truth.” 
540 See, amongst other authorities, Ahmed v. Austria paras 39-40, emphasis added. 
541 Suntiner, 16; see also the French wording "motifs sérieux et avérés de croire" used by the Court as opposed to "motifs 
sérieux de croire" of Article 3 CAT. 
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elsewhere, and second did not give precise information about the specific conditions of the 
detention which he risked undergoing upon his return. Hence, the applicant had “not 
sufficiently demonstrated that upon his return to Malaysia he will be prosecuted and 
eventually sentenced to the death penalty for transporting money to Malaysia”.542 The 
applicant’s claim hence failed.  
But how has the Court in fact handled the issue of burden of proof? To identify the 
differences of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence between States being not presumed to be safe 
(“regular States”) (a) and presumably safe States (b), this issue will be discussed along these 
lines. 
 
a. Regular States: Factual conditions 
 
The burden of proof regarding regular States is an issue in the case of direct refoulement (aa), 
and in the first step of indirect refoulement, amounting to persecution in the final State (bb). 
 
aa. Direct refoulement 
 
According to the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, it is the applicant who must adduce evidence in 
removal cases to prove the existence of “substantial grounds”.543 Only where such evidence is 
adduced, it is the role of the Government to dispel any doubts about it.544 Academics find that 
the practice of the Strasbourg organs confirms the fear that the burden of proof is primarily on 
the side of the applicant.545 Most of them agree that they have been quite restrictive in their 
approach to the evidentiary requirements.546 As for the Commission, the diagnosis was also 
found to be valid that the ECtHR’s case-law “shows that an applicant will have to advance 
rather strong arguments".547  
The author’s analysis of the Court’s finding of the affirmation of the “substantial grounds” for 
a relevant risk awaiting the applicant in a regular receiving State shows that no relevant 
evidence was adduced by the applicant in Soering v. the United Kingdom548 and Chahal v. the 
                                                
542 Y. v the Netherlands, 212; emphasis added. 
543 See N. v. Finland, 38885/02, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 23 September 2003,  para 167. 
544 Saadi v. Italy, para 129. 
545 Suntinger, 16. 
546 See Einarsen, 373, Van Dijk, 237; M.Villiger, Handbuch der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, Zürich 1993, 185. 
547 Suntinger, 17, referring to Van Dijk, 237. 
548 Soering v. the United Kingdom para 98; The ECtHR referred in its factual inquiry to the “foreseeable consequences” of 
the submissions of the different involved authorities, the most relevant being that the Commonwealth’s Attorney has himself 
determined to seek and to persist in seeking the death penalty. The Court concluded that it was not able to hold that there 
were no substantial grounds for believing that the applicant faced the real risk of being sentenced to death and hence 
experiencing the “death row phenomenon”. 
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United Kingdom549. Also in Saadi v. Italy,550 although the applicant produced a document on 
the assertion that an individual had been savagely tortured and held in the cells of the Ministry 
of the Interior in Tunis for twenty-four days, it was reports mentioning cases of torture and ill-
treatment that were found reliable by the Court. This analysis leads the author to conclude and 
argue that the ECHR can and must be interpreted as primarily demanding the State to provide 
the relevant available facts of the respective case. 
Not only in these concrete applications in practice, but also in its general considerations, the 
ECtHR has itself confirmed such approach by stating that, “[s]ince the nature of the 
Contracting States’ responsibility under Article 3 in cases of this kind lies in the act of 
exposing an individual to the risk of ill-treatment, the existence of the risk must be assessed 
primarily with reference to those facts which were known or ought to have been known to the 
Contracting State at the time of the expulsion”.551 Hence, regarding “the fundamentally 
important prohibition against torture and inhuman and degrading treatment under Article 3, 
read in conjunction with Article 1 of the Convention to secure to everyone within their 
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention”, 552 it must be defended in 
the context of Art 3 ECHR that not the applicant does carry the whole burden of convincing 
the Court of the existence of the “substantial grounds”,553 but the Contracting States have a 
general “duty to know the relevant facts in so far as it is possible”.554  
Art 3 CAT confirms the responsibility of the State in discerning the conditions faced by the 
applicant. Para 1 of Art 3 CAT requires only that substantial grounds “exist” and not that 
these grounds have been “shown” as the European organs demand, which emphasizes the 
important role of the authorities in the determination and indicates a lower threshold 
concerning the evidentiary requirements for the individual.555 This active role of the State is 
confirmed by Para 2, which stresses that "the competent authorities take into account all 
                                                
549 the ECtHR was persuaded by the evidence by the number of aforementioned diverse objective sources, against which the 
State’s assurances did an adequate guarantee of safety. 
550 Saadi v. Italy, para 147; the documents the ECtHR referred to the most were the Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers 
of the Council of Europe on human rights and the fight against terrorism, the reports on Tunisia by Human Rights Watch, 
Amnesty International and the US State Department as well as information on the activities of the International Committee of 
the Red Cross. The applicant himself produced a document from the Association internationale de soutien aux prisonniers 
politiques concerning the case of a young man named Hichem Ben Said Ben Frej who was alleged to have leapt from the 
window of a police station shortly before he was due to be interrogated; it was asserted that Mr Frej had been savagely 
tortured and held in the cells of the Ministry of the Interior in Tunis for twenty-four days. Similar allegations are to be found 
in statements by local organisations for the defence of prisoners' and women's rights and in numerous press cuttings.550 The 
reports that mentioned the decisive cases of torture and ill-treatment were those of Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch as well as the report of the US State Department. As the Court did not doubt reliability of these sources, it attached no 
relevance to the Tunisian authorities’ assurances. 
551 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, para 233, emphasis added. 
552 See, amongst other authorities, Ahmed v. Austria paras 39-40, emphasis added. 
553 Soering v. the United Kingdom para 91. 
554 Cruz Varas and others v. Sweden, para, 76; the Court is not precluded, however, from having regard to information which 
comes to light subsequent to the expulsion. This may be of value in confirming or refuting the appreciation that has been 
made by the Contracting Party or whether an applicant’s fears were well-founded. 
555 Suntinger, 18. 
 138 
relevant considerations". Furthermore, it is expressly stated that a consistent pattern of human 
rights violations has to be taken into account in the evaluation of the evidence.  
Facts that need to be proven by the applicant in a removal case should be limited to those 
concerning the background and personal experiences of the applicant which purportedly give 
rise to fear of refoulement. In this sense, the Committee against Torture was of the view in 
A.S. v. Sweden556 that the applicant had, by submitting as names of persons, their positions, 
dates, addresses, names of police stations etc., had given sufficient details regarding her 
singhe or mutah marriage and alleged arrest that could have been or, to a certain extent had 
been, verified by the State Party’s immigration authorities, to shift the burden of proof to the 
State Party.  
This low burden of proof on the side of the applicant has also proven to be highly important 
for the sensitive interplay between credibility and the benefit of the doubt: A supposed lack of 
evidence adduced by the applicant in support of his statement can lead the deciding authority 
to the opinion that the applicant even lacks credibility. Lack of credibility is the most frequent 
reason for refusing asylum claims. However, it is not always due to a dearth of information 
provided by the applicant, but can also result from mishandling evidence or from a breach of 
procedure: some contradictions and inconsistencies on the part of the applicant are explained 
at a later stage, but the explanation is rejected because of its timing, or could have been 
explained had the questions been asked.557 Other refusals based on lack of credibility are the 
clear result of dramatically wrong argumentation by the officer: for example, one official 
found it logical to declare the applicant not credible because, as he had left his country, he had 
not had any of the problems that he theoretically would have encountered had he stayed. 
Therefore, the applicant could not prove that these problems would have been occurred if he 
had stayed in his country.558   
 
Among the individuals threatened with removal, the demand that the burden of proof be 
considerably reduced for the applicant to information on his background and relevant personal 
experiences is even truer for asylum-seekers: It would not be acceptable that “an applicant 
must furnish prima facie evidence of his or her allegations as to the danger of ill-
treatment”.559  
 
                                                
556 No.149/1999. 
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559 Einarsen referring to Hailbronner, ‘Non-refoulement and “humanitarian refugees”: Customary International Law or 
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The author’s experience coincides with Einarsen’s diagnosis that the required evidence “is 
often difficult to fulfill, even in the case of a bona fide refugee. The individual may simply not 
be in a position to obtain and submit the necessary documentation as to why deportation 
might result in a real risk of ill-treatment; it is not often that the authorities put forward in 
writing their determination to persecute the applicant upon return”.560 Within the asylum 
procedure, evidence or proof of persecution is crucial. However, evidentiary questions are an 
aspect of refugee law that has been “largely ignored in the academic literature”.561 There is 
presently an absence of consensus amongst States on common standards for assessing 
evidence in asylum procedures. States with different legal traditions and histories have shown 
a reluctance to open the discussion on how the rules and standards on evidentiary questions 
are dealt with. Some commentators have argued that the task is simply too difficult, which 
may speak more to obstacles in reaching political agreement than to articulating common 
rules and standards.562 The UNHCR Handbook acknowledges that evidentiary requirements 
should not be applied too strictly “in view of the difficulty of proof inherent in the special 
situation in which an applicant for refugee status finds him or herself.”563 Although the burden 
of proof is discharged by the applicant through providing evidence, in the end the only 
available evidence may be an applicant’s oral testimony.564  
The decision of the Committee against Torture in A.S. v. Sweden is particularly instructive on 
the issue of burden of proof of asylum-seekers:565 The State Party had questioned the 
applicant’s credibility primarily because of her failure to submit verifiable information. It 
referred to international standards, i.e. the UNHCR Handbook, according to which an asylum-
seeker has an obligation to make an effort to support his or her statements by any available 
evidence and to give satisfactory explanation for any lack of evidence. The State Party 
claimed that the applicant had not fulfilled her obligation to submit the verifiable information 
that would enable her to enjoy the benefit of the doubt. In a key passage of the decision, the 
Committee commented as follows: 
 
“[T]he state party [...] questions the author’s credibility primarily based on her failure to submit 
controllable information and the reference in this context to international standards, i.e. 
UNHCR’s Handbook, according to which an asylum seeker has an obligation to make an effort to 
support his (or her) statements by any available evidence and give a satisfactory explanation for 
any lack of evidence. The Committee draws the attention of the parties to its General Comment 
on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22, adopted on 21 
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November 1997, according to which the burden to present an arguable case is on the author of a 
communication. The Committee notes the state party’s position that the author has not fulfilled 
her obligation to submit the controllable information that would enable her to enjoy the benefit of 
the doubt. However, the Committee is of the view that the author has submitted sufficient details 
regarding her sighe or mutah marriage and the alleged arrest, such as names of persons, their 
positions, dates, addresses, name of police station etc, that could have, and to a certain extent 
have been, verified by the [...] immigration authorities, to shift the burden of proof. In this 
context the Committee is of the view that the state party has not made sufficient efforts to 
determine whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the author would be in danger 
of being subjected to torture”.566 
 
As to the interplay between credibility and the benefit of the doubt for asylum-seekers, the 
ECtHR acknowledged in V. Matsiukhina and A. Matsiukhin v. Sweden that, “due to the 
special situation in which asylum seekers often find themselves, it is frequently necessary to 
give them the benefit of the doubt when it comes to assessing the credibility of their 
statements and the documents submitted in support thereof”.567 The author finds the ECtHR’s 
formulation of its position to be confusing. If benefit of the doubt were given even for the 
assessment of the applicant’s credibility, no check at all on the coherency and plausibility of 
the applicant’s assertion would take place. This is, however, the minimum possible check on 
the applicant’s assertion without which an assessment of the applicant’s credibility would be 
reduced to nothing. The only plausible interpretation of the ECtHR’s standpoint is that it was 
merely formulated in a slightly unclear manner and should be understood as in an older report 
of the ECommHR, Bahaddar v. the Netherlands. In this case, the Commission gave the 
applicant the benefit of the doubt after it had considered his account to be credible and on the 
whole consistent.568 Such understanding of the Court brings its position in line with the 
position of UNHCR. The UNHCR Handbook provides the following guidance on when it is 
warranted to grant a refugee applicant the benefit of the doubt: 
 
“It is a general legal principle that the burden of proof lies on the person submitting a claim. 
Often, however, an applicant may not be able to support his [or her] statements by documentary 
or other proof, and cases in which an applicant can provide evidence of all his [or her] statements 
will be the exception rather than the rule [...] Even such independent research may not, however, 
always be successful and there may also be statements that are not susceptible of proof. In such 
cases, if the applicant’s account appears credible, he [or she] should, unless there are good 
reasons to the contrary, be given the benefit of the doubt.”569 
 
“After the applicant has made a genuine effort to substantiate his [or her] story there may still be 
a lack of evidence for some of his [or her] statements. As explained above […], it is hardly 
possible for a refugee to ‘prove’ every part of his [or her] case, and indeed, if this were a 
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requirement the majority of refugees would not be recognised. It is therefore frequently necessary 
to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt. The benefit of the doubt should, however, only be 
given when all available evidence has been obtained and checked and when the examiner is 
satisfied as to the applicant’s general credibility. The applicant’s statements must be coherent and 
plausible, and must not run counter to generally known facts.”570 
 
Hence, UNHCR takes the position that the benefit of the doubt should only be given after all 
available evidence has been obtained and checked and the examiner is satisfied with the 
applicant’s general credibility. In this sense, the ECtHR held in Said v. the Netherlands that in 
light of more or less credible statements of the asylum-seeker in the context of general 
information concerning the situation in Eritrea, his expulsion would amount to a violation of 
Art 3 ECHR.571  
As the CAT Committee made clear, complete accuracy is seldom to be expected from victims 
of torture. Contradictions and inaccuracies in the story are not material and do not raise 
doubts about the general veracity of the author’s claims.572 In this sense, while the onus is on 
the asylum-seeker who fears torture if he or she was repatriated to prove that he or she had 
been ill-treated, the Committee has made clear that the criteria should be fairly flexible given 
that asylum seekers are usually ‘penniless, traumatized and in strange surroundings’.573 Byrne 
and Shacknove summarized what the author has also perceived: “Persons who have 
experienced torture, sexual violence, the execution or disappearance of family members, or 
communal violence are unlikely to be identified in an accelerated procedure. Far from having 
manifestly unfounded claims, such persons are likely to be among those most at risk of 
persecution upon return. Persons who have experienced trauma may suffer from memory loss, 
especially surrounding the traumatic event. They may hesitate in their speech, be aggressive, 
withdrawn or anxious, or offer confused testimony. These difficulties can lead to an 
incomplete factual record, and can give rise to doubts about credibility. In this respect, the 
behavior of manifestly unfounded applicants and persons with the strongest claims can be 
identical”.574 
  
It can hence be summarised that, in view of the particular nature of the refugee situation and 
the possible vulnerability of the applicant, the decision-maker should carry the duty to 
ascertain and evaluate all the relevant general facts. The asylum-seeker carries the burden of 
proof to produce all evidence available to him, which only includes evidence on his 
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background and personal experiences that purportedly give rise to the fear of refoulement. 
After all available evidence has been obtained and checked and the examiner is satisfied with 
the applicant’s general credibility, the decision-maker confronts the applicant’s assertion with 
the findings on the human rights situation in the State concerned.  
In general, where the situation in a State is poor and the personal characteristics of the 
applicant suggest that he might be at risk of being subjected to torture or ill-treatment, such 
risk should be assumed. At that point, the benefit of the doubt leads to a so-called “shift of 
burden of proof”, i.e. the burden is on the removing State to inform itself about the case-
specific relevant facts as much as possible.  
 
Decreasing an asylum-seeker’s burden of proof to a “not particularly great”575 level, as 
described by the CAT Committee, is in compliance with the complicity principle’s position of 
inverse demands on the standard and burden of proof in the face of the seriousness of the 
potential harm. While the language of the ECtHR can be understood in this sense on direct 
refoulement, it’s jurisprudence must now be discussed on the first step of indirect refoulement, 
i.e. persecution in the final State. 
 
bb. Indirect refoulement via a presumably safe third State: Persecution in the final State 
 
In T.I. v. the United Kingdom, the applicant gave explicit information and provided two 
medical reports to the Court, which strongly supported his claims that he had been tortured. 
He also provided photographs of scars of his injuries on his arm, leg and head. The ECtHR 
found almost none of the applicant’s evidence relevant enough to take into consideration.  
After the Court did not address the situation in the country of origin (Iran) in K.R.S. v. the 
United Kingdom, it considered the applicant’s evidence in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 
being copies of certificates showing that he had worked as an interpreter, in support of his 
fears concerning Afghanistan. The ECtHR also had access to general information about the 
current situation in Afghanistan and to the Guidelines for Assessing the International 
Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Afghanistan published by UNHCR and which was 
regularly updated. For the Court, “this information was prima facie evidence that the situation 
in Afghanistan has posed and continues to pose a widespread problem of insecurity and that 
the applicant belongs to a category of persons particularly exposed to reprisals at the hands of 
the anti-government forces because of the work he did as an interpreter for the international 
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air forces”.576 
 
Thus, also in cases of persecution or serious harm endangering the individual concerned via a 
“safe” EU State, the ECtHR has primarily attached greater importance to the information 
contained in reliable reports and has merely seen the applicant's specific allegations as 
corroborative evidence. Hence, asylum-seekers have been assigned a very low burden of 
proof on the danger expected in the final State. The author highly welcomes the Court’s 
approach, as it is compatible with the complicity principle’s position of inverse demands on 
standard and burden of proof based on the seriousness of the potential harm. 
However, it is not clear if compliance can be reached if the human rights situation in the 
receiving State is not obviously poor, in which case the burden may still rest on the applicant 
to show that he is in danger. This question will be discussed in the following section.  
 
bb. Presumably safe States 
 
If the human rights situation in the receiving State – in this case a presumably SCO or STC – 
is not obviously poor, the logical consequence was verbalized that the burden of proof may 
still rest on the applicant to show that he is in danger.  
How has the ECtHR approached the issue of burden of proof in the three “Dublin” cases? In 
T.I. v. the United Kingdom, the ECtHR found, regarding the safety presumption, that the 
applicant was only able to raise “considerable doubt” that he “would either be granted a 
follow up asylum hearing or that his second claim would be granted”.577 This is remarkable, 
as the applicant provided strong evidence before the ECtHR and alleged that this evidence 
would not be granted due importance in the German removal proceedings.578 Interestingly, the 
applicant’s arguments concerning the high burden of proof placed on asylum-seekers in 
Germany were countered not only by the argument that the record of Germany in granting 
large numbers of asylum claims “gives an indication that the threshold being applied in 
practice is not excessively high,” but also by the fact that “this matter was considered by the 
English Court of Appeal and rejected”.579 The Court was hence not persuaded that this 
argument “has been substantiated as preventing meritorious claims in practice”.  
 
In K.R.S. v. the United Kingdom as well, the ECtHR found almost nothing of the applicant’s 
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claim relevant enough to take into consideration. Rather, the Court considered reports of 
UNHCR, as well as Amnesty International, the Norwegian Organisation for Asylum Seekers 
and other NGOs, which in fact can be assumed to be more thorough than is possible for an 
asylum-seeker to produce. However, even the evidence in those reports was not sufficient to 
shift the burden of proof to the United Kingdom; rather, the ECtHR continued to rely on the 
safety presumption. 
 
Finally, in respect to the assessment of the indirect refoulement through removals to Greece 
by the Belgian authorities as examined in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, the Court found that, 
“[i]n addition to the fact that formal proof of this could not be adduced in abstracto and 
before the risk had materialized, the Belgian authorities should have taken the general 
situation into account and not taken the risk of removing [the applicant] back”.580 This 
“general situation was known to the Belgian authorities and that the applicant should not be 
expected to bear the entire burden of proof”.581 Before its finding that the applicant's transfer 
by Belgium to Greece gave rise to a violation of Art 3 ECHR, the Court countered the 
Government’s argument that “the applicant had not sufficiently individualised, before the 
Belgian authorities, the risk of having no access to the asylum procedure and being sent back 
by the Greek authorities”.582 The Court clarified again that “it was in fact up to the Belgian 
authorities, faced with the situation described above, not merely to assume that the applicant 
would be treated in conformity with the Convention standards but, on the contrary, to first 
verify how the Greek authorities applied their legislation on asylum in practice”.583 Had they 
done this, they would have seen that the risks the applicant faced were real and individual 
enough to fall within the scope of Art 3 ECHR. The Court added: “The fact that a large 
number of asylum seekers in Greece find themselves in the same situation as the applicant 
does not make the risk concerned any less individual where it is sufficiently real and 
probable”.584 The ECtHR concluded that “at the time of the applicant's removal the Belgian 
authorities knew or ought to have known that he had no guarantee that his asylum application 
would be seriously examined by the Greek authorities”585 and that hence “the applicant's 
transfer by Belgium to Greece gave rise to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention”.586 
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The author supports the decision of the Court in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece to accept the 
proof provided by the applicant, which included a description of the general situation through 
the aforementioned statistics on recognition rates and the reports on concrete circumstances 
awaiting the applicant. In this case, the burden of proof was thus shifted to Belgium and, as 
Belgium failed to fulfill it, the safety presumption was rebutted. This fact that no proof on the 
individual case was demanded by the Court for a shift of burden of proof regarding a State 
with presumably good human rights record represents a crucial change since Y. v. the 
Netherlands, where the ECommHR had demanded from the applicant to give precise 
information about the specific conditions of the detention which he himself risked undergoing 
upon his return. 
 
Thus, general information provided by statistics has been proven to have the power to shift 
the burden of proof. This is demonstrated by T.I. v. the United Kingdom, in which the Court 
relied on numbers in its evidence assessment to counter the applicant’s arguments concerning 
the high burden of proof placed on asylum-seekers in Germany. In this case, the Court argued 
that Germany’s record in granting large numbers of asylum claims “gives an indication that 
the threshold being applied in practice is not excessively high”. The author already argued in 
the case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece that statistical proof cannot only, as the Court 
stated, strengthen the applicant's argument concerning his loss of faith in the asylum 
procedure, but that such an asylum system with a rate of recognition not exceeding 1 percent 
is suspect per se in terms of the fairness of the procedure. As Judge Sajó defended in the 
dissenting part of his opinion, such statistics must lead to a shift of burden of proof, i.e. for the 
Government of Belgium to be obliged to provide “justification for this apparent statistical 
aberration”.  
Indeed, for the ECtHR, it was the general information provided in reports that led to the shift 
of burden of proof in this case. However, it seems plausible that the Court only accepted this 
solution due to the pressing, radical circumstances in the case that had continued to 
deteriorate. In particular, the following argumentation of the ECtHR leads to the suspicion: 
The Court considered that “the Belgian authorities should have taken the general situation into 
account”;587 “it was in fact up to the Belgian authorities, faced with the situation described 
above, not merely to assume that the applicant would be treated in conformity with the 
Convention standards but, on the contrary, to first verify how the Greek authorities applied 
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their legislation on asylum in practice”.588 In the author’s opinion, the ECtHR also proves 
here that it misuses the safety presumption as circular argument: “faced with the situation” in 
Greece, the Belgian authorities should have had to “first verify” the Greek practice: however, 
in order to be aware of what situation to the applicant faced, Greek practice must be verified. 
Even more worrying, the Court has not developed any criteria for determining when the 
burden of proof should be shifted. Even academics such as Battjes unconsciously used such 
circular arguments when stating that a State can rely on safety presumption arrangements “to 
a certain extent- to the extent that its inter-state trust in the STC is justified“,589 but tried to 
introduce criteria when formulating that the approach of “interstate trust as a rebuttable 
presumption” demands and allows for an individual assessment, “if proper grounds are 
adduced that this is necessary”.590  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The ECtHR has formulated its demands on the burden of proof as being with the applicant 
and has stated that “substantial grounds” must be shown for believing that the applicant would 
face refoulement. While many academics have feared that the burden of proof lies primarily 
on the side of the applicant, the author concludes after an analysis of the Court’s 
jurisprudence that it has itself reinforced the argument that the ECHR can and must be 
interpreted as primarily demanding the State to provide the relevant available facts of the 
respective case.  
This means for the concrete situation of the single procedure that the decision-maker carries 
the duty to ascertain and evaluate all the relevant general facts. The asylum-seeker carries the 
burden of proof to produce all evidence available to him, which only includes evidence on his 
background and personal experiences that purportedly give rise to the fear of refoulement. 
This low burden of proof has proven even more important in single procedures regarding the 
particular nature of the refugee situation, the possible vulnerability of the applicant as well as 
the danger of refusals based on lack of credibility resulting from mishandling the evidence. 
After all available evidence has been obtained and checked and the examiner is satisfied with 
the applicant’s general credibility, the decision-maker confronts the applicant’s assertion with 
the findings on the human rights situation in the State concerned. In general, where the 
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situation in a State is poor and the personal characteristics of the applicant suggest that he 
might be at risk of being subjected to torture or ill-treatment, such risk should be assumed. At 
that point, benefit of the doubt leads to a so-called “shift of burden of proof”, i.e. the burden is 
mainly on the removing State to inform itself about the case-specific relevant facts as much as 
possible.  
Such a decrease of the asylum-seeker’s burden of proof complies with the complicity 
principle’s position of inverse demands on the standard and burden of proof in the face of the 
seriousness of the potential harm, and the language of the ECtHR can be understood in this 
sense on regular States. However, it is unclear if compliance can be reached if the human 
rights situation in the receiving State – in this case a presumably SCO and STC – is not 
obviously poor: The logical consequence was verbalized that the burden of proof may still 
rest on the applicant to show that he is in danger. 
The ECtHR approached the issue of burden of proof in its relevant jurisprudence critically: In 
T.I. v. the United Kingdom, the Court was not persuaded that the argument had “been 
substantiated as preventing meritorious claims in practice”, despite strong evidence provided 
by the applicant. In K.R.S. v. the United Kingdom as well, the ECtHR found almost nothing of 
the applicant’s claim relevant enough to take into consideration and did not find the evidence 
by reputable reports sufficient to shift the burden of proof to the United Kingdom. After 
having trusted the safety presumption in these two cases, the Court was satisfied in M.S.S. v. 
Belgium and Greece with the proof provided by the applicant, which included a description of 
the general situation by the aforementioned statistics on recognition rates and the reports on 
concrete, but general circumstances awaiting the applicant. Through this evidence, the burden 
of proof was shifted to Belgium and, as Belgium failed to fulfil it, the safety presumption was 
rebutted.  
 
 
 
3. Balancing: Positive obligations on the removing State’s single procedure  
 
In the face of the reality of danger of over-weighing the safety presumption in national 
jurisprudence and in Strasbourg jurisprudence as described in Chapter II and in this Chapter, 
the issue is now addressed which positive procedural obligations can be derived from the 
principle of non-refoulement and hence Art 3 ECHR alone for the removing State’s single 
procedure on asylum and removal from the discussion of the variable standard of proof and 
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the analysis of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. Beyond a considerably low standard of proof (a) 
and burden of proof (b), demands are posed such as access to an individual interview (c) and 
on the quality of the procedure (d). 
 
a. Considerably low standard of proof 
 
As the concept of the variable standard of proof indicates that the gravity of the foreseeable 
ill-treatment is decisive with respect to the degree of probability and predictability applicable 
in different classes of cases, a relatively low level of knowledge ought to be required in the 
case of an alleged violation of Art 3 ECHR for the proof of a violation. On this level of 
standard of proof, the ECtHR’s jurisprudence does not allow for generalizations, but brings 
certain clarifications and enables some conclusions to be drawn from the identified concerns. 
First, the absoluteness of Art 3 ECHR prohibits any increase of the demands on the standard 
of proof in cases of removal in which the individual concerned being perceived to be a danger 
to the national security.  
For the removing State’s single procedure on asylum and removal, the ECtHR clarified that, 
as to direct refoulement, a person who has a well-founded fear of persecution within the 
meaning of Art 1 (A) GRC can also claim that he may not be returned to his country of origin 
because that would expose him to a real risk of being subjected to treatment prohibited by Art 
3 ECHR. In the case of indirect refoulement, only national procedures are in line with the 
variable standard of proof and hence provide considerable protection in the case of an alleged 
violation of Art 3 ECHR that keep the level demanded for knowledge relatively low for both 
assessments of risk: of persecution in the final State as well as procedural deficiencies in the 
third State’s single procedure.  
The ECtHR has clarified that this low standard of proof can be satisfied, concerning 
persecution in the final State, with easily accessible documentation from the applicant and 
general reports of international organisations and NGOs. However, concerning procedural 
deficiencies in the third State’s single procedure, to keep the standard of proof, also for 
rebuttal of the safety presumption, sufficiently low, it must, contrary to the ECtHR’s high 
prerogatives in T.I. v. the United Kingdom, be viewed as being fulfilled by fair consideration 
of statistical evidence on the considerable low rates of asylum or subsidiary protection granted 
by the presumably STC compared with other States, and general reports by international 
organizations and NGOs. In other words, it would be too much to require the applicant to 
demonstrate in concreto the irreparable nature of the damage done by the alleged potential 
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violation, and the safety presumption should be rebuttable by the sole evidence of statistics 
and reports on the general situation in the third State. In this sense, the ECtHR analyzed the 
concrete single procedure of the removing State in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece. The 
Belgian Government confirmed that the constant case-law of the Aliens Appeals Board 
required the applicants to demonstrate the “concrete risk” they faced.591 In this case, the 
UNHCR intervened as a third party, stating that “the constant case-law effectively doomed to 
failure any application for the suspension or review of an order to leave the country issued in 
application of the Dublin Regulation, as the individuals concerned were unable to provide 
concrete proof both that they faced an individual risk” and that it was impossible for them to 
secure protection in the receiving country. In adopting that approach, the Belgian courts 
automatically relied on the Dublin Regulation and failed to assume their higher obligations 
under the Convention and the international law on refugees.592 The ECtHR has clarified in 
this judgment that if the safety presumption cannot be rebutted in the removing State’s 
procedure by the sole evidence of reports on the general situation in the respective receiving 
presumably safe State, the standard of proof on the applicant is increased to an extent as to 
hinder the examination on the merits of the alleged risk of a violation. Therefore, general 
assumptions alone are insufficient to establish the international law responsibility of a State 
beyond reasonable doubt, but they must definitely be sufficient to rebut a safety presumption. 
 
It can be concluded that Art 3 ECHR imposes the positive obligation on the removing State to 
assess the risk of refoulement in its single procedure, also in the case of an existing safety 
presumption, with a standard of proof that is considerably low, i.e. being fulfilled by general 
information by reports or statistical data. 
 
b. Considerably low burden of proof 
 
The ECtHR has, despite formulating its demands on the burden of proof as being with the 
applicant and using the term “substantial grounds”, reinforced in its jurisprudence the 
argument that the ECHR can and must be interpreted as primarily demanding the State to 
provide the relevant available facts of the respective case.  
This means for the concrete situation of the single procedure that the decision-maker carries 
the duty to ascertain and evaluate all the relevant general facts. The asylum-seeker carries the 
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burden of proof to produce all evidence available to him, which only includes evidence on his 
background and personal experiences that purportedly give rise to the fear of refoulement.  
After all available evidence has been obtained and checked and the examiner is satisfied with 
the applicant’s general credibility, the decision-maker confronts the applicant’s assertion with 
the findings on the human rights situation in the State concerned. In general, where the 
situation in a State is poor and the personal characteristics of the applicant suggest that he 
might be at risk of being subjected to torture or ill-treatment, such risk should be assumed. At 
that point, benefit of the doubt leads to a so-called “shift of burden of proof”, i.e. the burden is 
mainly on the removing State to inform itself about the case-specific relevant facts as much as 
possible. Such a decrease of the asylum-seeker’s burden of proof complies with the 
complicity principle’s position of inverse demands on the standard and burden of proof in the 
face of the seriousness of the potential harm, and the language of the ECtHR can be 
understood in this sense on regular States.  
However, concerning procedural deficiencies in the third State’s single procedure, to keep the 
burden of proof sufficiently low, it must be viewed as being fulfilled by an applicant if 
including a description of the general situation by the statistics on recognition rates and the 
reports on the concrete, but general circumstances awaiting the applicant. Through this 
evidence, the burden of proof must be shifted to the removing State. 
As to the level of burden of proof in the removing State’s procedure regarding the risk of 
indirect refoulement due to procedural deficiencies a STC’s single procedure, hence for the 
rebuttal of a safety presumption, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece is illuminative. The applicant 
submitted on the issue of burden of proof in the Belgian review procedure what also the 
author could have done in the cases referred to in the introduction to this thesis: At the time of 
the applicant’s removal, his request for a stay of execution lodged under the extremely urgent 
procedure had no chance of succeeding because the constant case-law of certain divisions of 
the Aliens Appeals Board “systematically” upheld the safety presumption by finding that 
there was no virtually irreparable damage since it was to be presumed that Greece would 
fulfill its international obligations in asylum matters, and that presumption could not be 
rebutted based on reports on the general situation in Greece, without the risk to the person 
being demonstrated in concreto. Only a handful of judgments to the contrary had been 
delivered, but in a completely unforeseeable manner and with no explanation of the 
reasons.593 The applicant further stated that this increase in the burden of proof even in cases 
where “the individuals concerned demonstrated that they belonged to a vulnerable group who 
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were systematically subjected in Greece to treatment contrary to Article 3” made appeals to 
the Aliens Appeals Board “totally ineffective”.594  
The Belgian judgments discussed in the Court’s reasoning confirmed that the examination of 
the complaints under Art 3 ECHR carried out by certain divisions of the Aliens Appeals 
Board at the time of the applicant's expulsion was not thorough: “They limited their 
examination to verifying whether the persons concerned had produced concrete proof of the 
irreparable nature of the damage that might result from the alleged potential violation of 
Article 3, thereby increasing the burden of proof to such an extent as to hinder the 
examination on the merits of the alleged risk of a violation. Furthermore, even if the 
individuals concerned did attempt to add more material to their files along these lines after 
their interviews with the Aliens Office, the Aliens Appeals Board did not always take that 
material into account”.595 The persons concerned were thus prevented from establishing the 
arguable nature of their complaints under Art 3 ECHR.  
The ECtHR has furthermore clarified in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece that if in the safe 
country procedure of the removing State the safety presumption cannot be rebutted by the sole 
evidence of reports on the general situation in the respective receiving presumably safe State, 
the burden of proof on the applicant is increased to an extent as to hinder the examination on 
the merits of the alleged risk of a violation.  
Therefore, the applicant’s burden of proof, which entails producing all evidence available to 
him on his background and personal experiences that purportedly give rise to the fear of 
refoulement, must not be increased, vis-à-vis a safety presumption in a safe country 
procedure, to go beyond providing general information by statistics on recognition rates and 
reports on the general circumstances that raise suspicion per se in terms of the fairness of the 
procedure in the presumably safe State. Having submitted such proof, the burden of proof 
must shift to the removing State, i.e. the decision-maker- which means that the safety 
presumption is rebutted.  
This clarification has been proven necessary as the safe country notion has in fact caused 
interviewing officers to heighten the burden of proof and exaggerate doubts about an 
applicant's credibility.596  
Such a decrease of the asylum-seeker’s burden of proof complies with the complicity 
principle’s position of inverse demands on the standard and burden of proof in the face of the 
                                                
594 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece para 380. 
595M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece para. 389, emphasis added. 
596 For example, an Austrian Ministry of Interior official stated that in a safe country case he would begin by asking: "You 
come from a safe country, why the hell are you coming here?" Byrne and Shaknove, note 127, referring to Interview with 
Ministry of Interior Official (June 1992). 
 152 
seriousness of the potential harm. Only such an approach ensures that the safety presumption 
also remains in realiter, as Legomsky puts it, a “rebuttable evidentiary presumption”.597 He 
understands under this term that the safe country concept’s various modalities can “be read as 
mere statements of the established perceptions that these countries are generally safe, without 
affecting the burden of proof resting on applicants”.598 Hence, “[t]he destination country may 
shift to the applicant the burden of identifying any particular Convention provisions that he or 
she believe the third country will violate, as well as the burden of producing some evidence of 
the prospective violations, but once those burdens are met, the government of the destination 
country retains the ultimate burden of proving that the third country will not violate those 
provisions”.599 
 
The GRC also allows only for such an approach through the already discussed “presumption 
doctrine”: If on the one hand a State abstains from status determination, the refugee status of 
the asylum seeker must, on the other hand, be presumed.600 The fact that the presumption of 
the refugee status is conditioned by the validity of the claim is acceptable as long as the 
burden demanded for this claim is not increased in comparison to the demands in the asylum 
procedure. In this sense, UNHCR’s Handbook criticises that “in some jurisdictions, recent 
case law suggests that the claimant may also be required to prove that return is unsafe”.601 
However, UNHCR has further stated that, since the State in which a person seeks refugee 
protection has the primary responsibility for considering the claim, that country has the 
burden of proving that it would be safe to transfer responsibility to a third country.602 In 
contrast to this clear wording, UNHCR has been soft and unrealistic in its reaction to the EU’s 
installations of safe country concepts.603 It only noted its concern that “currently states may 
place the burden of proof entirely on the applicant, sometimes in the context of an accelerated 
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procedure”.604 Only in 2010 UNHCR stipulated on SCO procedures that “the burden of proof 
on the applicant is not increased”.605 
 
It can be concluded that a complaint under Art 3 ECHR imposes the positive obligation on the 
removing State to assess in its single procedure the risk of refoulement with a burden of proof 
on the side of the applicant that is quite low, i.e. limited to his background and personal 
experiences that purportedly give rise to their fear of refoulement. Also in the case of an 
existing safety presumption, the burden of proof must not go beyond providing general 
information by statistics on recognition rates and reports on the general circumstances that 
raise suspicion per se in terms of the fairness of the procedure in the presumably safe State. 
c. Individual interview 
 
Byrne and Shacknove declare it as “unlikely that country of origin information will be 
sufficiently specific or objective to enable immigration officials to assess the likelihood that 
persecution will not occur without conducting an individual interview”.606 Such risk is 
unacceptable to take in cases in which a violation of Art 3 ECHR by the removal is claimed. 
UNHCR shares this concern, especially in the context of accelerated procedures like safe 
country procedures, and specifically recommends that Member States applying the safe third 
country concept “should ensure that the applicant […] is always given the possibility of an 
interview in which to challenge the application of the concept”.607 The ExCom Conclusions 
No. 30 of 1981 demand, among other issues, that the acceleration of these claims be 
accompanied by procedural guarantees of a complete personal interview by a fully qualified 
official and interpreter. And the CAT Committee recommended for asylum procedures on 
asylum applications based on Art 3 CAT that they should provide for a more thorough risk 
assessment, including systematically holding individual interviews to better assess the 
personal risk to the applicant, and by providing free interpretation services.1 
 
d. Quality: Rigorous scrutiny  
 
It may again be reiterated, that, while the procedural distinction between the decision-making 
process on asylum and removal may legally be an issue, it is not of relevance in practice in the 
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States in focus of this thesis, having installed a single procedure. As to the procedural quality 
of this single procedure, the two aspects are thus two sides of the same coin: discharging the 
non-refoulement obligation requires an evaluation of the risk of harm- being also condition for 
a serious assessment of the asylum claim.  
As already described in Chapter II, questions about basic fairness of procedures were raised 
when sitting in asylum interviews of first instance. Regardless of official policy, if the word 
passes through the bureaucratic hierarchy that a given country is safe, interviewers are less 
likely to actively engage an asylum-seeker in order to understand his personal history. In this 
sense, the unprofessional conduct of the British immigration officers’ work was harshly 
criticized by Lord Bridge in Bugdaycay v Secretary of State for the Home Department608 who 
was critical of the original asylum interview conducted by an immigration officer with no 
knowledge of the country of origin: “a detailed examination of the way in which the 
application made by the appellant for asylum was dealt with by the immigration authorities 
gives cause for grave concern”.609 Regarding the subsequent decision-making, the author’s 
experience was congruent with Robert’s diagnosis: it is of indifferent quality, poorly 
reasoned, inadequately engages with the evidence of the applicant and frequently discloses 
factual inaccuracies about conditions in the applicant’s country.610 On the Home Office’s 
lamentable conduct, the UK’s Immigration Appeal Tribunal noted that, if it took the 
charitable view that it was no more than institutional incompetence, “it is hard to imagine any 
other department of state in this country where such incompetence would be tolerated”. 
However, the Home Office’s failings were so severe that it “begins to go beyond mere 
institutional incompetence, into the realm of an institutional culture of disregard for 
adjudicators, who are the primary judicial authority […] for making sure that immigration 
powers are efficiently, as well as fairly, exercised”.611 
 
To what extent has the ECtHR articulated itself on demands of quality? It has done so in Cruz 
Varas and others v. Sweden and Vilvaraja and others v. the United Kingdom. In Cruz Varas 
and others v. Sweden, the Court stated that “the Swedish authorities had particular knowledge 
and experience in evaluating claims of the present nature by virtue of the large number of 
Chilean asylum-seekers who had arrived in Sweden since 1973”. In Vilvarajah and others v. 
the United Kingdom, the Court mentioned the knowledge and experience that the United 
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Kingdom authorities had in dealing with large numbers of asylum seekers from Sri Lanka, 
many of whom were granted leave to stay, and the fact that the personal circumstances of 
each applicant had been carefully considered by the Secretary of State. Further, the Court 
stated in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece that, according to its established case-law, “any 
complaint that expulsion to another country will expose an individual to treatment prohibited 
by Article 3 of the Convention requires close and rigorous scrutiny and that, subject to a 
certain margin of appreciation left to the States, conformity with Article 13 requires that the 
competent body must be able to examine the substance of the complaint and afford proper 
reparation”.612 In this sense, the ECtHR had been struck in Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. 
Turkey by the “totally passive” attitude of the Turkish authorities regarding the applicants’ 
serious allegations of a risk of ill-treatment if returned to Iraq or Iran. The lack of response by 
the national authorities amounted to a lack of the “rigorous scrutiny” required by Art 13 
ECHR.613 
 
The author defends that it is Art 3 ECHR that requires a meaningful assessment of the 
applicant's claim of the existence of a real risk.614 To guarantee a meaningful assessment, i.e. 
that Art 3 ECHR’s non-refoulement obligation is not violated upon removal, fact-finding in 
the asylum procedure must attain a certain accuracy and quality. Also another absolute 
provision, namely Art 2 ECHR, was referred to to formulate the obligation to maintain a high 
standard of rigorous scrutiny in the administrative procedure. In Bugdaycay v. Secretary of 
State for the Home Department,615 the importance of procedural fairness and fundamental 
rights deriving from Art 2 ECHR was emphasized when Lord Bridge noted: “the most 
fundamental of all human rights is the individual’s right to life, and when an administrative 
decision under challenge is said to be […] one which may put the applicant’s life at risk, the 
basis of the decision must surely call for the most anxious scrutiny”.616 This judgment 
recognized that “where fundamental rights are at risk (in this instance the right to life), the 
courts, in judicial review proceedings, should examine the decision-making process very 
closely to ensure that there is no unfairness to the individual”.617 The ECtHR itself noted in 
Vilvarajah and others v. the United Kingdom, the Court on Art 13 ECHR: “The Court’s 
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examination of the existence of a risk of ill-treatment in breach of Article 3 […] at the 
relevant time must necessarily be a rigorous one in view of the absolute character of this 
provision and the fact that it enshrines one of the fundamental values of the democratic 
societies making up the Council of Europe”.618 In this sense, the CAT Committee has 
established that, generally, a certain number of material and procedural guarantees must be 
provided in domestic law in relation to removal. For instance, difficulties in registering 
requests for asylum and the summary nature of legal proceedings have been listed by the 
Committee as obstacles to the implementation of Art 3 CAT.619 In fact, Art 3 CAT implies the 
establishment of a competent administrative body in that field.620 States Parties should 
regulate procedures for dealing with and deciding on applications for asylum and refugee 
status which envisage the opportunity for the applicants to attend formal hearings and to make 
such submissions as may be relevant to the right which they invoke, including pertinent 
evidence, with protection of the characteristics of due process of law.621  
It should be mentioned that, according to Legomsky, Art 33 GRC also poses procedural 
demands: “The Convention does not expressly prohibit […] any […] specific procedure, but 
[if a] procedure is so unfair and unreliable, the act of establishing it assures that an 
unacceptable high number of refugees will be returned erroneously to their persecutors. Thus, 
it is submitted, the establishment of an unfair refugee status determination procedure is itself a 
violation of Art 33”;622 regarding international law in general, Battjes stated that it “is neutral 
on the organization of procedures, as long as they do not affect the effectiveness of protection 
from refoulement and allow for a meaningful and rigorous scrutiny of claims”.623 
 
Within the context of the quality of the asylum procedure, the term “administrative justice” 
needs to be addressed. This term is defined by Mashaw as “those qualities of a decision-
process that provide arguments for the acceptability of its decisions”.624 For the necessary 
qualities of the decision-process, the author refers to Robert, who lists the “underlying values 
of asylum adjudication” as follows: accuracy, fairness, consistency as well as timeliness and 
finality of decision-making.625 
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Accuracy concerns the “degree to which the substantive outcome of a decision corresponds, 
through correct application of the relevant rules, with the true facts of an individual’s 
circumstances”.626 There are clearly inherent limitations to the substantive ideal of this most 
important value of any adjudicatory system. While asylum law itself seems superficially 
simple, the difficulty is that asylum adjudication conceals “a mass of detailed, difficult and 
very problematic factual and legal issues”.627 They must be solved objectively. 
As to the factual issues, UNHCR states in its Handbook that, “[a]lthough the legal burden is 
on the asylum-seeker, a basic tenet of refugee status determination holds that the 
responsibility for establishing the factual record is shared jointly by the asylum-seeker and the 
interviewing officer”.628 Hence, the asylum office’s factual recording must be correct for a fair 
share of the burden of proof. This issue must not be underestimated. While there is no 
problem with lack of information, there is a problem with verified information. What counts 
in every case is the weight of the information. Provided that it is available, verified and public 
information on a country’s situation should gain authority. Finally, the decision-maker must 
personally interpret whether the applicant is credible. Cultural, social and linguistic distances 
between the decision-maker and the applicant as well as diversity of the clientele can lead to 
communication problems that make the decision on the credibility of the personal history an 
intellectual and interpersonal challenge. 
High intellectual competence is demanded in legal issues, because, as already stated, 
discretion is vital throughout the whole decision-making process in an area where the law is 
vague on terms such as “reasonable degree” of likelihood of persecution or “ill-treatment”, 
“proportionality” of removal etc. Even more importantly, adequate training of the responsible 
personnel is obligatory. According to the CAT Committee, States Parties have a positive 
obligation to ensure that public officials have been made aware of their obligations and 
received special training or instructions on their Art 3 CAT-related obligations.629 
Additionally, the judiciary dealing with the question of asylum-seekers should also have 
appropriate instructions and recommendations which would ensure that the CAT was fully 
implemented in practice.630 Further, it may be stated that the Committee was concerned about 
the summary nature of so-called priority procedures in administrative holding centres or at the 
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borders, which did not enable an assessment of the risks covered by Art 3 CAT; rather, each 
case should be dealt with individually. 
 
The term “fairness” seems quite broad and vague. It has to do with resistance to errors: 
“While errors will always occur in an administrative system, no system can be considered fair 
if the probability of error is too high.”631 Fair procedures are likely to promote accurate 
decision-making and guarantee that individuals are treated in accordance with the value of 
dignity. In R (Anufrijeva) v Secretary of State for the Home Department632 the House of Lords 
held that “[f]airness is the guiding principle of our public law”.633 In a climate of hostility 
towards asylum-seekers, the stress on the fairness of procedures is valuable. 
 
Consistency is highly difficult to achieve, but it is gravely necessary. In the context of asylum 
procedures taken under EU-legislation, consistency will only be possible by the work of the 
EU Asylum Support Office. 
  
While all these qualities should be self-evident characteristics of asylum procedures, they 
must survive under pressure of compressed time limits exerted by governments in light of the 
political imperatives of asylum policy.634 For the complexity of the cases and difficulties of 
fact-finding, adjudicators operate within a highly pressurized time frame. But in fact, 
timeliness and finality of decision-making are further procedural demands that are of 
important value to the asylum-seeker himself. These difficulties lead us to the question if the 
second balancing of the direct balancing approach leads to a reduction of the developed 
demands. 
 
States have, explicitly or implicitly, declared non-admission policies as the introduction of 
safe country procedures a legitimate aim, sometimes based on the argument of non-
compliance with formal immigration control requirements. The author could now defend that 
the positive obligation to implement the developed high-quality single procedure is demanded 
by the principle of non-refoulement inherent in Art 3 ECHR and, as Art 3 ECHR is absolute, 
not open to balancing with states’ interest. Still, the author wants to open up for this 
discussion to corroborate her findings.  
The author wants to refer to the argumentation of Justice Harlan of the United States Supreme 
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Court on the determination of the proper standard of proof for finding facts in civil and 
criminal courts of law. Justice Harlan advocates selecting “the appropriate standard of proof 
for any category of case would be to ask how harmful an error in either direction would be”. 
This question is also valid for the appropriate burden of proof and the quality of the asylum 
procedure. As to the possibility of refoulement, Byrne and Shacknove agree by holding that it 
is “highly likely” that governments return bona fide refugees to circumstances of persecution 
in violation of Art 33 GRC when individual applicants are denied the opportunity to 
distinguish their claims from those deemed prima facie ineligible for refugee status because of 
group characteristics.635 Without permitting the applicants to present their claims and rebut in 
realiter, i.e. by a fair burden of proof, immigration officers cannot assure that the return of 
any particular asylum-seeker is reasonably unlikely to result in persecution. Such probability 
of danger is too high for cases of claims of refoulement. Potential consequences of removal 
decisions are drastic,636 and hence the costs to the individual concerned with wrong removal 
decisions in the context of an asylum procedure are potentially extremely high. In other 
words: “The serious consequences of the return decision make accuracy vital”.637 No 
deviation from the developed demands is acceptable with the argument of the state’s interest 
in reducing financial and organizational resources. As to the argument of immigration control, 
mechanisms restricting admissibility to the asylum procedure of a given state are considered 
as striking an inadequate balance between immigration control and refugee protection, in so 
far as they refer asylum-seekers to another state’s jurisprudence merely because of non-
compliance with formal immigration control requirements.638 Regarding accelerated 
procedures, Judge Zupančič rightly articulated in his concurring opinion in Saadi v. the 
United Kingdom: “The aim of the procedure is not some kind of truth finding. The aim is 
simply to create a delay without irremediable consequences and hence to create conditions in 
which truth finding may yet happen”.639 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, positive obligations regarding the removing State’s single procedure on 
asylum and refoulement were developed by analyzing the ECtHR’s relevant jurisprudence 
through the lenses of the direct balancing approach. 
As to absolute balancing on gravity, the author defended that factors of gravity under Art 3 
ECHR alone are, first, the lack of availability of an effective remedy and suspensive effect of 
proceedings against a removal decision in the receiving third State and, second, the lack of a 
certain quality of the third State’s single procedure, having in the respective case as result a 
more restrictive protection scope than foreseen by the universal refugee definition.  
As positive procedural obligation, it was developed that, upon an application for asylum, the 
removing State can refuse to examine the merits of the claim on the assumption that a specific 
State, whether it be a STC or a SCO, is prima facie safe only if the applicant is given the 
opportunity to rebut the safety presumption, i.e. present counter evidence to the effect that the 
state is not safe. 
 
The circumstances under which rebuttal should be allowed consider the question of standard 
and burden of proof, a most crucial issue that was discussed in the step of individual 
balancing. As to standard of proof, the ECtHR has never increased the demands on the 
standard of proof in cases where the individual concerned was perceived to be a danger to the 
national security and, hence, has allowed the absoluteness of Art 3 ECHR prevail also 
regarding the level of probability and predictability. On first sight, the necessary threshold for 
the standard of proof appeared misguided: “substantial grounds” must be shown to prove that 
the person concerned faces a “real risk” of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment in the country of potential return.  
However, in assessing the risk of direct refoulement due to the factual conditions in the 
receiving state amounting to persecution the analysis of the Court’s jurisprudence 
demonstrated that it has developed the same standard of proof for the well-founded fear of 
persecution within the meaning of Art 1 (A) GRC as for the claim to be exposed to 
refoulement in case of removal.  
In assessing the risk of indirect refoulement via a presumably STC, the reduction of the 
Court’s analysis to the existence of an “arguable claim” on the first step on persecution in the 
final State is seen as a positive development, also its execution doing justice to the prerogative 
of a low demand on standard of proof: documentation easily accessible for the applicant and 
general reports of international organizations and NGOs fulfill the Court’s demands on the 
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standard of proof. As to the successive assessment of the risk for the claimant of chain-
refoulement via the third State, the author welcomed that in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, the 
ECtHR found statistical evidence on extremely low rate of asylum or subsidiary protection 
and reports by international organizations, NGOs and state organizations strong enough to 
rebut the safety presumption.  
Regarding the burden of proof, an analysis of the Court’s jurisprudence lets us conclude that it 
has itself reinforced the argument that the ECHR can and must be interpreted as primarily 
demanding the State to provide the relevant available facts of the respective case.  
 
The following positive procedural obligations deriving from Art 3 ECHR for the removing 
State’s single procedure on asylum and refoulement were developed in this step of individual 
balancing: First, the risk of refoulement is to be assessed, also in the case of an existing safety 
presumption, with a standard of proof that is considerably low, i.e. being fulfilled by general 
information by reports or statistical data. Second, also the burden of proof on the side of the 
applicant is to be kept considerably low, i.e. limited to his background and personal 
experiences that purportedly give rise to his fear of refoulement; also in the case of an existing 
safety presumption, the burden of proof must not go beyond providing general information by 
statistics on recognition rates and reports on the general circumstances that raise suspicion per 
se in terms of the fairness of the procedure in the presumably safe State. Third, a serious 
assessment necessitates an individual interview. Finally, the single procedure has to attain a 
certain quality, circumscribed by “rigorous scrutiny” and encompassing accuracy, fairness 
and consistency. 
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V. Conclusion: 
In the current world of protection discrepancies: 
EU-legislation on safe country concepts 
in breach of 
the principle of non-refoulement 
 
 
The conclusion of this thesis on the compatibility of the EU’s safe country procedures with 
the principle of non-refoulement is that Art 3 ECHR’s non-refoulement properties alone 
impose in case of a complaint under Art 3 ECHR on the removing state the positive 
obligations to only refuse to examine the merits of the claim on the assumption that the 
receiving State- may it be a STC or a SCO- is prima facie safe if the applicant is given the 
opportunity to rebut the safety presumption, i.e. present counter evidence to the effect that the 
state is not safe. This and the further developed positive obligations to assess the risk deriving 
from the presumably safe State with a considerably low standard of proof, a very low the 
burden of proof on the applicant and with close and rigorous scrutiny by an individual 
interview and a high-quality procedure stand as long as the safe country concept is applied in 
a situation of protection discrepancies. If not, it can happen, as regarding Greece, that an 
erroneous presumption of safety remains institutionalized for 20 years to the detriment of the 
asylum-seekers concerned.  
The thesis’ result is only valid: “Presumptions are intended to reduce complexity. Grossly 
counterfactual presumptions do the opposite”.640 In view of the States’ idiosyncrasy, the 
resulting danger can not be underestimated: They find that, “unless asylum applications are 
determined in an equivalent manner across the EU and subject to a supervisory appellate 
structure to ensure consistency among Member States (and any other States to which asylum 
seekers are sent), the protection against refoulement may not be guaranteed”.641 Hence, until 
then, the SCO and STC notions fail “to provide adequate protection against the cornerstone of 
the GRC: an individual’s right not to be refouled”.642 
 
Therefore, until the time of equivalent protection- which naturally endorses interpretations of 
protective instruments which do not fall short of an international interpretation- in the 
removing and the “safe” State, the EU MSs as parties to the ECHR have the obligation vis-à-
                                                
640 Noll, Formalism versus Empiricism, 182. 
641 Guild 321. 
642 Allain 553. 
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vis the asylum-seekers either to apply the EU’s safe country concepts not at all or to apply 
them in implementing the positive obligations developed in this thesis.  
 
As to the latter solution to implement the formulated obligations, this is possible where the 
EU legislation has left the EU MSs the respective flexibility.643 Interestingly, it is the Dublin 
Regulation on which not only in chapter II most critical remarks were focused that it poses no 
problem for EU MS to perform the developed positive obligations: it allows the Member State 
by its Art 3 (2) to take up responsibility for the applicant’s claim if a transfer to the Member 
State responsible for dealing with the asylum claim would constitute a violation of the 
principle of non-refoulement. Domestic legislation “requiring examination if another Member 
State is unsafe for a particular applicant would not run counter to Preamble recital (2) […] 
that states that Member States are safe, as that recital does not state that the presumption of 
safety cannot be rebutted”.644 As for the other EU-legislation, most of the critical provisions 
are permissive, allowing, but not obliging MS to apply the safe third country concept: The 
Qualification Directive and the Procedures Directive merely determine “minimum 
standards”,645 and the Procedures Directive contains mainly permissive provisions as it seeks 
to assuage various political agendas of the EU MS by leaving the majority of procedures and 
designation of "safe" countries up to State discretion.646 Nevertheless, as all relevant 
instruments of EU legislation constitute a core component of the asylum acquis and are hence 
“politically binding”,647 also the dangers emanating from the only standard setting provisions 
will be discussed (A). Very rarely, Community law leaves EU MSs no discretion (B).  
 
 
A. EU-legislation’s permissive provisions 
 
The following sections will discuss the dubious legal setting on non-EU SCOs (1) and non-
EU STCs (2). 
 
                                                
643 Battjes 167-8. 
644 Battjes, 420; This Community law obligation to take up responsibility pursuant to Art 3 (2) DC to prevent violations of 
Art 3 ECHR first had been outlined explicitly by the Austrian Constitutional Court in 2001 in a landmark-ruling 
(Verfassungsgerichtshof (VfGH) 08.03.2001, G 117/00, G 146/00, G 147/00). 
645 Arts 63 (1)(b), (c), (d) and (2) TEC characterize Community instruments on asylum only as “minimum standards”, which 
should, according to Art 63 (1) TEC, be applied in accordance with relevant international law. 
646 Panezi, Maria, ‘Legislative Development: The 2005 Asylum Procedures Directive: Developing the European Asylum 
Law’ (2007) 13 Columbia Journal of European Law 506. 
647 Verdsted 26.  
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1. Non-EU safe countries of origin: Discrimination 
 
On the text on the SCO concept, criticism will be voiced on provisions concerning gravity (a), 
standard of proof (b) and burden of proof (c). 
 
a. Gravity: Deficient definition of “safety” 
 
As Paras (1) and (2) of Art 29 PD were annulled by the ECJ, the only mode for designating 
countries as SCOs at the time of writing is set out in Art 30 PD. The author shares the 
opinion of UNHCR that for this designation, the definition of a “safe country of origin” 
stipulated in Annex II PD is broadly adequate in theory. Non EU MS SCO: gravity: 
However, it should be mentioned that UNHCR researched that, in practice, there has been 
considerable divergence among the surveyed EU MSs that apply the safe country of origin 
concept as to which countries have been considered to be safe countries of origin.  
 
According to Art 30 (2) PD, Member States may retain legislation in force on 1 December 
2005 that allows for the national designation of third countries as safe countries of origin, but 
under less strict conditions than Annex II PD, i.e. as long as the EU MSs are satisfied that 
persons in the third countries concerned are generally subject neither to persecution as 
defined in Art 9 QD, nor to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. This 
paper holds that these conditions are not sufficient for the necessary definition of “safety” 
despite the additional obligation for the MSs in their assessment to “have regard to the legal 
situation, the application of the law and the general political circumstances in the third 
country concerned”;648 in this sense, also UNHCR has voiced its reservations about this 
allowance for EU MSs to retain legislation on national designations.649 It should be added 
that the exceptions made for pre-existing national lists undermine the uniform approach 
required to achieve the objective of a Common European Asylum System.650 
 
Art 30 (3) PD, which allows Member States to retain legislation designating part of a country 
as safe for a specified group of persons in that country under the less strict conditions of Para 
                                                
648 Art 30 (4) PD. 
649 UNHCR, ‘UNHCR's Observations on the European Commission's Proposal for a Council Directive on Minimum 
Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third Country Nationals and Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who 
Otherwise Need International Protection (Brussels, 12 September 2001, COM (2001) 510 final, 2001/0207 (CNS))’, 1 
November 2001, 225. 
650 Ibidem, 332. 
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(2), is evidently in danger of breaching the GRC.651 Such a concept of a presumed safe part of 
a country is alien to the GRC and not in conformity to the internal flight alternative, for which 
it is only one element of examination.652  
 
b. Standard of proof: Ambiguity 
 
On the shift of standard of proof to counter the presumption of safety, Art 31 (1) PD 
articulates on the one hand that the applicant has to submit “serious grounds” to prove that 
his country of origin is not safe “in his/her particular circumstances”. Recital 21 PD 
recognizes that the “designation of a third country as a safe country of origin [...] cannot 
establish an absolute guarantee of safety for nationals of that country”. Recital 19 refers to 
the “rebuttable presumption of the safety” of the SCO. On the other hand, Recital 17 PD 
states that “a key consideration for the well-foundedness of an asylum application is the 
safety of the applicant in his/her country of origin. Where a third country can be regarded as 
a safe country of origin, Member States should be able to designate it as safe and presume its 
safety for a particular applicant, unless he/she presents serious counter-indications”.653 
Hence, the Recitals display considerable ambiguity on this point. In addition, the Procedures 
Directive itself is silent on whether or how applicants can be given an effective opportunity 
to rebut a presumption of safety; Art 31 (3) PD only requires States to establish further rules 
and modalities in national legislation for the application of the safe country of origin concept.  
 
c. Burden of proof: Dangerous textual tendency 
 
While in Art 31 PD, the need for an individual examination is explicitly confirmed, the 
provision appears to place at the same time the burden of proof on the applicant to 
demonstrate that his country is not a safe country of origin in his particular circumstances. 
That’s why UNHCR recommended that, even where Member States have transposed Art 31 
(1) PD, express guidance should be provided to decision-makers concerning the shared duty 
to establish the facts.654  
                                                
651 Ibidem, 335. 
652 UNHCR, ‘Guidelines on International Protection No. 4: "Internal Flight or Relocation Alternative" Within the Context of 
Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees’, 23 July 
2003, HCR/GIP/03/04, 8. 
653 Emphasis added. 
654 UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, 41. 
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Among the general provisions of the PD on the examination procedure of first instance, Art 
23 (4) PD lists conditions that seek to address the credibility of the asylum claimant. Most of 
interest is Art 23 PD (4) (g) that provides: 
 
“Member States may also provide that an examination procedure in accordance with the basic 
principles and guarantees of Chapter II be prioritized or accelerated if [...] the applicant has made 
inconsistent, contradictory, improbable or insufficient representations which make his/her claim 
clearly unconvincing in relation to his/her having been the object of persecution referred to in 
Directive 2004/83/EC“. 
 
This provision of the PD guides national practice in the reverse direction from the 
observations of the CommAT655 as well as national practical manuals for determination 
authorities that increasingly acknowledge such features as symptomatic of victims of torture, 
or significant cross cultural barriers.656 As such criteria clearly address the credibility of an 
asylum claimant in expedited procedures, they should be viewed critically: as UNHCR has 
consistently held, credibility assessment is sufficiently complex as to be inappropriate for 
consideration in expedited procedures.657 Also according to UNHCR, it is inappropriate to 
question the credibility of the applicant through expedited procedures. Other sides have also 
criticized the provision due to the substantial risk carried in accelerated or prioritized 
procedures for inaccurate assessments in certain circumstances.658 
 
It can be summarized that, while the Procedures Directive’s provisions relevant for the SCO 
procedure on non-EU MSs are permissive articles, they are susceptible to having unsafe 
countries on the list because the definition of “safety” is deficient. While the text remains 
ambiguous on the standard of proof, the provision on the demanded level of burden of proof 
can be easily read as placing the burden of proof on the applicant and hence includes a textual 
dangerous tendency. 
 
                                                
655 “[T]he Committee considers that complete accuracy is seldom to be expected by victims of torture, especially when the 
victim suffers from post-traumatic stress syndrome; it also notes that the principle of strict accuracy does not necessarily 
apply when the inconsistencies are of a material nature.”, Haydin v Sweden, 01/1997, 16 Dec 1998, para 6.7, Tala v Sweden, 
43/1996, 15 Nov 1996, para. 10.3; Alan v Switzerland, 21/1995, 21 Jan 1995, para. 11.3. 
656 Byrne 82, referring as example in fn 36 to Immigration and Refugee Board (Canada) Refugee Protection Division, 
Assessment of Credibility in Claims for Protection, June 28 2002; Immigration Officer Academy (USA), Asylum Officer 
Basic Training course, 6 Dec 2002, Chapter IV-V. 
657 Byrne 81-2. 
658 Panezi 506-7. 
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2. Non-EU safe third countries 
 
Criticism will be voiced on the provisions regarding gravity (a) and exigencies on the 
removing state’s asylum procedure (b). 
 
a. Gravity 
 
The provisions on gravity lack a comprehensive definition of “safety” (aa), and do not clarify 
the circumstances in which rebuttal of the safety presumption is to be granted (bb). 
 
aa. Deficient definition of “safety” 
 
As Art 36 (3) PD requiring the adoption of a common list by the Council was annulled by the 
ECJ, the relevant provision is Art 27 PD at the time of writing. Regarding the determination 
of safety, Art 27 (2) (c) PD foresees that national legislation shall permit the applicant to 
challenge the presumption of safety on the ground that he would be subject to torture, cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. However, the provision does not ensure the 
possibility to rebut the presumption on the basis of a fear of persecution on 1951 Convention 
grounds, and other individual risks which would found an entitlement to protection such as, 
for instance, the fact that the third state would apply more restrictive criteria in determining 
the claimant’s status than the State where the application has been presented or the fact that 
the third state would not assess whether there is a serious and individual threat to a civilian’s 
life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal 
armed conflict.659  
The minimalism of the PD suggests it was deliberately drawn up to allow as many States as 
possible to be deemed safe third countries rather than giving the safety of the applicant for 
refugee status the higher priority. UNHCR anticipated these concerns and recommended that 
”any Member State which provides for the national designation of countries considered to be 
generally safe should have a clear, transparent and accountable process for such national 
designation”.660  
 
 
 
                                                
659 UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, 301.  
660 UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, 16. 
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bb. No clarification of possibility to rebut safety presumption 
 
Also on the examination of safety of the third country, the Procedures Directive is notably 
vague. However, the PD does not explicitly permit the applicant to challenge the application 
of the STC concept on the ground that the criteria stated in Art 27 (2) (a) PD are not fulfilled 
and it would not be reasonable for him to go to the third country. 661 
 
b. Exigencies on the removing state’s asylum procedure: Possibility to omit the 
individual interview  
 
An interview of the applicant would let the applicant put into practice his right pursuant to Art 
27 (c) PD to raise grounds to challenge the application of the concept.662 However, Art 12 (2) 
(c), together with Art 23 (4) (c) (ii) PD, permits the EU MSs to omit the personal interview on 
the grounds that the determining authority considers that there is a safe third country for the 
applicant. In addition, Art 36 (1), (4) and (5) PD allows EU MS to deny access to the 
procedure to all asylum-seekers who arrive “illegally” from the nationally designated third 
countries:663 
 
“1. Member States may provide that no, or no full, examination of the asylum application and of the 
safety of the applicant in his/her particular circumstances as described in Chapter II, shall take place in 
cases where a competent authority has established, on the basis of the facts, that the applicant for 
asylum is seeking to enter or has entered illegally into its territory from a safe third country according 
to paragraph 2. [...] 
4. The Member States concerned shall lay down in national law the modalities for implementing the 
provisions of paragraph 1 and the consequences of decisions pursuant to those provisions in 
accordance with the principle of non-refoulement under the Geneva Convention, including providing 
for exceptions from the application of this Art for humanitarian or political reasons or for reasons of 
public international law. 
5. When implementing a decision solely based on this Article, the Member States concerned shall: 
(a) inform the applicant accordingly; and 
(b) provide him/her with a document informing the authorities of the third country, in the language of 
that country, that the application has not been examined in substance.”664 
 
                                                
661 UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, 302  
662 UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, 317. 
663 Art 36 (6) PD. 
664 Emphasis added. 
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If applied, UNHCR predicted that the provisions’ "sweeping exemption" from individual 
process would send people back to countries that "might nonetheless not be safe for particular 
individuals".665 On Art 36 PD concretely, the Standing Committee of Experts on International 
Immigration, Refugee and Criminal Law observed that, in allowing Member States to expel 
applicants without any prior examination, the Directive does not secure compliance with Art 3 
ECHR.666 
 
It can be summarized that, while the Procedures Directive’s provisions relevant for the STC 
procedure on non-EU MSs are permissive articles, they are, regarding gravity susceptible to 
having unsafe countries on the list as the definition of “safety” is deficient. Further, the 
provisions do not clearly establish the possibility to rebut the safety presumption for the case 
of Art 27 (2) (a) PD. On the procedural exigency of an individual interview, it must be 
criticized that the PD allows for its omission. 
 
 
B. EU-legislation’s mandatory provisions: EU MSs as SCOs: Denial of 
rebuttal of safety presumption: Discrimination 
 
The Spanish Protocol leaves no flexibility to the sending EU MSs. By its declaratory 
definition, EU MSs are stated to be safe countries of origin. Furthermore, no examination of 
the presumed safety is foreseen: The safety assumption is absolute. 
 
It must be highlighted that the Spanish Protocol is a unique instrument within the framework 
of European integration, as it places by the denial of rebuttal of safety presumption the 
citizens of the EU MSs in a less favourable position than citizens of third countries to whom 
only the Qualifications Directive applies. By establishing this geographical limitation, EU 
MSs have obliged themselves to in principle exclude EU nationals from their asylum 
procedure without granting the individual applicant any opportunity to demonstrate 
persecution in his particular case.667 This exclusion of EU nationals is quite ironic in view of 
the historical development of the refugee system: the GRC itself provided for an opt-out 
provision, whereby States could limit the scope of application of the Convention to refugees 
                                                
665 UNHCR, ‘Note on key issues of concern to UNHCR on the draft Asylum Procedures Directive’, available at 
http://www.ecre.org/press/UNHCR_concern_directive.pdf [hereinafter Asylum Procedures Directive]. 
666 Statewatch Observatory 2005, available at http://www.statewatch.org/asylum/obserasy-lum.htm. 
667 Bank, Roland, ‘The Emergent EU Policy on Asylum and Refugees’ (1999) 68 Nordic Journal of International Law 1 26. 
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from Europe;668 it is only with the New York Protocol that this geographical limitation was 
phased out.669 Boutillon’s suggested as solution for this textual discrimination: “the reason for 
the exclusion may find its root, not in the political assumption that the E.U. cannot generate 
refugees, but rather in the basic principle of freedom of movement within the E.U. Because 
most of the E.U. is a unified zone for the movement of persons and goods, a potential refugee 
from one E.U. country may freely move and re-establish in another country of the Union”.670 
This suggestion is not acceptable as it contradicts common knowledge that, in practice, the 
free movement within the EU is conditioned and hence possibly inhibited by the bureaucratic 
and financial efforts it involves. 
 
Therefore, the fact that EU nationals are excluded from the outset from the remit of the GRC 
is a discrimination that amounts to a violation of Art 3 GRC. Also UNHCR opposes the SCO 
notion in such cases in which its application a priori precludes a whole group of asylum-
seekers from access to an eligibility procedure. Such notion is not only be inconsistent with 
Art 3 GRC, but also: 
 
“(a) be a reservation to Art 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and thus violate Art 42 which prohibits 
such reservations; 
(b) introduce a new geographical limitation to the 1951 Convention, incompatible with the 
universal intent of the 1967 New York Protocol;  
…  
(d) be inconsistent with the individual nature of refugee status determination under Art 1 of the 
1951 Convention; and 
(e) be likely to result in refoulement, a violation of Art 33 of the Convention.”671 
 
As this geographical limitation in question affects nations as a whole, the denial of status 
constitutes a geographic limitation on Art 1 GRC in violation of Art 42 GRC.672 The 
limitation raises also claims of discriminatory treatment prohibited by human rights 
provisions as Art 26 ICCPR and Art 14 ECHR as being discrimination on the grounds of 
nationality.673 
 
 
                                                
668 Art 1B(1)(a) GRC. 
669 Art 1(3) GRC. 
670 Boutillon 140. 
671 UNHCR, ‘Background Note on the Safe Country Concept and Refugee Status’, 26 July 1991, EC/SCP/68, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae68ccec.html [accessed 13 June 2011] 
672 Ibidem. 
673 Bank 1; for a separate analysis, see Noll, Negotiating Asylum, chapter 12.3; Gilbert, Is Europe Living Up, 975. 
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Attachments 
 
Abstract 
 
The intent of this thesis is to analyze the compatibility of the EU’s legislation on “safe 
country” concepts with the principle of non-refoulement. Chapter I presents the two anti-
poles: the EU’s legislation on the “safe country of origin” (SCO) and “safe third country” 
(STC) concepts and the principle of non-refoulement as reflected in Art 33 GRC, Art 3 ECHR 
and Art 3 CAT- having acquired the status of ius cogens. Chapter II gives insight into the 
worrying reality: it is asylum officers with an often prejudiced approach towards the asylum-
seeker and/or biased sources at hand who determine the need for refugee and refoulement 
protection with the legal possibilities of the “safe country” concepts. However, while a 
presumably safe country can in realiter be precarious due to the living or detention conditions 
awaiting the asylum-seeker there, a declared STC can, because of deficiencies of its asylum 
procedure, pose the risk of chain-refoulement.  
Chapter III presents the “direct balancing approach” and the “complicity principle” as the 
framework for the further discussion. The “direct balancing approach” encompasses two 
steps: The first step of abstract balancing for the search for non-refoulement properties in an 
ECHR right regards the question of its applicability, hence the gravity of the risked violation. 
The second step of individual balancing brings in two important limitations taking into 
account the State’s possibilities: the probability of the risk and its predictability, concerning 
the standard of proof and burden of proof. On the discussion of their level, Legomsky’s 
“complicity principle”. It defends a “variable standard of proof”: The question on the 
necessary probability of risk can only be answered in a relative manner, because 
proportionality must persist between the predictability and the gravity of the respective 
anticipated violation.  
In Chapter IV, positive obligations regarding the removing State’s single procedure on asylum 
and refoulement are developed by analyzing the ECtHR’s relevant jurisdiction. As to absolute 
balancing on gravity, the author defends that factors of gravity under Art 3 ECHR alone are, 
first, the lack of availability of an effective remedy and suspensive effect of proceedings 
against a removal decision in the receiving third State and, second, the lack of a certain 
quality of the third State’s single procedure, having in the respective case as result a more 
restrictive protection scope than foreseen by the universal refugee definition.  
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As positive procedural obligation, it is developed that, upon an application for asylum, the 
removing State can refuse to examine the merits of the claim on the assumption that a specific 
State, whether it be a STC or a SCO, is prima facie safe only if the applicant is given the 
opportunity to rebut the safety presumption, i.e. present counter evidence to the effect that the 
state is not safe. 
The circumstances under which rebuttal should be allowed consider the question of standard 
and burden of proof, a most crucial issue that was discussed in the step of individual 
balancing. As to standard of proof, in assessing the risk of direct refoulement due to the 
factual conditions in the receiving state amounting to persecution the analysis of the Court’s 
jurisprudence demonstrated that it has developed the same standard of proof for the well-
founded fear of persecution within the meaning of Art 1 (A) GRC as for the claim to be 
exposed to refoulement in case of removal.  
In assessing the risk of indirect refoulement via a presumably STC, the reduction of the 
Court’s analysis to the existence of an “arguable claim” on the first step on persecution in the 
final State is seen as a positive development, also its execution doing justice to the prerogative 
of a low demand on standard of proof: documentation easily accessible for the applicant and 
general reports of international organizations and NGOs fulfill the Court’s demands on the 
standard of proof. As to the successive assessment of the risk for the claimant of chain-
refoulement via the third State, the author welcomed that in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, the 
ECtHR found statistical evidence on extremely low rate of asylum or subsidiary protection 
and reports by international organizations, NGOs and state organizations strong enough to 
rebut the safety presumption.  
Regarding the burden of proof, an analysis of the Court’s jurisprudence lets us conclude that it has itself 
reinforced the argument that the ECHR can and must be interpreted as primarily demanding the State to provide 
the relevant available facts of the respective case.  
The following positive procedural obligations deriving from Art 3 ECHR for the removing 
State’s single procedure on asylum and refoulement were developed in this step of individual 
balancing: First, the risk of refoulement is to be assessed, also in the case of an existing safety 
presumption, with a standard of proof that is considerably low, i.e. being fulfilled by general 
information by reports or statistical data. Second, also the burden of proof on the side of the 
applicant is to be kept considerably low, i.e. limited to his background and personal 
experiences that purportedly give rise to his fear of refoulement; also in the case of an existing 
safety presumption, the burden of proof must not go beyond providing general information by 
statistics on recognition rates and reports on the general circumstances that raise suspicion per 
se in terms of the fairness of the procedure in the presumably safe State. Third, a serious 
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assessment necessitates an individual interview. Finally, the single procedure has to attain a 
certain quality, circumscribed by “rigorous scrutiny” and encompassing accuracy, fairness 
and consistency. 
In Chapter V, it is concluded that, until the time of equivalent protection- which naturally 
endorses interpretations of protective instruments which do not fall short of an international 
interpretation- in the removing and the “safe” State, the EU MSs as parties to the ECHR have 
the obligation vis-à-vis the asylum-seekers either to apply the EU’s safe country concepts not 
at all or to apply them in implementing the positive obligations developed in this thesis. While 
permissive provisions of EU legislation allow for such approach, the Spanish Protocol leaves 
no flexibility to the sending EU MSs and places by the denial of rebuttal of safety 
presumption the citizens of the EU MSs in a less favourable position than citizens of third 
countries. Such legislation amounts to a discrimination and a violation of Art 3 GRC. 
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Das Ziel dieser Dissertation ist es, die Vereinbarkeit der durch EU-Gesetzgebung 
eingeführten Konzepte der “sicheren Staaten” mit dem Prinzip des Non-refoulement zu 
analysieren. Das erste Kapitel präsentiert die beiden Antipoden: die EU-Gesetzgebung zum 
“sicheren Herkunftsland” und zum “sicheren Drittstaat” als auch das Prinzip der Non-
refoulement nach Art 33 der Genfer Flüchtlingskonvention (GFK), Art 3 der Europäischen 
Menschenrechtskonvention (EMRK) und Art 3 der UNO-Konvention gegen die Folter. Das 
zweite Kapitel gibt Einblick in die besorgniserregende Realität innerhalb der EU dass oft 
Beamte mit einer- besonders im Rahmen dieser beschleunigten Verfahren- 
voreingenommenen Haltung gegenüber Asylwerbern und/oder einseitigen Quellen zur 
Entscheidungsfindung sind, die- außer in Irland- in einem zusammengelegten Verfahren über 
die Gewährung von Asyl und Schutz vor Refoulement entscheiden. Die “sicheren Staaten” 
sind jedoch entweder wegen der dortigen Lebens- oder Haftbedingungen oder- im Falle der 
“sicheren Drittstaaten”- aufgrund der Unzulänglichkeit der Asyl- und Refoulement-Verfahren 
derart prekär, dass Gefahr von Refoulement besteht.  
Das dritte Kapitel präsentiert den “direct balancing approach” und das “complicity principle” 
als Analysemethode für die weitere Diskussion. Der “direct balancing approach” umfasst 
zwei Schritte: Der erste des abstrakten Abwägens betrifft die Frage der Umstände, die als 
Verletzung von Art 3 EMRK zu werten sind, d.h. die notwendige Schwere der Verletzung. 
Der zweite Schritt des individuellen Abwägens bringt zwei wichtige Limitierungen ins Spiel: 
the Wahrscheinlichkeit des Risiko und seine Vorhersehbarkeit, d.h. den Beweisstandard und 
die Beweislast. Der Frage ihres Ausmaßes nähert sich die Dissertation mit Legomsky’s 
“complicity principle”, der einen “variablen Beweisstandard” einführt: Die Frage nach dem 
notwendigen Ausmaß an Wahrscheinlichkeit des Risikoeintritts kann nur relativ beantwortet 
werden, weil Verhältnismäßigkiet zwischen Vorhersehbarkeit und Schwere der Verletzung 
bestehen muss.  
Im vierten Kapitel werden anhand der vorgestellten Analysemethoden für die Diskussion über 
den Schutz vor Refoulement durch die EMRK positive Verpflichtungen für das 
Abschiebeverfahren herausgearbeitet. Hinsichtlich des abstrakten Abwägens verteidigt die 
Autorin den Standpunkt, dass auch als Verletzung von Art 3 EMRK von relevanter Schwere 
anzusehen ist, wenn es im “sicheren Drittland” im erstinstanzlichen Verfahren an Qualität und 
in der Folge der GFK entsprechenden Gewährung von Asyl oder im Rechtmittelverfahren an 
effizienten Rechtsmitteln oder einer aufschiebenden Wirkung mangelt. Als positive 
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Verpflichtung für das Verfahren des abschiebenden Staates ergibt sich, dass ein Staat die 
inhaltliche Prüfung eines Asylantrages in der Annahme der Abschiebung des Antragstellers in 
ein “sicheres Land” nur verweigern kann, wenn dem Asylwerber im Rahmen dieses 
beschleunigten Verfahrens  die Möglichkeit eingeräumt wird, diese Annahme zu widerlegen. 
Die Umstände, unter denen diese Widerlegung ermöcht wird, betreffen die Fragen von 
Beweisstandard und Beweislast und damit den zweiten Schritt der individuellen Abwägung. 
Bezüglich des Beweisstandards ergibt die Analyse der Rechtsprechung des EGMR, dass der 
Gerichtshof bei der Risikoeinschätzung des direkten Refoulements aufgrund der faktischen 
Umstände von Verfolgung im Aufnahmeland denselben Beweisstandard für die 
wohlbegründete Angst vor Verfolgung iSv Art 1 (A) GFK setzt wie für das Risiko des 
Refoulement im Falle der Abschiebung. Bei der Risikoeinschätzung des indirekten 
Refoulements über ein angeblich sicheres Drittland wird die Reduktion der Analyse des 
EGMR auf die Existenz eines “arguable claim” über den ersten Schritt der Verfolgung im 
Zielland als positive Entwicklung gesehen, die auch der Anforderung des “variablen 
Beweisstandard” eines niedrigen Beweisstandard gerecht wird: für den Antragsteller leicht 
zugängliche Dokumentation und generelle Berichte internationaler Organisationen und NGOs 
erfüllen den geforderten Beweisstandard. Auch beim zweiten Schritt der Risikoeinschätzung 
des Ketten-Refoulements aufgrund der den Antragsteller erwartenden Verfahren im angeblich 
sicheren Drittland fand der EGMR in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece statistische Daten über 
eine extrem niedrige Anerkennungsrate bei Asyl oder subsidiärem Schutz und Berichte 
internationaler Organisationen und NGOs ausreichenden Beweis zur Widerlegung der 
Annahme der Sicherheit des Drittlandes.  
Bezüglich der Beweislast ergibt die Analyse der Rechtsprechung des EGMR, dass er dahingehend verstanden 
werden kann und muss, primär den ausweisenden Staat zu verpflichten, die für den entsprechenden Fall 
relevante Umstände zu erheben.  
Aus dem zweiten Schritt der individuellen Abwägung ergeben sich folgende positive 
Verpflichtungen für das Verfahren des abschiebenden Staates: Erstens ist, auch im Falle der 
Annahme der Sicherheit eines Landes, für die Risikoeinschätzung der Beweisstandard niedrig 
zu halten, d.h. durch allgemeine Informationen durch Berichte oder statistische Daten erfüllt 
zu sehen. Zweitens ist aufseiten des Antragstellers auch die Beweislast niedrig zu halten, d.h. 
auf seinen Hintergrund und persönlichen Erfahrungen, die seine Angst vor Refoulement 
begründen, zu reduzieren; auch im Falle der Annahme der Sicherheit eines Drittlandes darf 
die Beweislast nicht über die Zuverfügungstellung genereller Informationen über Statistik von 
Anerkennungsraten und Berichte über die allgemeinen Umstände, die per se Verdacht über 
die Fairness des Verfahrens erwecken, hinausgehen. Drittens bedarf eine seriöse 
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Risikoeinschätzung eines individuellen Interviews. Schließlich muss das Abschiebverfahren 
eine gewisse Qualität aufweisen, die mit “rigorous scrutiny” umschrieben wird und Sorgfalt, 
Fairness und Folgerichtigkeit umfasst. 
Im fünften Kapitel wird zusammengefasst dass bis zu der Zeit eines einheitlichen Schutzes im 
ausweisenden und im „sicheren“ Land die EU-Mitgliedsstaaaten aufgrund der EMRK 
verpflichtet sind, die Konzepte der “sicheren Staaten” nicht oder unter Erfüllung der in dieser 
Arbeit entwickelten positiven Verpflichtungen anzuwenden.  
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